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Displaying: 1-20 of 30 documents

1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Nenad Miščević, Nenad Smokrović Theories of Rationality
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2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Wolfgang Spohn The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality
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Modern theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. Still, the general topic remained a genuinely philosophical one. This essay is concerned with giving a brief overview. Section 2 explains the fundamental scheme of all rationality assessments. With its help, a schematic order of the main questions concerning the theory of rationality can be given; the questions turn out to be quite unevenly addressed in the literature. Section 3 discusses the fundamental issue that the theory of rationality seems to be both a normative and an empirical theory. Section 4, finally, shows how the unity of the theory of rationality can nevertheless be maintained.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Pascal Engel Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief
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This paper attempts to clarify some issues about what is usually called “doxastic voluntarism”. This phrase often hides a confusion between two separate (although connected) issues: whether beliefis or can be, as a matter of psychological fact, under the control of the will, on the one hand, and whether we can have practical reasons to believe something, or whether our beliefs are subject to any sort of “ought”, on the other hand. The first issue -- which I prefer to call the issue of volitionism about belief -- is psychological, and I take the answer to be negative, along the lines of the conceptual arguments against believing at will adduced by writers such as Bernard Williams. The second issue -- which I call voluntarism proper -- is normative, and the answer that I give is a qualified yes. Belief is not a matter of the will, although there are certain things that we ought to believe.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Knowles Naturalised Epistemology without Norms
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I seek to show that we do not need norms in a genuinely naturalistic epistemology. The argumentation is launched against a common conception of such norms as derived through a process of wide reflective equilibrium, where one aims to bring general normative statements into accord with concrete, possibly expert, intuitions about particular cases, taking simultaneously into account relevant scientific findings -- including facts about human psychological abilities -- and philosophical theories. According to this line, it is possible thus to arrive at genuine, general normative statements concerning how we should reason. I maintain that such statements are superfluous or illegitimate for several interlocking reasons. The central arguments are i) that certain norms simply repeat the content of descriptive statements which in any case would have to be taken account of in scientific reasoning; ii) if norms are merely meant to systematize an intuitive capacity for reasoning and forming beliefs, we can make do with honing that capacity; iii) there is no reason to regard principles in a psychological reasoning module as norms rather than simply prescursors of behaviour; iv) we cannot make sense of experts in relation to epistemic rationality; v) making play with the idea of purely philosophical constraints on theories of norms involves reneging on naturalism.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Elisabeth Pacherie Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity
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The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in naturalistic epistemologies. What particular stand a given naturalistic epistemology takes on normativity will depend both on what it thinks is wrong with traditional epistemology and on what level of normativity is at stake. I propose a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity from within naturalistic epistemology. In section I, I give a brief presentation of traditional epistemology, stressing the dimensions of this approach that may appear problematic to naturalists. In section II, I present and discuss the naturalist project in its radical form, as personified by Quine, who questions not only the way in which traditional epistemology proceeds in order to attain its objectives, but also the validity of these objectives. The last two sections concentrate on more moderate versions of naturalism. Section III investigates the various possible roles that may be assigned to psychology in these moderate forms of naturalism and the ensuingconsequences vis-a-vis the problem of normativity. In section IV, I distinguish between two levels of normativity in epistemology, what I call the normativity of means and the normativity of ends and I discuss the prospects of a naturalization of epistemic ends.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
John Cantwell The Pragmatic Stance: Whither Dutch Books and Money Pumps?
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The view that decision methods can only be justified by appeal to pragmatic considerations is defended. Pragmatic considerations are viewed as providing the underlying subject matter (“semantics”) of decision theories. It is argued that other approaches (e.g. justifying principles by appeal to obviousness, common usage, etc.) fail to provide grounds for a normative decision theory.It is argued that preferences that can lead to pragmatically adverse outcomes in a relevantly similar possible decision situation are pragmatically unsound, even if the decision situation never arises. This rebuts several standard objections to money-pump and Dutch book arguments. However, because one can only appeal to relevantly similar decision situations in pragmatic arguments, these will have a less general scope than is often imagined. A conclusion is that pragmatic arguments for strong unconditional principles such as ‘always maximise expected utility!’ do not work. Pragmatic considerations can however be used to argue for conditional principles of the form ‘if conditions X, Y and Z are satisfied, then one ought to satisfy W’, where W need not follow logically from X, Y and Z.The notion of a sound pragmatic argument is defined in terms of particular notion of coherence, it is shown how this can be applied and how it handles problematic cases such as van Fraassen’s Dutch book for the principle of Reflection.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Bruno Verbeek Game Theory and Moral Norms: An Overview and an Application
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This paper provides an overview of developments in the application of game theory to moral philosophy. Game theory has been used in moral theory in three ways. First, as a tool to analyze the function of moral norms. Secondly, to characterize bargaining about moral norms. Thirdly, the paper demonstrates how game theory can make sense of the authority of moral norms in a way that renders the concept suitable for further analysis.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Olav Gjelsvik Paradox Lost, but in which Envelope?
