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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
John F. Post Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing from Below
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David Papineau's model of scientific reduction, contrary to his intent, appears to enable a naturalist realist account of the primitive normativity involved in a biological adaptation's being "for" this or that (say the eye's being for seeing). By disabling the crucial anti-naturalist arguments against any such reduction, his model would support a cognitivist semantics for normative claims like "The heart is for pumping blood, and defective if it doesn't." No moral claim would follow, certainly. Nonetheless, by thus "pressing from below" we may learn something about moral normativity. For instance, suppose non-cognitivists like Mackie are right that the semantics of normative claims should be "unified": if the semantics of moral claims is non-cognitivist, so too is that of all normative claims. Then, assuming that a naturalist reduction does yield a sound cognitivist account of the primitive normativity, it would follow that our semantics of moral claims is cognitivist as well.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Turner Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?
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Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pre theoretical intuitions. we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is infact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
William Child Memory, Expression, and Past-Tense Self-Knowledge
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How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primary thing"? The epistemology and metaphysics of past-tense self-ascription are examined in the light of those comments, and our acquisition of the concept of past attitudes is discussed. Third, does Wittgenstein give us reason to think that the identity of a past attitude may be constituted,not by anything that was true of the subject at the time, but by her retrospective tendency to self-ascribe it? It is argued that, contrary to some interpretations, he does not.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Jennifer Lackey Learning from Words
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Scott Campbell The Potential Information Analysis of Seeing
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I argue for a version of the causal analysis of seeing which I call the 'potential information' analysis. I proceed initially by considering some standard causal analyses, those of Tye and Jackson. I show that these analyses are too weak, for they allow cases of hallucination to count as seeing. I argue that what is central to seeing is that our visual experiences provide a means of gaining true beliefs about objects. This, however, does not mean that we must actually gain true beliefs about objects in any particular case. Rather, what must be the case is that a perceiver of our sort could gain true beliefs about objects on the basis of experiences like ours. I defend this analysis against various objections, making important qualifications to it as I do so.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Eduardo Rivera-López Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions?
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Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the "Dependence Claim": A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be excused: duress, mental illness, and mistake. I try to show that the reasons for excusing in either case are not relevantly distinguishable from the reasons for claiming that the prima facie wrong action is not wrong all things considered.
symposia
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Lucy Allais Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant
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This paper argues that there is an important respect in which Rae Langton's recent interpretation of Kant is correct: Kant's claim that we cannot know things in themselves should be understood as the claim that we cannot know the intrinsic nature of things. However, I dispute Langton's account of intrinsic properties, and therefore her version of what this claim amounts to. Langton's distinction between intrinsic, causally inert properties and causal powers is problematic, both as an interpretation of Kant, and as an independent metaphysical position. I propose a different reading of the claim that we cannot know things intrinsically. I distinguish between two ways of knowing things: in terms of their effects on other things, and as they are apart from these. I argue that knowing things' powers is knowing things in terms of effects on other things, and therefore is not knowing them as they are in themselves, and that there are textual grounds for attributing this position to Kant.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Rae Langton Kant’s Phenomena: Extrinsic or Relational Properties? A Reply to Allais
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Baron Reed Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense
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Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects don't have such doubts, so epistemically circular beliefs are rarely called upon to play this role. Second, following Thomas Reid, Bergmann argues that we have noninferential, though epistemically circular, knowledge that our faculties are reliable. I argue, however, that Bergmann's view is undermined by doubts a subject should have and that there is no plausible explanation for how we can have noninferential knowledge that our faculties are reliable.
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Michael Bergmann Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed
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book symposium
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Stephen Schiffer Précis of The Things We Mean
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Thomas Hofweber Schiffer’s New Theory of Propositions
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
John Macfarlane The Things We (Sorta Kinda) Believe
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Crispin Wright Vagueness-related Partial Belief and the Constitution of Borderline Cases
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Stephen Schiffer Replies
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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