Cover of Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy
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articles in english
1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Andrejs Balodis Revitalization of the Past: Henry Bergson’s Theory of Memory
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The concept of memory rests at the heart of Bersgon’s theory of consciousness. His theory of memory is the novelty in the history of philosophy. It is not an affirmation either of the metaphysical conceptions (versions à la Platonism) where “all knowledge is recollection”, nor of empiricist psychology possibly traceble back to Aristotle, where, briefly speaking, the faculty of memory depends on the general perceptual capacity. Contrary to the majority of the philosophical and psychological theories of his epoch, Bergson assigns memory the most important role in the intellectual process, denying the characteristic of passivity (from greek word pathos meaning kind of affection) attached to it, instead concerning with the creative, productive and vital power of memory rather than merely its retentive and recalling capacity.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Michael Jungert In Memory We Trust?: Philosophical Remarks on the Relation between Memory, Self and Truthfulness
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Common sense regards memory as fairly exact, reliable and trustworthy in the majority of cases. However, recent scientific findings in psychology and biology seem to object this point of view. According to them, memory appears as a highly constructive and often deceptive phenomenon. These assumptions lead to various philosophical problems. The talk will briefly outline some of them. At first, some general statements about philosophy and memory research will be made. Second, the relationship between self and (autobiographical) memory is being analyzed. This can be illustrated by case-studies of traumatical disorders, a field which is so far stunningly unnoted in philosophy. Third, some aspects of the relation between memory and truth will be examined.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Young E. Lee The Nature of Embodied Distributed Cognition
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There has been a lot of strong evidence showing that human cognition works not in a central processing way but in a distributed way. As well known, human brain processes huge information in a parallel and distributed way. Recently cognitive scientists have contended that the minds are embodied in environment. These two ideas of distribution in cognition and embodiment in the mind can go along overall, but there is a tension between them in some specific respects, especially in the matter of representation. The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of the embodied distributed cognition by focusing on the concept of mental representation. Firstly, I shall examine the nature of embodied mind and distributed cognition. Secondly I shall make a distinction between those ideas that the notion of embodiment can be confined to the mind but the notion of distribution can be applied to both the mind and to its environment. This implies a difference of applicability of those notions. That is, while the suitable application domain of the latter is scientific cognition, that of the former is our mind. This difference can throw light upon untangling the dispute between Churchland's internalism and Giere's externalism of presentation.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Jariya Nualnirun Model of Intentionality as Interpretation of a Content
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This paper aims to analyse Husserl’s texts in order to evaluate his attempt to apply a model of intentionality as interpretation(Auffassung) of a content (Inhalt) he had earlier developed to explain a notion of timeconsciousness. In Husserl’s previous published work the Logical Investigations (1900‐01), he construed perceptual intentionality on the model of apprehending intention and apprehended sensual contents for an ordinary object. For later published work, the so‐called early lectures on The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1928), he continued to apply the model to analyse temporal objects both in the awareness of duration and in the temporal flow. Brough presented that Husserl’s attempt to apply the model culminated in its rejection. The paper postulates that Husserl did not fail, but in fact was a success. Husserl succeeded in applying the model as a foundation method for investigating the occurrence of remembrance of elapsed temporal objects. In the end he found a suitable way to determine what is actually temporal now, before and after in the continuous stream of time‐consciousness. Without interpretation of a content model, the Husserlian phenomenology that everyone is conscious of the same thing, appearing as such, at the same time, cannot be possible.
articles in french
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Misook Choi Ribot et Bergson, la théorie de la mémoire
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Tandis que « Matière et mémoire » de Bergson est aujourd’hui bien connu et relativement bien analysé, « Les maladies de la mémoire » de Ribot est presque oublié malgré son originalité et nouveauté dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Mais dans le domaine de la science, notamment dans des recherches sur la mémoire, la pensée de Ribot est toujours vivante. Dans cet article, nous voulons d’abord voir la relation entre deux pensées sur la mémoire, celle de Ribot et celle de Bergson, et ensuite nous vérifierons comment traiter aujourd’hui l’héritage de la pensée de Ribot et de Bergson dans le domaine de la philosophie et de la science. A travers ces recherches, nous allons comprendre que le désaccord de Bergson avec Ribot vient de la différence méthodologique entre deux philosophes et que cette différence suscite deux pensées complètement différentes l’une à l’autre.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Su-Young Hwang Mémoire et Identité de l’homme chez Descartes, Hume et Bergson
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Le problème de l’identité personnelle est une préoccupation essentielle des philosophes modernes depuis que la conscience est mise en scène philosophiquement. Cependant parmi eux il n’y en a pas beaucoup qui considèrent la mémoire comme le fondement de l’identité humaine, bien qu’aujourd’hui, et grâce aux neurosciences, on sache pourtant qu’elle joue un rôle capital. D’une manière générale, les empiristes s’y intéressent davantage que les rationnalistes. Ceux‐ci ayant comme idéal normatif les systèmes mathématiques ne pensent pas qu’elle puisse contribuer à élargir nos connaissances du monde. C’est ce qui explique que le système des idées claires et distinctes chez Descartes, s’établit directement par la conscience présente. De son côté, l’empiriste sceptique Hume, bien qu’il ait souligné l’importance de la mémoire dans notre personnalité, n’a pas pu mettre en pleine lumière sa nature et son fonctionnement. L’esprit considéré comme l’ensemble des perceptions et des idées est loin de constituer l’identité de l’homme normal. On voit dans les théoriesbergsoniennes de la durée et de la mémoire une toute autre perspective qui fonde l’identité personnelle sur l’équilibre mental de la conscience présente et de l’inconscient, c’est‐à‐dire du moi superficiel et du moi profond.
articles in russian
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Долженко Владимир Время ‐ Мера Длины Космического Пути Земных Событий
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PROCESS this ordered movement of energy from one object to other object, changing their physical parameters. EVENT is the information on process. LIFE is the information on processes. The LIFE is process. The INFORMATION is a part of energy reflected or radiated by object written down in memory of the person, a material, space.
articles in korean
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Sun-Hye Kim Introduction for Philosophical Therapy ‐ Self-Awareness, Self‐Care, Dialogue as the Three Axes of Philosophical Therapy
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The modern times proclaimed ‘God’s death’ and the post‐modern times did ‘the death of Man/Subject. And recently our society suffers from ‘the death of the humanities’. The death appearing along with is ‘the death of philosophy’. What on earth does the notice of death of philosophy mean by in the life of human beings living in the modern times? This writer is groping for the point to revive the modern significance of philosophy facing the tragic situations called ‘Death’ through the inquiry of the rendezvous between philosophy and therapy. This writer will study the features of the philosophical therapy in philosophizing in the ancient times, firstly in the relation of philosophy and therapy, secondly the soul as the subject and object of mind‐therapy, thirdly the self‐awareness (gnôthiseautón) as the way of mind‐therapy, fourth the self‐care (epimeleia heautou) as the goal of mind‐therapy, and finally the dialogue as the method of mind‐ therapy, during which I am going to form a solid foundation instead to study the spirit of philosophical therapy dwelling in philosophizing.