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seccion monografica
1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Francisco Rodríguez-Consuegra, Juan-José Acero-Fernández Presentation
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2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Andy Clark Word, Niche and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter More
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How does language (spoken or written) impact thought? One useful way to approach this important but elusive question may be to consider language itself as a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure. To take this perspective is to view language as a kind of self-constructed cognitive niche. These self-constructed cognitive niches play, I suggest, three distinct but deeply interlocking roles in human thought and reason. Working together, these three interlocking routines radically transform the human mind, and mark a genuine discontinuity in the space of anitnal minds.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Terrence W. Deacon Language as an Emergent Function: Some Radical Neurological and Evolutionary Implications
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Language is a spontaneously evolved emergent adaptation, not a formal computational system. Its structure does not derive from either innate or social instruction but rather self-organization and selection. Its quasi-universal features emerge from the interactions among semiotic constraints, neural processing limitations, and social transmission dynamics. The neurological processing of sentence structure is more analogous to embryonic differentiation than to algorithmic computation. The biological basis of this unprecedented adaptation is not located in some unique neurologieal structure nor the result of any single mutation, but is vested in the synergistic interaction of numerous coevolved neurological biases and social dynamics.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Christopher Gauker On the Evidence for Prelinguistic Concepts
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Language acquisition is often said to be a process of mapping words into pre-existing concepts. If that is right, then we ought to be able to obtain experimental evidence for the existence of concepts in prelinguistic children. One line of research that attempts to provide such evidence is the work of Paul Quinn, who claims that looking-time results show that four--month old infants form “category representations”. This paper argues that Quinn’s results have an alternative explanation. A distinction is drawn between conceptual thought and the perception of comparative similarity relations, and it is argued that Quinn’s results can be explained in terms of the latter rather than the former.
5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
John A. Lucy Through the Window of Language: Assessing the Influence of Language Diversity on Thought
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The way we understand language diversity, how languages differ in representing reality, affects our approach to understanding linguistic relativity, how that diversity affects thought. Historically, researchers divided over whether the diverse representations of reality across languages were natural or conventional, but all tacitly assumed an optimal fit between language and reality. Twenrieth century anthropological linguists interested in linguisric relativity have questioned this assumption and sought to characterize “reality” without it by using domain- or structure-centered approaches. Arguments are presented favoring structure-centered approaches, along with a case illustration. A concluding discussion emphasizes the broader significance of language diversity in human development.
6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, William M. Fields, Pär Segerdahl, Duane Rumbaugh Culture Prefigures Cognition in Pan/Homo Bonobos
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This article questions traditional experimental approaches to the study of primate cognition. Beecuse of a widespread assumption that cognition in non-human primates is genetically encoded and “natural,” these approaches neglect how profoundly apes’ cultural rearing experiences affect test results. We deseribe how three advanced cognitive abilities - imitation, theory of mind and language - emerged in bonobos maturing in a bi-species Pan/Homo culture, and how individual rearing differences led to individual forms of these abilities. These descriptions are taken from a rich ethnographic material, and we argue for the scientific superiority of participant-based ethnographic studies of primate cognition in shared Pan/Homo cultures.
7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Stuart G. Shanker, Stanley I. Greenspan The Role of Affect in Language Development
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This paper presents the Functional/Emotional approach to language development, which explains the process leading up to the core capacities necessary for language (e.g., pattern-recognition, joint attention); shows how this process leads to the formation of internal symbols; and how it shapes and is shaped by the child’s development of language. The heart of this approach is that, through a series of affective transformations, a child develops these core capacities and the capacity to form meaningful symbols. Far from being a sudden jump, the transition from pre-symbolic communication to language is enabled by the advances taking place in the child’s affective gesturing.
