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Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents

1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Hilan Bensusan, Manuel De Pinedo Epistemic virtues and transparency
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Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely accepted they are from a third-personal point of view. We show that beliefs formed in a way that is insufficiently first-personal may not be transparently accessible to those holding them.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Darren Bradley Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori
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Jenkins has developed a theory of the a priori that she claims solves the problem of how justification regarding our concepts can give us justification regarding the world. She claims that concepts themselves can be justified, and that beliefs formed by examining such concepts can be justified a priori. I object that we can have a priori justified beliefs with unjustified concepts if those beliefs have no existential import. I then argue that only beliefs without existential import can be justified a priori on the widely held conceptual approach. This limits the scope of the a priori and undermines arguments for essentialism.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Martin Stokhof The Quest for Purity: Another Look at the New Wittgenstein
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This short note takes another look at the ideas proposed by the ‘New Wittgen steinians’, focusing on a feature of the discussion these ideas have generated that hitherto seems to have received comparatively little attention, viz., certain assumptions about the conception of philosophy as an intellectual enterprise, including its relation to the sciences, that seem to be adopted by both the New Wittgensteinians and (many of) their critics.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
William J. Melanson Reassessing the Epistemological Challenge to Mathematical Platonism
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In his Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, Hartry Field attempted to revitalize the epistemological case against mathematical platontism by challenging mathematical platonists to explain how we could be epistemically reliable with regard to the abstract objects of mathematics. Field suggested that the seeming impossibility of providing such an explanation tends to undermine belief in the existence of abstract mathematical objects regardless of whatever reason we have for believing in their existence. After more than two decades, Field’s explanatory challenge remains among the best available motivations for mathematical nominalism. This paper argues that Field’s explanatory challenge misidentifies the central epistemological problem facing mathematical platonism. Contrary to Field’s suggestion, inexplicability of epistemic reliability does not act as an epistemic defeater. The failure to explain our epistemic reliability with respect to the existence and properties of abstract mathematical objects is simply one aspect of a broader failure to establish that we are epistemically reliable with respect to abstract mathematical objects in the first place. Ultimately, it is this broader failure that is the source of mathematical platonism’s real epistemological problems.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Murat Baç, Nurbay Irmak Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses?
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The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. Then, taking Allan Hazlett’s recent account of the gap between traditional analyses of knowledge and actual epistemic practices of real cognitive agents as a point of departure, we spell out a non-universalist and non-extensionalistperspective on the value of “knowing wrongly.”
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Noriaki Iwasa Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem
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Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume’s or Smith’s theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it draws normative claims from human nature. Anyway, the sentiments of anger, resentment, vengeance, superiority, sympathy, and benevolence show that drawing norms from human nature is sometimes morally problematic. The changeability of the moral sense and moral sentiments in Hume’s and Smith’s theories supports this idea. Hutcheson’s theory is morally more appropriate because it bases morality on disinterested benevolence. Yetdisinterested benevolence is not enough for morality. There are no sentiments the presence of which alone makes any action moral.
book reviews
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Miklavž Vospernik Thought Experiment in the Natural Sciences
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8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Iris Vidmar Literature, Analytically Speaking: Explorations in the Theory of Interpretation, Analytic Aesthetics, and Evolution (Series: Cognitive Approaches to Literature and Culture)
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9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Nenad Miščević Our Knowledge of the Internal World
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10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Karmen Marguč A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (Environmental Ethics and Science Policy)
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11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Table of Contents of Vol. XI
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