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1. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Craig Hazen Editor’s Introduction
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articles
2. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Vince Vitale Non-Identity Theodicy
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I develop a theodicy (Non-Identity Theodicy) that begins with the recognition that we owe our existence to great and varied evils. I develop two versions of this theodicy, with the result that some version is available to the theist regardless of her assumptions about the existence and nature of free will. My defense of Non-Identity Theodicy is aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. I argue that if one affirms the morality of voluntary human procreation, one should affirm the morality of divine creation; conversely, denying the morality of divine creation commits one to denying the morality of human procreation.
3. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Justin J. Daeley Creatio Ex Nihilo: A Solution to the Problem of the Necessity of Creation and Divine Aseity
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A number of theologians have propounded what we will call proposition (P): If God creates from an internal necessity, then God cannot have aseity (i.e., be from himself ). According to (P), there is inconsistency between divine aseity and the idea that God creates from an internal necessity. In this article, however, I develop an argument for the consistency of divine aseity and the idea that God creates from an internal necessity, thus claiming that proposition (P) is false. The argument is founded upon the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo along with two operative principles implied by this doctrine.
4. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Michael D. Bertrand, Jack Mulder, Jr Why Christians Should Not Be Kaneans about Freedom
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In this paper we argue that Robert Kane’s theory of free will cannot accommodate the possibility of a sinless individual who faces morally significant choices because a sinless agent cannot voluntarily accord value to an immoral desire, and we argue that Kane’s theory requires this. Since the Jesus of the historic Christian tradition is held to be sinless, we think Christians should reject Kane’s theory because it seems irreconcilable with historic Christian Christology. We consider two objections to our argument and argue that both fail.
5. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
R. Scott Smith Craig, Anti-Platonism, and Objective Morality
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Though William Lane Craig believes his anti-Platonism is compatible with objective, Christian morality, I argue that it is not. First, I survey the main contours of his nominalism. Second, I discuss how he sees those points in relation to objective, Christian morality. Then, I argue that his view cannot sustain the qualitative aspects of moral virtues or principles, or even human beings. Moreover, Craig’s view loses any connection between those morals and humans, thereby doing great violence to objective, Christian morals. Finally, I sketch two advantages of a Platonic realism in regards to Christian morals.
6. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Matthew Flannagan Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A Reply to Erik Wielenberg
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In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defenses of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that (I) the divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers; (II) Godless normative robust realism (GRNR) can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis; and (III) GRNR provides a better account of intrinsic value. In this paper, I will argue Wielenberg’s defenses of the autonomy thesis fails. I will argue that his objection to divine command theories fails, that he fails to address two standard challenges to the autonomy thesis adequately, and, finally, that Wielenberg fails to show that GRNR better accounts for the intuition that certain things are intrinsically good than various forms of theistic alternatives.
7. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Tapio Puolimatka How Wolterstorff’s Defense of Same-Sex Marriage Violates His Theory of Justice: Philosophical Note on Wolterstorff’s Argument for Same-Sex Marriage
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According to Nicholas Wolterstorff’s analysis, the biblical view of justice defends the inherent natural rights of the most vulnerable minorities. As homosexuals are such a vulnerable minority, he argues that church and state ought to recognize same-sex marriage. My aim is to critique Wolterstorff’s argument for failing to apply his own theory and to acknowledge the natural rights of children, who are the most vulnerable persons involved. By ignoring the natural law emphasis on the natural structures of marriage, such as gender complementarity, he ends up undermining children’s natural right to know and be reared by their biological parents.
8. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Brandon Rickabaugh, Todd Buras The Argument from Reason, and Mental Causal Drainage: A Reply to Peter van Inwagen
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According to Peter van Inwagen, C. S. Lewis failed in his attempt to undermine naturalism with his argument from reason. According to van Inwagen, Lewis provides no justification for his central premise, that naturalism is inconsistent with holding beliefs for reasons. What is worse, van Inwagen argues that the main premise in Lewis’s argument from reason is false. We argue that it is not false. The defender of Lewis’s argument can make use of the problem of mental causal drainage, a long-standing issue in philosophy of mind, to show how van Inwagen’s objection fails.
9. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
John M. DePoe Berkeleyan Idealism, Christianity, and the Problem of Evil
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In response to the recent resurgence of idealism among a cluster of Christian theologians and philosophers, this article raises a difficulty for Christians to be idealists. Unlike traditional accounts of Christianity that must explain why God permits or allows evil, idealists face a different and more difficult problem—namely why does God willfully and directly produce experiences of evil. Because the metaphysics of idealism requires God to produce experiences of evil directly and willfully, it is difficult to reconcile it with the essential goodness of God. The existence of matter, therefore, may play an important role in maintaining God’s innocence while allowing creatures to exercise free will.
10. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
C. Stephen Evans How Reformation Christians Can Be Catholic (Small “c”) Christians
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A key sentence of the Nicene Creed: “We believe in one holy, catholic, and apostolic church.” This paper attempts to explain how a Protestant Christian can be part of the catholic church. What is essential to genuine or “mere” Christianity is adherence to the doctrines in the Nicene Creed. This account is consistent with a Protestant affirmation of “Scripture alone.” Scripture has the highest authority only when properly interpreted, but this requires that the Bible should be read in accord with the “rule of faith” summarized in the Nicene Creed.
philosophical notes
11. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
William Lane Craig Absolute Creationism and Divine Conceptualism: A Call for Conceptual Clarity
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The contemporary debate over God and abstract objects is hampered by a lack of conceptual clarity concerning two distinct metaphysical views: absolute creationism and divine conceptualism. This confusion goes back to the fount of the current debate, the article “Absolute Creation” by Thomas Morris and Christopher Menzel, who were not of one mind concerning God’s relation to abstract objects. Confusion has followed in their wake. Going forward, theistic philosophers need to distinguish more clearly between a sort of modified Platonism, according to which abstract objects depend ontologically on God, and a sort of divine psychologism, according to which objects typically thought to be abstract are, in fact, concrete mental entities of some sort.
12. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Robert Larmer Decretalism and the Laws of Nature: A Response to Jeffrey Koperski
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In his article, “Breaking Laws of Nature,” Jeffrey Koperski considers various attempts to give an account of the laws of nature. Following early modern natural philosophers, he opts for an account he terms “decretalism,” namely the view that laws are not created entities or powers that act as intermediaries between God and nature, but rather are best understood as God’s decrees. Koperski argues there are good reason for accepting his account and that it does not commit him to occasionalism. In response, I argue that the reasons he gives for accepting decretalism are unconvincing and that decretalism does in fact commit him to occasionalism.
13. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Donald T. Williams “Made for Another World”: C. S. Lewis’s Argument from Desire Revisited
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C. S. Lewis’s argument from desire is best understood as an argument to the best explanation. It has two weaknesses. First, it is not clear that everyone in fact has the experience it references. Second, even if it successfully points to the existence of some Desired Object not experienced in the finite temporal world, it cannot of itself show that this object is a god, much less the God of the Bible. Nevertheless, the argument does have value in confirming, for people who recognize themselves as having had the experience of sehnsucht, the more explicit conclusions reached by other arguments.
14. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Stephen T. Davis Cartesian Omnipotence
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Let’s call “Cartesian omnipotence” (CO) the view that an omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs at all, even logically impossible ones. The present paper explores what can be said in support of CO. It turns out that several powerful and interesting arguments can be given in its defense, although in the end, along with the vast majority of philosophers of religion, I reject it.
15. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
John Warwick Montgomery A Computable Universe?
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The very idea of a noncomputable universe creates considerable anxiety among not a few cosmologists and mathematical theorists. This brief paper offers some suggestions as to why noncomputability constitutes a threat to a certain philosophical mentality.
book reviews
16. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Paul M. Gould God over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism
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17. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
William Lane Craig Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism
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18. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Todd R. Long The God Relationship: The Ethics for Inquiry about the Divine
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19. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Andrew Tsz Wan Hung The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society
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20. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
News and Announcements
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