In this paper I present an argument that there can be no more than one God in a way which allows me to give the doctrine ofthe Trinity logical priority over the attributes traditionally used in arguments for God’s unicity. The argument that there is at most one God makes no assumptions about the particular attributes included in divinity. It uses only the Identity of Indiscemibles and a Principle of Plenitude. I then offer a theory on the relationship between individuals and kinds which allows me to offer an interpretation of the Trinity.

The problem addressed is: whether religious belief, defined here as accepting that God has revealed and that what he has revealed is true, could ever be rational. That is, does the idea of religious belief imply that it is irrational? The author attempts to resolve this problem in favor of religious belief, and suggests how reasons can legitimately function in religious belief. The evidentialist objection to religion is answered, and it is proposed that reasons might function, not to prove that God has revealed, or that what he has revealed is true, but that the choice to believe is a morally responsible one.

Current discussions of “evidentialism” seem to presuppose essentially traditional theistic conceptions and formulations. For many theologians. however, these have become problematic because of (a) the rise of a new consciousness of the significance of religiouspluralism; (b) the emergence of theories about the ways in which our symbolic frames of orientation shape all our experiencing and thinking; (c) a growing awareness that significant responsibility for some of the major evils of the twentieth century must be laid to ourreligious traditions. Since recent discussion of “evidentialism” continues to employ traditional symbols and concepts without sensitivity to these matters, it has not attracted much interest among contemporary theologians.

Recent proponents of a divine command ethics have chiefly defended the theory by refuting objections rather than by offering “positive reasons” to support it. We here offer a catalogue of such positive arguments drawn from historical discussions of the theory. We presentarguments which focus on various properties of the divine nature and on the unique status of God, as well as arguments which are analogical in character. Finally, we describe a particularform of the theory to which these arguments point, and indicate how they counteract a standard criticism of it. Throughout we pick up on previous work of Philip Quinn.

I begin with a few general suggestions about what it means to be a Christian. I then summarize the new interpretation of Kant as proposing a ‘System of Perspectives,’ which I have set out in greater detail elsewhere. After discussing the important notions of ‘criticism,’ ‘perspective’ and ‘system’ as they operate in Kant’s thought, the bulk of the essay is devoted to an assessment of the theological implications of Kant’s System, I conclude that, contrary to popular opinion, particularly among some Christian theologians, Kant’s intentions were theologically constructive, and moreover, that his System is thoroughly consistent with the Christian perspective.

Natural theologians have argued that God (logically) must be incorporeal, without body or parts. This conclusion apparently contradicts the common Christian beliefs that God (the Son) was incarnate in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and now exists everlastingly with a resurrected body. In this paper, I examine the most common rational arguments for divine incorporeality and show that none of them is sufficient to prove it, and that, therefore, none need be a stumbling block to rational acceptance of the resurrected Christ as God.

In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, James Kellenberger argues that the “ethics of love” aspect of Christianity entails pacifism, In response, I present an argument designed to show that Christian doctrine entails the falsity of pacifism, I go on to show, however, that the spirit of Kellenberger’s point may survive, for perhaps Christ’s teaching regarding “mental sin” prohibits the war-related activity known as nuclear deterrence.

In this reply I consider David O’Connor’s article “A Variation on the Free Will Defense” in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is required for the possibility of “morally creditable free choice.” I argue that O’Connor’s reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls “p.” that an altered understanding of what “morally creditable free choice” is would not help. and finally, that if God’s moral condition is fundamentally different than ours, it could not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans being moral.