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The aim of this paper is to diagnose the so-called two envelopes paradox. Many writers have claimed that there is something genuinely paradoxical in the situation with the two envelopes, and some writers are now developing non-standards theories of expected utility. I claim that there is no paradox for expected utility theory as I understand that theory, and that contrary claims are confused. Expected utility theory is completely unaffected by the two-envelope paradox.
book reviews
9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
István Aranyosi Physicalism and Its Discontents
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10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Giovanni de Grandis Rationality in Action
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11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Lars Bergström Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy
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In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
12. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
János Kis Behind the Veil of Ignorance
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The paper examines consensual contractarianism John Rawls proposed in his A Theory of Justice, and develops the following criticism. The veil of ignorance device requires but cannot secure the neutrality of the primary goods. In the Rawlsian ‘original position’ of contract, the only relevant information the hypothetical choosers are allowed to have is that they all prefer to have some ‘primary goods’ rather than not to have any, and that they prefer to have more rather than less of the primary goods. This stipulation entails that the ‘primary goods’ are neutral with regard to the diverging preferences of the choosers. In other words, for the Rawlsian contract to yield acceptable results, neutrality of the primary goods must hold. It cannot, however. Hence Rawls’ account of a consensual contract is untenable. The paper suggests that the difficulty is not rooted in the particular features of the Rawlsian theory but in the very idea of a consensual contract.
13. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Raphael Cohen-Almagor Non-Voluntary and Involuntary Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Dutch Perspectives
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During the summer of 1999, twenty-eight interviews with some of the leading authorities on the euthanasia policy were conducted in the Netherlands. They were asked about cases of non-voluntary (when patients are incompetent) and involuntary euthanasia (when patients are competent and made no request to die). This study reports the main findings, showing that most respondents are quite complacent with regard to breaches of the guideline that speaks ofthe patient’s consent as prerequisite to performance of euthanasia.
14. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Sergio Cremaschi Two Views of Natural Law and the Shaping of Economic Science
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In this paper I argue that differences between the ‘new moral science’ of the seventeenth century and scholastic natural law theory originated primarily from the skeptical challenge the former had to face. Pufendorf’s project of a scientia practica universalis is the paramount expression of an anti-skeptical moral science, a ‘science’ that is both explanatory and normative, but also anti-dogmatic insofar as it tries to base its laws on those basic phenomena of human life which, supposedly, are immune to skeptical doubt. The main scholastic legacy to the new moral science is the dichotomy between an ‘intellectualist’ and a ‘voluntarist’ view of natural law (or between lex immanens and lex imposita). Voluntarism lies at the basis of both theological views, such as Calvinism, and political views, such as those of Hobbes and Locke. The need to counterbalance the undesirable implications of extreme voluntarism may account for much of the developments in ethics and politics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.Scottish natural jurisprudence, which tried to find a middle way between skepticism and extreme voluntarism, is less secular and more empirical than received wisdom admits. There emerged, as one of its ‘accidental’ outcomes, a systematic, self-contained and empirical economic theory from the search for an empirically based normative theory of social life. The basic assumption of such a theory, namely, the notion of societal laws as embedded in trans-individual mechanisms, derives from the voluntarist view of natural law as ‘imposed’ law.Later discussions of social issues in terms of ‘economic’ and ‘ethical’ reasons originated partly from a misreading ofthe Scottish natural jurisprudential framework of economic theory. Starting with this reconstruction, I try to shed some light on recent discussions about the role of ethics in economics.
15. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Danilo Šuster Embedded Conditionals as the Essence of Causality?
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Counterfactual analysis of causation between particular events, combined with standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals, cannot express the idea that the cause is sufficient for the effect. Several authors have suggested that a more complex pattern of nested counterfactual conditionals is a better candidate for expressing the idea of causal connection. The most systematic account is developed by Kadri Vihvelin. She argues that a complex pattern of causal dependence, expressed by embedded conditionals, covers all the cases of causation and still yields an account of causal asymmetry. But the new account relies heavily on the use of backtracking conditionals, and no criterion is given for their evaluation. I will try to show that Vihvelin’s proposal is not superior to the standard account because it overlooks the disadvantages of a liberal theory of causal relata.
16. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
John Collins Horwich’s Sting: Constitution and Composition
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Horwich (1998) seeks to undermine the familiar truth-theoretic approach to meaning, as championed by Davidson. Horwich’s criticism has two chief parts: (i) the Davidsonian approach commits a common constitution fallacy under which the form of the explanans (in this case, truth theoretic clauses and theorems) is constrained to respect the form of the explanandum (in this case, ‘meaning facts’) and (ii) that compositionality can be explained independently of a concept of truth, and so the putative central plank of Davidson’s argument is removed. This paper seeks to show that these claims are premised upon a systematic misreading of the Davidsonian approach. First, the very idea of a constitution fallacy has no application to the truth-theoretic approach, for meaning is simply not analysed under it. Second,compositionality is properly understood to be a general, independent constraint on theories of meaning, not a consequence of any particular approach. Moreover, I shall show that Horwich’s format for explaining compositionality independently of truth fails to meet certain elementary constraints.
book reviews
17. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Nenad Miščević Sameness and Substance Renewed
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18. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Nenad Miščević New Essays on the A Priori
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19. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Matej Sušnik Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism
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20. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Ana Maršanić Poredak slobode: Politička misao Johna Stuarta Milla: (The Order of Freedom: The Political Thought of John Stuart Mill)
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