articulos
8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Charles Sayward Steiner versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical Truth
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Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
sumario
9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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sumario analitico / summary
10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Sumario Analitico / Summary
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sumario
11. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO DEL VOL. 20/ CONTENTS OF VOL. 20
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sumario del vol. 19 / contents of vol. 19
12. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Sumario del Vol. 19 / Contents of Vol. 19
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13. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Sumario del Vol. 19 / Contents of Vol. 19
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14. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Sumario del Vol. 19 / Contents of Vol. 19
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15. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Indice de Autores / Author Index
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articulos
16. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Antonio Beltrán Marí El “caso Galileo”, sin final previsible (The “Galileo’s case”, no end in sight)
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La Iglesia ha dado por zanjado el caso Galileo en más de una ocasion. No obstante, la polémica ha continuado. Aquí se argumenta que las distintas iniciativas de la Iglesia respecto al caso Galileo -la revision de la condena dei copernicanismo a partir de 1820; la utilización de los documentos dei dossier inquisitorial de Galileo a partir de 1850 y la polémica suscitada; el caso Paschini (1942-1965); y las conclusiones de Juan Pablo II en 1992-1993- ponen de manifiesto la misma actitud de la Iglesia y la persistencia de los intereses básicos de partida, que hacen muy improbable que el “caso de Galileo”, al margen de los problemas genuinamente históricos, pueda cerrarse.Althoght the Catholic Church has setlled “Galileo’s case” several times, the controverse goes on. I argue that Church’s initatives on this matter -the revision of the condenmation of copernicanism from 1820; the use of documents coming from Galileo’s inquisitorial dossier from 1850 on and the controversy raised by this use; Paschini case (1942-1965); and the conclusions drawn by pope John Paul II in 1992-1993- make evident the identical actitude of the Church as well as the persistence of his basic interests, which make very unlikely that Galileo’s case, regardless of genuine historical problems, call be considered as closed.
17. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Eugenio Moya Epigénesisy validez - EI papel de la embriología en el programa transcendental de Kant (Epigenesis and validity - The role of the embriology in Kant’s transcendental program)
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Este artículo examina eI significado de los términos biológicos “epigénesis” y “preformación” en eI desarrollo imelectual de Kant, así como sus implicaciones epistemológicas. De hecho, las ideas de espontaneidad y sistema, centrales en la teoría kantiana de la mente, encontraron su analogía empírica en la idea de epigénesis de la naturaleza, una noción que Kant utiliza para dar respuesta a la cuestión de la genesis y validez de las represenraciones puras. Para el autor, la idea de epigénesis compendia la revolución copernicana de Kant en la medida en que aquélla ilustra el papel productivo del entendimiento humano en la constitución de la experiencia.This paper explores the meaning of the biological terms “epigenesis” and “preformation” in Kant’s intellectual development, as well as its epistemological implications. In fact, spontaneity and system, two central ideas in Kant’s theory of mind, found their empirical analogy in the idea of epigenesis in nature, a notion that Kant uses to give answer to the question of the genesis and validity of the pure representations. For the author, epigenesis summarizes Kant’s Copernican Revolution in the measure in which that idea illustrates tbe productive role of the human understanding in the constitution of experience.
18. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Claudia Lorena García Innatismo y Biología - Hacia un concepto biológico de lo innato (Innateness and Biology - Towards a biological concept of innateness)
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En el presente artículo examino algunas propuestas recientes que pretenden caracterizar una noción de lo innato coherente y teóricamente útil usando conceptos e ideas de la biología del desarrollo o de la biología evolucionista (o ambas), y argumento que la mayoría de elIas o bien padecen serios problemas conceptuales, o bien no pueden capturar de maneras biológicamente interesantes algunas de las connotaciones más importantes asociadas al termino ‘innato’ tal y como se usa en algunas disciplinas cognitivas de corte evolucionista. Asimismo, defiendo mi propia propuesta mostrando que no tiene los problemas que aquejan a las otras propuestas, y sí muchas de sus ventajas.Here l examine some recent proposals to characterize a notion of innateness having some theoretical usefulness and using some concepts and ideas from either developmental biology or evolutionary biology (or both), and argue that most of them either have serious conceptual problems, or else fail to capture in biologically interesting ways some of the important connotations associated to the term ‘innate’ as it is used in some cognitive disciplines of an evolutionary sort. I also make my own proposal, and show that it does not have the problems that the other proposals have, having many of their advantages.
19. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Gemma Robles, José M. Méndez Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A note
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Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are provided.
20. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Joan Pagès Truthmaking and Supervenience
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In his criticism of Armstrong’s argument against nominalism, Parsons (1999) makes a crucial use of a notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: (i) does not entail truthmaker essentialism, (ii) is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and (iii) is useful in Armstrong’s argument against Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons’ notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong supervenience fails in two respects: (i) it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and (ii) it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated.