Mou Zong-san’s “intellectual intuition” contains two internal contradictions: first, a contradiction between intellect and sensibility regarding moral feeling; second, a contradiction between being and creation of the thing-in-itself. These contradictions are caused by his acceptance of Kant’s theoretical assumption of a dichotomy between sensibility and intellect as well as by the characteristics of non-sensibility and creativity in Kant’s theory of intuition. In turn, this has led to unresolvable difficulties in Mou’s “intellectual intuition” reading of Chinese philosophy. While Husserl’s theory on the intentionality of perception resolved Kant’sdichotomy between sensibility and intellect, his distinction between sensation and perception also provides a phenomenologically based theoretical foundation for solving the internal contradictions of Mou’s “intellectual intuition”: while sensation is equivalent to intellectual intuition as a way for intuiting the thing-in-itself, it involves sensibility and non-creativity, and therefore avoids Mou’s two theoretical contradictions.

This essay investigates the problem about the modularity of central cognitive architecture, focusing on how to grasp the debate between Fodorian minimal modularism and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) proposed by evolutionary psychologists. Both conceive of the idea of "modularity" in different ways. While minimal modularism takes "informational encapsulation" to be essential to modules, the MMH does not. Furthermore, their idea of "domain specificity" does not even agree. This essay does not take the debate to be mere verbal issue. Instead, this essay argues that from the minimal modularist point of view, due to the holistic and isotropic features essential to central mechanisms, such mechanisms are informationally unencapsulated and hence are not modular in the Fodorian sense. This is something not denied by evolutionary psychology. This essay then raises six objections to the MMH and concludes accordingly that even on the MMH conception of modularity, the central cognitive system need not be massively modular.

Professor Mou Zongsan once proclaimed: “Kant has no great successors in the West.” Recently, Professor Karl Ameriks also uttered: “A supposed childless professor, Kant the metaphysician left behind a fertile family of illegitimate heirs.” By contrasting Mou’s and Ameriks’ perspectives employed to express a somehow shared sentiment, this paper intends to extract the philosophical imports from this seemingly mere sentiment taking place in the history of philosophy.Mou believes that Kant is often too polite to attribute “intellectual intuition” exclusively to God. Instead, Mou, by taking the stand of Chinese practical philosophy, attributes “intellectual intuition” to humans, thus dissolves the gap between “phenomena and thing-in-itself” and further establishes an “absolute realism” based on values. Ameriks, on the other hand, thinks that Kant’s philosophy is apologetic and modest in comparison to its direct successors in German Idealism. The transformation of Kant into the German Idealism through advocating “the primacy of practical reason” by K. L. Reinhold, however, also misunderstands Kant's very basic discourse of critical philosophy. On the other hand, in the absence of English translation of Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, theAnglo-American Kantians, get Kant’s philosophy expressed in a completely different direction. By following the thread of exact science, they convert the Kantian philosophy to logical positivism, scientific realism and pragmatism, and thus miss the critical flavor of Kant's original insights. Only the early Romantics, in Ameriks’ view, have inherited Kant's critical philosophical thinking.

The category of “li” as it appears in the Yueji (Record of Music) chapter of the Liji (Book of Rites) is of considerable significance. On the one hand, the Liji Yueji contains the first instance of the word ‘lunli’ in the history of the category of “li.” On the other hand, following Zhuangzi, it contains an early use of the concept of “tianli” (principle of nature) and broadens this to “tianli renyu” (principle of nature and human desires). From all meanings of the character ‘li’ in the pre-Qin period, the Yueji inherited its aspects of “internal property and operational pattern of all things and events,” “consciousness of destiny and life,” and “ethics” (lunli). From a school perspective, the Yueji blends the thought of the Confucian, Daoist and Mohist schools, yet with Confucianism as its main framework. It moreoverbuilds a three-level tacit structure with li as body (ti), etiquette and music as performance (xiang), and the practice of social traditions and customs as function (yong). Moreover, the Yueji also generates close connections between “li” and other philosophical categories, thereby revealing the intellectual context of the category of “li” in the pre-Qin period.

尋覓一套適切的語言，以便用於有關上帝的言說（God - talk），歷久以 來都是神學及哲學的一個重要課題。比喻作為一種語言的工具，自古已被應 用到不同的知識範疇，但對宗教論述而言，類比的方法卻是經由中世紀的托 馬斯‧阿奎那推廣後，才開始被廣泛採用。但阿奎那式的類比法也並非普遍 被接納。其中的主要爭論，是在於文字究竟是否只可以作單一意義的闡釋，還是可以像比喻那樣具有多重涵義。當代學術界的研究，對宗教語言的討論 更是火上加油：邏輯實證論者堅持認為有關上帝的言說都是毫無意義的，因 為真理的宣稱永不能在這個範疇得以立定。有些批評者更認為，宗教是屬於 「不能言說」的世界，人們只能以沉默來回應。這些批評驅使宗教思想家們急於作出回應。前牛津大學基督宗教哲學教授藍聖恩（Ian Ramsey）對此挑 戰作出了當面的回應。他的回答可分為兩方面。首先，他固然是要在這些哲 學的批判之前為宗教語言作出辯護。與此同時，他也渴望說明護教學其實能 夠從邏輯經驗主義的理論找到支持。藍氏所建構的「模型」（model）與「揭 示」（disclosure）進路，恰能證明宗教語言在經驗世界的基礎。他的進路也 顯示出，宗教言說所涵概的足以超越經驗主義對真理與意義的狹隘定義。本 文的目的，是將阿奎那的類比法與藍氏的模型理論作一個比較，並特別指出 兩個方法同樣是從可見的到不可見的進路來言說上帝。與此同時，本文也會 指出，兩者因着不同的本體論引申而來的基本區別。

