Though sometimes maligned, “trolleyology” offers an effective means of opening and framing, not only classes in ethics, but indeed any introductory philosophy course taking a broadly “puzzle-based” approach. When properly sequenced, a subset of the thought experiments that are trolleyology’s stock-in-trade can generate a series of puzzles illustrating the shortcomings of our untutored moral intuitions, and which thus motivate the very enterprise of moral theorizing. Students can be engaged in the attempt to resolve said puzzles, inasmuch as they’re accessible and compelling, and their resolutions generally easy to achieve. Once thus engaged, students can be directed to the fact that (perhaps unbeknownst to them) they had already rolled up their sleeves and begun “doing philosophy.” In this way, engagement with trolleyological puzzles can serve as a “microcosm” for philosophy more broadly, illustrating the processes of critical thinking that are likewise the stock-in-trade of philosophers across many different domains of inquiry.

I argue that instructor-graded participation assessments, which are one of the most popular ways to incentivize classroom participation, either fail to satisfactorily assess student participation or are open to issues of unconscious instructor bias. I then argue that a better way to assess participation is to use student self-assessments. Student-self assessments not only avoid these issues, but also have other added benefits like cultivating student self-reflection which is associated with academic gains. However, self-assessments pose new worries about under confidence biases and cultural differences for some students from diverse backgrounds. This is particularly worrisome since many students in these situations are already vulnerable to systemic biases. If there is a possibility that self-assessments might reinforce inequalities, great care needs to be taken in how they are designed and implemented. I then present a way to approach student self-assessment surveys and ways to frame classroom participation to help lessen the chance that these self-assessments will reinforce inequalities.

In a group exam, students first do an exam individually and then redo the same exam in small groups. Studies have shown that group exams provide a number of benefits, including improvements in performance, learning, motivation, and preparation, as well as a reduction in anxiety. However, little has been written on whether group exams are fair. This paper aims to discuss and reject three fairness concerns that arise from (i) improved performance, (ii) improved learning, and (iii) accessibility. It also discusses in detail the benefits of improved learning, arguing that they are the most valuable benefit which makes group exams particularly suitable for philosophy education.

In this paper we argue that the approach for teaching non-Western, and specifically Chinese philosophy to undergraduate Western students, does not have to be significantly different than that for teaching philosophies from “Western” traditions. Four areas will be explored. Firstly, we look at debates on teaching non-Western philosophy from the perspective of themes or traditions, suggesting that, as an overarching guideline, it is mote discussion. Secondly, in terms of making generalizations, we argue that no more explanation of the “Chineseness” of Chinese philosophy be offered than the “Germanness” of German philosophy, or “Greekness” of Greek philosophy. Thirdly, that lines of philosophical coherences are not limited to regional or cultural bounds. Finally, that foreign language be used in a way that invites understanding and does not close ideas off to students. In sum, we suggest applying well proven methods of teaching “Western” philosophy to Chinese (and other “Non-Western”) philosophies. After all, value of Chinese and other “Non-Western” philosophies comes not from their being “Chinese” or “Non-Western,” but from being philosophical.

This article attempts to contribute to the literature on what has become known as “student relativism” by suggesting that in many cases it is a symptom of a broader and equally problematic pre-reflective epistemological framework that students often bring with them to the study of philosophy. It goes on to describe the notion of a “dialectical fact,” and to propose that this concept can be a useful pedagogical tool for helping students to progress beyond that framework.

An important part of the work of an introductory philosophy class is learning how to read philosophy. The digital annotation platform Perusall can be useful in both F2F learning environments as well as in virtual learning environments, as it helps students learn how to read philosophy. While the traditional online learning environment relies heavily on the discussion forum to replicate the F2F learning experience, digital annotation is a valuable alternative for promoting student engagement with course material. This paper will describe the platform as well as how to use Perusall to facilitate student participation and close reading of texts.

I develop Levinas’s analysis of “proximity” to explain how successful faceless class dialogues are possible despite physical social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. I first examine features of Levinas’s notion of proximity within his idiosyncratic approach to “ethics.” Second, I turn to Levinas’s examination of intentionality and questioning in relation to the hermeneutic priority of questioning. Third, I detail some successes and failures in attempts to embody Levinasian proximity in online or masked discussions with students. I draw out contrasts between experiences at two different institutions as well as between curricular and extracurricular experiences. I do this to expose my own vulnerability in this essay itself. Given pandemic conditions as well as Levinas’s theory of proximity, I found that many masked or virtual class discussions—but especially extracurricular group discussions, such as a philosophy club and the Black Student Union meetings—maintained a closeness of community despite social distancing.

Online classes have brought with them challenges, as well as opportunities, for philosophy and philosophical education. The democratization of interactions, the creative tension between anonymity and publicity, and the virtualization and centralization of information that compel participants to focus on the mobility of ideas together make up what the present article calls e-philosophy. The article presents three issues essential to teaching philosophy via the internet: building a framework for communication, syllabus design, and engaging participants. Two major problems specific to China, where the author teaches and works as a philosopher of science, and those related to philosophical education in the internet era in general, are discussed.

In this article, I reflect upon my experiences developing an asynchronous Philosophy for Children (P4C) course toward the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. I argue that P4C practitioners ought to reconsider what we mean by community in Community of Inquiry (CoI). The traditional Community of Inquiry model emphasizes face-to-face interactions in which the children and facilitator(s) are traditionally seated in a circle, synchronously wondering together. The CoI pedagogical model has, once again, served as a methodological starting-point for the place-based P4C I have tried to practice in my teaching, but it was also the model that I had to overcome while developing a virtual P4C course in a pandemic. Specifically, I argue that we ought to broaden vastly what we mean by “community” in “Community of Inquiry” in order to make Philosophy for Children more accessible for a virtual, and even asynchronous, learning environment. Furthermore, I argue that this reconceptualization of “community” is useful not only to our pandemic pedagogy, but also for our post-pandemic future in which face-to-face classes are resumed.

The study presented here is concerned with the pedagogical and technical issues around the provision of feedback. More specifically, it looks at how feedback is received and interpreted by students and how it can become integrated in a comprehensive plan for supporting philosophy students and helping them develop critical and analytical writing skills. It is especially relevant in post-Covid-19 educational settings, where face-to-face contact is limited and feedback is delivered remotely, potentially opening a gap between instructors’ intentions and student perceptions of the feedback they receive. I discuss tools for eliciting students’ responses to feedback and argue that having a strategy for receiving feedback from students can have a lot of benefits: it provides a timely tool for instructors to check on the effectiveness of their feedback, helps solidify the learning partnership and circumvents some of the problems digital technologies pose for teaching and learning.

What does success in online teaching look like? There are two ways to answer this question. The first defines success in terms of replacement of educational means: for example, how closely does an online lecture approximate its offline counterpart? The second defines success in terms of educational goals: for example, how well does an online lecture facilitate learning, compared with its offline counterpart? The first is a trap: it commits us to an endless online game of catch-up with offline models of teaching. Instead, we should adopt a goal-oriented approach, mindful of obstacles to online teaching. As a case study, I present practices developed using this approach to teach philosophy online in 2020. An important upshot is that this approach leaves us open to ways in which online teaching is actually better than its offline counterpart. I conclude with some examples of these, and discuss their future implementation.