本論文試圖論證：殊性存有論並不需要將殊性之間的相似關係作為其存 有論的原初設定。論證主要依據所謂的「位元原則」。但這不表示「相似」 是一個沒有意義的概念。本論文建議，在形上學裡，「相似」可以化約到介 於兩個一階內存關係之間的二階內存關係，例如「大於」、「重於」；本論文 並且倡議相似現象應該訴求知識論或心理學的解釋。

This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentratedthe limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on this view that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.

有關行動理由的哲學爭辯常聚焦於理由與動機之關連，內在論主張行動 理由與動機事實有必要之聯結，外在論則否認。1980 年，威廉斯發表論文 “Internal and External Reasons”，提出反對外在論的強力論證，引發了倫理 學、行動理論以及理由理論一連串深具影響力的辯論。二十年後，他發表 “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons”（2001），精進他的休謨 理論以回應這些年來其他學者所提出的質詢；更重要的是，他將過去二十多 年來的主要批評歸類為兩種進路：「康德進路」以及「亞理斯多德進路」，並 且對二者提出強烈反對。本文檢視康德進路及亞理斯多德進路近來的可能發 展，其中包括柯思嘉和麥克道爾的哲學論述，以解釋並論證為何威廉斯的最 新論點不足以反駁此二進路。

This paper is one of a series of my articles researching practice ways of “Perfect-teaching” (圓教) in T’ien-t’ai Buddhism. Practicing different ways of Perfect-teaching is the most unsurpassable and wonderful one among all dharma-gates. However, it has been an issue of debate among the academia whether these are suitable for average people to practice or not. Moreover, I realize that in fact, there are several ways to practice Perfect-teaching showing different characteristics. As a result, they have their different positions, are suitable for different people, and can reach different obtainments.In order to fully comprehend the related issues in ways of practice in Perfect-teaching, it is imperative to fully clarify aspects that are not well defined in academia. For example, different ways of practice, possibilities in classification of different ways, and justifications of different ways in Perfect-teaching should all be studied. Main objectives of this research are as follows: all ways of practice in Perfect-teaching will be collected, reasons of different ways of practice as such will be analyzed and classified, and then foundations of various ways in practicing Perfect-teaching will be concluded. Only after these works have been done can one gain a correct whole picture of the practices in Perfect-teaching which is the foundation to sort out different viewpoints of the Perfect-teaching.After analyzing thirty ways of practice in Perfect-teaching taught by Master Zhi-yi (智顗), seven characteristics or circumstances can be identified that make a certain practice under the Perfect-teaching:a. when recitation of the Saddharmapundarika Sutra (妙法蓮華經) is involved or it has been stated clearly in the scripture;b. when it belongs to the unsurpassed Buddha of Perfect-teaching;c. when it corresponds to the principles of the Perfect-teaching;d. when it is defined by the principle of Perfect-teaching;e. practices which are unique to the Perfect-teaching;f. those that are the prerequisites of “Threefold Contemplation in One Single Mind” (一心三觀,) which is the representative way of practice in Perfect-teaching; andg. those that are auxiliary to the “Threefold Contemplation in One Single Mind.”

The remarkable philosophical innovations revealed in the interpretations of the classics, which has on the one hand contributed to the Sinicization of Buddhism and to the development of Neo-Confucianism, and has provided valuable intellectual sources and theoretical models on the other, are probably the reason why metaphysics in Wei and Jin Dynasties played an important role in Chinese philosophy. The essence of Wang Pi’s philosophy consists in three pairs of concepts, being and non-being, root and branch, and substance and function, by which his philosophical innovation can be illustrated. I try to show Wang Pi’s philosophical innovation in three ways: i. from the concept of Being and Non-Being, a new connotation or logic can be found in the ancient concepts. ii, from the concept of root and branch, the logical sequence of the text can be clarified. iii, from the concept of substance and function, the process of rendering brand-new meaning by employing new conceptual categories as framework (or logic) is demonstrated. This essay attempts to show the philosophical innovation in Wang Pi’s philosophy through these three pairs of concepts.

In this article, I attempt to throw some light on the basic structure of self-awareness (jikaku), which is one of the central concepts in the philosophy of Nishida, according to his early essay "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding" published in 1912. Nishida puts forward a theory of logical development of experience which can be considered as the prototype of self-awareness. Here we can see Nishida's incorporation of ideas drawn from Rickert's and Sigwart’s logical thinking, Royce's self-representative system and Dedekind's definition of infinity into his own system of self-awareness. We focus on Nishida’s Rickert-interpretation. It is my view that only an infinite self-representative or a self-mirroring system cannot explain all of the aspects of Nishida's self-awareness for missing the intuition into the whole that inherent in this system. This ultimate whole which absolute free will intuits is the totality of being (on) and non-being (me on). I try to clarify its meaning according to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant’s productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft). The article is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction of the theme and method of the article (section one), I try to reconstruct Nishida's argumentations in logical understanding (section two) and mathematical understanding (section three). Finally in the last section (section four), I discuss some insights of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant's productive imagination, and attempt to expound possible horizons opened by Nishida in his discussion of the "Absolute Free Will".

In Nietzsche’s idea of “God is dead”, man has lost his validity in the origin of value, no longer holds the meaning and truth of constancy and eternity in the world of becoming built on “will to power”, but comprehends the meaning of existence through their relative and temporary validity and value. The present work attempts to seek in Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence a possible comprehension and evaluation toward life other than “God is dead” or traditionalmetaphysics, and to create new values from the new way of understanding in the world of becoming. For this, the hypothesis addressed in the present workis: The doctrine of eternal recurrence is the manner of man’s self-evaluation. Its particularity lies in that, through this manner of evaluation, the meaning ofthe world of becoming is reserved on one hand, and the value of existence is created within nihilism and becoming on the other. This manner is presented inNietzsche’s philosophy as a dynamic development from “nihilism” to “laughing”. Beyond all language and rationality, “laughing” has created a new point ofview setting out from the body, and is the meaning of human as super-human.

This paper aims to discuss how Sengzhao, basing on the Buddhist view of “naming of illusory existence”, acquires the insight into the existence of all dharmas and reveals the connotation of ultimate reality. Through this insight, he distinguishes true existence from insubstantial and epistemological existence and opens a thinking path to the “ultimate truth” or “nature of things”. The discussion is based mainly on Sengzhao's works: Treatise of Things Do Not Shift and Commentary to the Vimalakirti Nirdesa-Sutra. The approach focuses on self-reflection and the interpretation of his philosophy. The main conclusions drawn from this research include:(1) The viewpoint taken in Treatise of Things Do Not Shift involving “the nature of things” is a theory which establishes the concept of naming for the insubstantial existence.(2) The theory of “Not Shift” is established on the cognitive framework through which things are distinguished from the phenomena.(3) Although the concept, “Things Do Not Shift” does not imply that it is the ultimate truth, it can be seen as a path of exploring truth.(4) Regardless pro or con towards the views of Sengzhao, one must clearly distinguish the differences between the epistemological and ontological definitions of “Things” in order to discuss the divergent views of “Things Do Not Shift” and to be more convincing.

The present study treats political authority as a “command-obedience” relationship. This relationship appears in different “forms,” and each respective form is underpinned by a certain “base.” The author targets the forms and bases of political authority exposed in the chapter “Quanxiu” of Guanzi and finds that morality and law are typical forms of authority. From a more detailed analysis, the legal form is presented in the three distinctive dimensions: legitimate authority, induced authority, and coercive authority. The author further argues that the moral form has a mental base, whereas legal form is based on economy and force.