The epistemological positions of Kant and Hegel are greatly different, and the meanings they give to the idea of God play a clear indication to it. Both of them have the same idea of God as “ens realissimum,” but they understand it differently. The reasons why there is a great difference between the two philosophers could be seen in the fact that the purport of their dealing with the problems of God is different and their theological views of the world are not the same. In this article I propose to contrast Kant’s statement on the idea of God with Hegel’s on the basis of their respective metaphysical ideas and methods.

Wang Tingxiang is one of the most highly regarded Qi theory ideologists. Originally developed by Zhang Zai, Qi theory is about the human nature. However, Wang Tingxiang often quoted Cheng Hao’s Qi theory which was different from Zhang Zai’s. He pointed out that since Zhang Zai, neo-Confucian scholars have divided human nature into philosophical connotations and natural disposition. This division is accordingly deviated from traditional Confucian philosophy. He believed instead that human nature is a natural disposition and supported the idea of inherent qualities. He suggests that human nature includes both good and evil, persisting that all these arguments can be directly supported by Cheng Hao’s ideas. In this way, it seems as if the two scholars had the same view on thetheory of human nature. However, in the latest perspective of Neo-Confucianism researches, Wang Tingxiang is regarded as a representative of Monism of Qi from the Ming Dynasty, while Cheng Hao is a representative of the Theory of One Origin. From this perspective, there must be some significant differences between the two. This essay attempts to identify these differences. The former discussed human nature in an analytic way and the latter did it through the idea of integration. Of greatest importance is Wang Tingxiang’s refusal of the aspect of integration. Although both basing their discussion of human nature on natural disposition, Cheng Hao accepted the division between philosophical connotations and natural disposition in his integration theory, whereas Wang Tingxiangabsolutely refused the possibility of philosophical connotations. By taking their theories of human nature into account, this essay attempts to discuss thesimilarities and differences between Cheng Hao and Wang Tingxiang from the following three questions: What is human nature? Is human nature good, evil or both? Is it possible to remove evil and follow the good?

The main concern of this paper is Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom which received heavy criticism. Basically he divides Kant’s theory of freedom into two different periods, namely the period of semi-critical moral theory around 1781 and the period of mature theory of freedom in second Critique. In the first part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom by Allison, he tries to develop the first period of Kant’s theory of freedom based on the texts of the first Critique. His main thesis is the following: In the semi-critical period, Kant tries to construct a theory of rational agency based on the concept of practical freedom. In the third partof Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Allison argues further that Kant develops a new theory of freedom in order to justify the use of practical freedom, and in the center of this justification lies the concept of transcendental freedom. Allison claimed that Kant did not solve the problem of transcendental freedom in Groundwork III until the publication of the second Critique. He called Kant’s arguments “Reciprocity Thesis” and “Doctrine of fact of pure reason”.

Jia Yi (賈誼) was a political philosopher active in the West Han Wendi (西漢文帝) period. At this time, Li (‘禮’) was growing in importance and Jia Yi was one of its leading proponents. Most academics point out that Jia Yi’s conception of Li was influenced by Xunzi (荀子). However, in Jia Yi’s book Jia Yi Xinshu (賈誼新書), we cannot find any obvious influence from Xunzi. On the contrary, when Jia Yi spoke about Li he quoted ancient documents such as Guanzi (管子), Qingshishi zhi ji (青史氏之記), Xueli (學禮), Quli (曲禮), Wangzhi (王制).This article will first examine Jia Yi’s conception of Li based on the analytical constructs of ‘visualization (可視化)’ and ‘discipline (規訓化)’ in Jia Yi Xinshu. Second, it will discuss the relationship between Xunzi and Jia Yi Xinshu. Though there is a strong resemblance between the two, Jia Yi Xinshu does not refer to Xunzi. Why is this? On the one hand, Jia Yi was very conscious of the Qin (秦) dynasty, at which time one premier, Li Si (李 斯), was a student of Xunzi. However, in the early days of the Han dynasty, the Qin was not held in particularly high esteem and thus Jia Yi could not overtly refer to Xunzi. Furthermore, Jia Yi had read not only Xunzi, but also many other ancient documents, no longer extant today, and so he did not necessarily need to quote from Xunzi. We should not neglect these points, and accordingly, we must reconsider the role of Xunzi’s thinking at the beginning of the Han dynasty.