The Living Wage Movement (LWM) should be evaluated on whether it enables more people, or people willing to work, to lead a decent life. But, first, to the extent that it succeeds in getting some workers up to that threshold it is likely to make it harder for other workers to do the same. Second, to the extent that it succeeds in getting some workers up to that threshold it is likely to make it harder for non-workers to do the same. The LWM is likely afflicted with these problems to a greater extent than is the Minimum Wage Movement.

The paper identifies a view of work that has become prominent in recent years: The view in question is that work is “split” into two main forms: “manual” and “intellectual.” These two forms of work are seen socially as being completely opposed to one another and stereotypes abound on both sides about the people who do them. The paper calls this view “The Manichean View of Work” after the Ancient Persian religion. It is argued that this view is based on an erroneous philosophical position of dualism, a split between mind and body, that derives from the Greeks and was formalised by such thinkers as Ibn Sina and Rene Descartes, which has filtered down into all of Western society. A new, more inclusive definition of work is offered, along with criticisms of the “Manichean View.” Lastly, as a counter to the Western view, an argument based on Zen Buddhist philosophy, which views manual work positively, is given before some practical ways by which the split can be healed as a conclusion.

The criticism of neoliberalism is omnipresent. The term is seemingly self-explanatory, but its original use in public has been forgotten. Its form originated in the international movement of ordoliberalism in the 1930s, which used neoliberalism to describe its distinction from laissez-faire capitalism. This conceptual confusion has created considerable consequential problems that overlay today’s debate on the future of the market economy. The fact that the neoliberalism of the ordoliberals is today equated by its critics with the capitalism of the libertarians raises questions. Since the economic dogma of Milton Friedman, who was the inspiration for the so-called Chicago Boys in Chile, whose economic policy was first captured by today’s negatively connoted term neoliberalism, this approach needs to be looked at more closely. Should the ideas of the Chicago school of thought substantially distinguish themselves from the other currents of economic liberalism, a solution to the confusion of terms could be possible, giving a new twist to the debate on the market economy. Such a clarifiation would be of fundamental importance for the ethical question of the social orientation of the economic order, since ordoliberalism was in turn the godfather of the social market economy. Furthermore, this would have consequences for applied political ethics in the context of political theories of justice, whose theoretical constructs reflect the existing economic order as a fact of experience.

Suppose we morally ought to maximize social welfare. Suppose profit maxi­mization is a means to maximize social welfare. Does this imply that we morally ought to maximize profits? Many proponents of the view that we have a moral obligation to maximize profits (tacitly) assume the validity of this argument. In this paper, we critically assess this assumption. We show that the validity of this argument is far from trivial and requires a careful argumentative defence.

Philosophers have said surprisingly little about academic freedom, considering how central it is to liberal societies. This article takes a holistic approach to the topic by developing a framework for philosophical analyses of academic freedom. It treats the definition, extent, and justification of academic freedom, arguing in favor of an individualist account thereof. The complete theory is constructed using the same methods and moral arguments as in analyses of other liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech and association, which means that the account is fully integrable in all liberal societies.

Just war theory has traditionally accepted revolutionary overthrow of an undemocratic government as a just cause but not foreign intervention for the same purpose. For many contemporary cosmopolitan theorists this asymmetry involves an indefensible inconsistency. For example, Ned Dobos argues that it is only a potential foreign intervener’s duty to its own citizens and soldiers, not any additional duty of non-intervention, that places additional restrictions upon the use of force across borders. I defend insurrection/intervention asymmetry, arguing that due to several intersecting practical difficulties, intervention has a higher threshold of just cause. I argue that interven­tion’s high costs and low likelihood of success, intervener’s limited ability to evaluate the validity of democratic intervention, and the effects of intervention on the international system, lead to a stronger presumption against intervention than revolution. In particular, democratization is a just cause for revolution but not humanitarian intervention.

As self-conscious curators and critics of moral history, the early Confucians are relevant to the contemporary debate over the fate of memorials dedicated to morally flawed individuals. They provide us with a pragmatic justification that is distinct from those utilized in the current debate, and in many respects superior to the alternatives. In addition to supplying this curative philosophic resource, the early Confucian practices of ancestral memorialization suggest preventative measures we might adopt to minimize the chances of establishing divisive and oppressive memorials in the future.

The Golden Rule (“what you want done [or not done] to yourself, do [or don’t do] to others”) is the most widely accepted summary statement of human morality, and even today it continues to have philosophical supporters. This article argues that the Golden Rule suffers from four faults, the first two related to the ethics of justice and the second two related to the ethics of benevolence. One, it fails to explain how to deal with non-reciprocation. Two, it fails to make clear that my obligations are obligations regardless of how I would wish to be treated by others. Three, it lacks any special value in explaining the right occasions for benevolence. And, four, it has no power to motivate benevolence.

What makes a good leader? This paper takes Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues as the starting point for developing three leadership skills that are still relevant today: being on a mission, thinking in questions, and thinking like a beginner. I arrive at these Socratic leadership skills through an interdisciplinary approach to Plato’s early dialogues that puts Socrates in conversation with a diversity of thinkers: modern-day business leaders and leadership coaches, educators, Zen Buddhists, and art historians. I show that Socratic leadership skills are valued in today’s business world, and I propose concrete exercises that can help anyone acquire these skills. In contrast to Platonic leadership—the leadership skills of the philosopher king—Socratic leadership skills have not been the focus of much investigation. This paper aims to advance a scholarly conversation about Socrates as a leadership model.

Among the most common suggestions one hears about how to improve pedagogy is for teachers to recast the information they are teaching into a narrative story form. In this paper, I argue that student understanding likely is improved by putting information into this form (even if student knowledge is not). Still, there are some disadvantages of the story form. This paper discusses how to maximize these advantages while minimizing the disadvantages of the story form.

Iain Thomson proposes that Heidegger’s notion of “being as such” should be regarded as the core concept of ecophenomenology. Here, we attempt to tease out further nuances of this concept by juxtaposing Thomas Sheehan’s interpretation of “being as such” with that of Ian Thomson. We demonstrate that Sheehan’s reading of “being as such” as the intrinsic-hidden-clearing aligns with Thomson’s interpretation, and further adds a nuanced hermeneutic-phenomenological understanding of the concept in Heidegger scholarship. We suggest that this reconciliation—which portrays that “being as such” qua ex-sistence qua the intrinsic-hidden-clearing denotes the same transcen­dental realm—is imperative to guide ecophenomenology to proceed further towards attaining its core philosophy of “back to the thing itself.” This reconciliation helps us go beyond safeguarding a particular thing or an ecosystem. Alternatively, it emphasizes the manner in which a respectful awareness of the “being as such” can build empathy toward the excess that a thing always possesses in our relation to it. This could give rise to an ethic of relationship.