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articles
1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Paolo Labinaz Argumentation as a Speech Act: A (Provisional) Balance
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This paper investigates whether, and if so, in what way, argumentation can be profitably described in speech-act theoretical terms. I suggest that the two theories of argumentation that are supposed to provide the most elaborate analysis of it in speech-act theoretical terms (namely van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst’s Pragma-Dialectics and Lilian Bermejo-Luque’s linguistic normative model of argumentation) both suffer from the same two flaws: firstly, their “illocutionary act pluralism” assumption and secondly, a lack of interest in where arguing belongs in the classification of illocutionary acts. I argue that these flaws derive from the authors’ reliance on an intention-based speech-theoretical framework. Finally, I adopt a deontic framework for speech acts in order to propose an alternative way of accounting for argumentation which seems to overcome the two limitations outlined above. According to this framework, argumentation may be conceived as a speech act sequence, characterized by the conventional effects brought about by the communicative moves (as illocutionary acts) of which it is composed.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Danilo Šuster Arguing about Free Will: Lewis and the Consequence Argument
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I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is power necessity (“no choice” operator), while Lewis analyses the version where the central notion is the locution “cannot render false.”Lewis accepts closure of the relevant (in)ability operator under entailment but not closure under implication. His strategy has a seemingly strange corollary: a free predetermined agent is able (in a strong, causal sense) to falsity the conjunction of history and law. I compare a Moorean position with respect to radical skepticism and knowledge closure with ability closure and propose to explain Lewis’s strategy in the framework of his Moorean stance.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Martina Blečić Implicitness, Logical Form and Arguments
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In the paper I suggest that a loose notion of logical form can be a useful tool for the understanding or evaluation of everyday language and the explicit and implicit content of communication. Reconciling ordinary language and logic provides formal guidelines for rational communication, giving strength and order to ordinary communication and content to logical schemas. The starting point of the paper is the idea that the bearers of logical form are not natural language sentences, but what we communicate with them, that is, their content in a particular context. On the basis of that idea, I propose that we can ascribe logical proprieties to what is communicated using ordinary language and suggest a continuum between semantic phenomena such as explicatures and pragmatic communicational strategies such as (particularized) conversational implicatures, which challenges the idea that an implicatum is completely separate from what is said. I believe that this continuum can be best explained by the notion of logical form, taken as a propriety of sentences relative to particular interpretations.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Luigi Pavone On Formalizing Logical Modalities
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This paper is in the scope of the philosophy of modal logic; more precisely, it concerns the semantics of modal logic, when the modal elements are interpreted as logical modalities. Most authors have thought that the logic for logical modality—that is, the one to be used to formalize the notion of logical truth (and other related notions)—is to be found among logical systems in which modalities are allowed to be iterated. This has raised the problem of the adequacy, to that formalization purpose, of some modal schemes, such as S4 and S5 . It has been argued that the acceptance of S5 leads to non-normal modal systems, in which the uniform substitution rule fails. The thesis supported in this paper is that such a failure is rather to be attributed to what will be called “Condition of internalization.” If this is correct, there seems to be no normal modal logic system capable of formalizing logical modality, even when S5 is rejected in favor of a weaker system such as S4, as recently proposed by McKeon.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Matej Sušnik The Intuition behind the Non-Identity Problem
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This paper examines a well-known non-identity case of a mother who chooses to conceive a blind child instead of a sighted one. While some people accept the non-identity argument and claim that we should reject the intuition that the mother’s act is morally wrong, others hold onto that intuition and try to find a fault in the non-identity argument. This paper proposes a somewhat middle approach. It is argued that the conclusion of the non-identity argument is not necessarily in conflict with our intuitive response to this case.
book reviews
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
David Grčki Jonathan Gilmore, Apt Imaginings, Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind
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7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Iris Vidmar Jovanović Wolfgang Huemer and Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Beauty: New Essays in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art
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8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Iva Martinić Ivan Cerovac, Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy
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9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Acknowledgement to Referees
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10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Table of Contents of Vol. XXI
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