Cover of Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
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1. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Sven Ove Hansson De-Marginalizing the Philosophy of Technology
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Five examples are given of major philosophical discussions in which technology needs to be taken into account. In the philosophy of science, the notion of mechanism has a central role. It has a technological origin, and its interpretation has links to technology. In the philosophy of mind, a series of technological analogues have had a deep influence on our understanding of human cognition: automata and watches, telegraphy and telephony, and most recently computers. The discussion on free will largely concerns, in Locke’s words, whether we can “put morality and mechanism together.” Notions of computation and automata that have been abstracted from the behavior of technological devices are key concepts both in logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. Finally, bioethics is largely concerned with the ethical issues that new technologies give rise to in healthcare. As these examples show, there is no lack of technology-related subject matter in philosophy, but there is a lack of sustained attention to it.
2. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Robert-Jan Geerts Self-Practices and the Experiential Gap: An Analysis of Moral Behavior around Electricity Consumption
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As a way to mitigate climate change, ways to reduce electricity consump­tion are being explored. I claim Briggle and Mitcham’s experiential gap offers a useful framework to understand the workings of our environment regarding this consumption. Via Foucauldian ethics, which holds people need to relate to their environment through ‘self practices’ in order to make moral choices, I argue that the complex and opaque electrical network makes it particularly difficult to consciously curb consumption. Efforts to make the network simpler and more transparent could enable engagement and ‘ethical consumption,’ but at the cost of decreased usability.
3. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Edwin Sayes From the Sacred to the Sacred Object: Girard, Serres, and Latour on the Ordering of the Human Collective
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The philosophy of Bruno Latour has given us one of the most important statements on the part played by technology in the ordering of the human collective. Typically presented as a radical departure from mainstream social thought, Latour is not without his intellectual creditors: Michel Serres and, through him, René Girard. By tracing this development, we are led to understand better the relationship of Latour’s work, and Actor-Network Theory more generally, to traditional sociological concerns. By doing so we can also hope to understand better the role that objects play in structuring society.
4. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Ivelin Sardamov From "Bio-Power" to "Neuropolitics": Stepping beyond Foucault
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According to Foucault, power in modern society is diffuse and pervasive, and works through the agency of free subjects. Its imperatives are internalized by indi­viduals who become self-disciplined, are tied to a particular identity, and govern their own behavior accordingly. Drawing on recent insights from neuroscience, the whole process of norm internalization can be seen as an expression of “neuropower” and a form of “neuropolitics” through which social and power relations become ingrained not just in human bodies and minds, but also in human brains. In recent decades, this process has been partly reversed as a result of the proliferation of information technologies and the electronic media.
5. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Andrés Vaccari Dissolving Nature: How Descartes Made Us Posthuman
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This paper is an enquiry into the philosophical fault-line that leads from mechanicism to posthumanism. I focus on a central aspect of posthumanism: the erosion of the distinction between organism and machine, nature and art, and the biological and engineering sciences. I claim that this shift can be placed in the seventeenth century, in Descartes’s biology. The Cartesian fusion of the natural and technological opened the door to distinctly posthuman understandings of the living body, its relation to technological extensions, and the possibility of its drastic alteration. Descartes’s mechanicism demanded a reconceptualization of bodily boundaries, organismic unity, natural finality, causation, and bio/technological instrumentality; all of which Descartes boldly theorized in terms of the wondrous technologies of his day. This radical proposal obscured the possibility of thinking the human as ontologically unique, or as having an ideal unity. This paper will examine the posthuman ramifications of these aspects of Descartes’s philosophy.
6. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Piotr Boltuc The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness
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I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views on consciousness that still predominate within cognitive science. If Nagel-Chalmers-Block-style non-reductive naturalism about first-person consciousness (h-consciousness) holds true, then, eventually we should be able to understand how such consciousness operates and how it gets produced (this is not the same as bridging the explanatory gap or solving Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness). If so, the consciousness it involves can in principle be engineered.