This paper explores the role that willing plays in Fichte’s transcendental idealism, as set out in the nova methodo lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre and elsewhere. I first consider the link between the idea of the self-positing I and freedom, as well as the bifurcation of the I into cognition and volition. I then pinpoint the significance of intellectual intuition as part of Fichte’s strategy of substantiating the actuality of freedom via practical reason, especially in relation to the way in which our capacity for self-determination conditions our knowledge-claims about nature. Finally I indicate that the will is essential for intuitional experience, which entails the ability to distinguish pure willing from empirical willing. In this context, I argue that, for Fichte, willing is constitutive of the possibility of consciousnessin general, and the possibility of determinate knowledge in particular.

This essay attempts to provide detailed evidence for Charles Taylor’s claim that both Hegel and Merleau-Ponty follow Kant’s refutation of idealism in an effort to take a stand against Modernism’s claim that human knowledge of the world is reducible to a conceptual representation of it. For both the Hegel of Phenomenology of Mind and Merleau-Ponty throughout his career, human consciousness and knowledge must embrace and make sense of a world that is always already there. This stand will be made against Postmodernism as well.

The focus of this paper is the experience of vocational call and, in particular, three of its aspects: the source of the call, the form of the call, and the content of the call. It begins with a short reflection on Biblical accounts of vocation and then briefly contrasts that picture with the contemporary understanding of vocation as it is reflected in the thinking of Dewey, Weber, and Heidegger. It then explores Pope John Paul II’s creative retrieval of the original understanding of vocation for our contemporary context by restoring the meaning of vocational call as having a divine source and dialogical form. The paper concludes with a reflection on the content of vocational call in the lives of individuals as they work out their vocations within the context of their particular communities.

This paper describes and evaluates two different ways of doing philosophy: a “reflexive” approach that sees metaphilosophical inquiry as fundamental, and a “nonreflexive” approach that sees metaphilosophy as dispensable. It examines arguments that have been advanced for these approaches by Gilbert Ryle, Jerry Fodor, and Richard Rorty, and claims that none of these arguments are convincing. Finally, the paper draws on Alasdair MacIntyre’s work to propose a different way of choosing between the approaches, one that asks which approach is more successful at making its appeal intelligible to the other. From this perspective, the reflexive approach appears to have an important advantage over its rival.

The paper considers whether virtue ethics should be regarded as excluding duty ethics or any of its essential elements. The argument suggested here consists of two steps: (1) an argument that there are two different versions of virtue ethics (moderate and strong) and that moderate virtue ethics does not exclude the duty ethics; (2) an analysis of various difficulties with the strong version of virtue ethics, which shows that moderate virtue ethics is more plausible because of its capacity to avoid these difficulties. This capacity makes moderate virtue ethics more attractive as an ethical theory because it covers the entire range of moral phenomena described both by strong versions of virtue ethics and by duty ethics without the attendant difficulties.

Malebranche’s characterization of the human condition appears to generate a problem. While his metaphysics and his conception of man and man’s place in nature appear to preclude the possibility that we could ever be responsible for anything—much less for our passions—he insists that we are. Consequently, many commentators (both past and present) have argued that Malebranche is committed to an untenable, if not inconsistent, position. In this paper I argue that careful consideration of Malebranche’s account of the passions and the various means, methods, and strategies one might employ in order to control them reveals that these charges—charges that might well be justified with respect to contemporary pre-theoretical views of the emotions—are mistaken.