This paper replies to Fred Ablondi’s discussion of Descartes’s treatment of madness in the Meditations. Against Ablondi’s interpretation that Descartes never seriously takes on board the skeptical hypothesis that he might be mad, because to do so would be for him to undermine the logical thought processes required to realize his agenda in the Meditations, I contend that Descartes does employ madness as a skeptical device, by assimilating its skeptical essentials into the dream argument. I maintain that while Descartes does not use madness to undermine logical processes, he does adduce other considerations that reveal him to be prepared to see those processes undermined. On the question why Descartes abandons madness in the Meditations, I argue that, despite its attractiveness as a skeptical device, the madness hypothesis involves methodological shortcomings that render it unfit for service in the doubt.

This article presents a reading of Mill in which his view of self is social rather than individualistic. I will provide criticisms of the radically-individualist interpretations of Mill offered by John Gray, R. P. Anschutz, and Robert Wolff. Gray and Anschutz get Mill wrong from the right, and Wolff gets Mill wrong from the left. Mill’s individualism has at times been overstated, leading to a neglect of the importance that he places on positive community influence of moral agents. This heavy emphasis on individual detachment can lead to an (intended or not) impression that Mill’s individual is thoroughly atomistic. An overemphasis on the individualism in Mill neglects the importance of community’s role in nurturing the individual to be united with fellow citizens, to develop sympathetic affections, and to be integrated into a unified web of corroborative associations.

Immanuel Kant’s position on international justice is beset by some troublesome inconsistencies, most notably a conflicted set of views on the status of federations as suitable alternatives to a world state. It is tempting for contemporary readers to interpret Kant’s indecision as a lack of commitment or resoluteness. Closer inspection demonstrates that this problem involves deeper paradoxes, rooted in the concept of sovereignty. On this matter, Kant’s Rechtslehre is the source of the difficulties found in the “popular” essays. Kant’s vacillating position on the proper institutional end for international relations is attributable to the fundamentally “permissive” character of his concept of right. Rechtslehre doctrines entail a form of skepticism, from which a coherent cosmopolitan program cannot possibly be derived.

This essay attempts to counter the claim that there is a significant shift or even a break in the body of Merleau-Ponty’s work, one that dramatically moves from a focus on perception to a focus on language. This break proves to be untenable for the following reasons: (1) The early studies of perception do not disregard the importance of language. (2) The later studies of language do not disregard perception and are purposely taken up to help more fully enlighten the importance of the earlier works. (3) The relatively recent appearance of Merleau-Ponty’s later Nature reveals that the author returns to earlier ontological studies in order to develop them more fully, and that he does so, in part, to more fully understand the emergence of human perception and its connection to language.

Spinoza assigns to the imagination a wide-ranging and often disparate looking set of operations. Commentators have long recognized that these operations share a certain proximity to the body and a common tendency to lead people into error. Yet others remark on the apparent thinness of an overarching theme. This article examines the prominent and often underappreciated role of memory in unifying Spinoza’s account of imaginative cognition. The discussion revisits various aspects of imagination in light of their integrated characterization as forms of remembering. The article also assesses reasons other than memory that Spinoza has for grouping them in common. The examination focuses on the intrinsic character of the imagination and its related operations in the Ethics, while occasionally bringing other works into play.

Christian philosophers have always been interested in clarifying the relationship between God and ethics. The theories presented on this topic can be divided into two kinds: “divine command” and “other.” In this paper I evaluate two interesting but ultimately incompatible versions of the “other” variety: one by George Mavrodes and one by Søren Kierkegaard. In the course of my analysis I argue that anyone who reads Kierkegaard’s Works of Love as presenting a divine command theory (e.g., C. Stephen Evans in his recent book Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love) is mistaken.