Stanley Cavell has suggested that the deepest roots of skepticism lie in a sense of alienation between the subject and the world, and this has led him to reassess the philosophical importance of the Romantic project of “re-enchanting” the world. One way to pursue this project is by starting from Kant’s reflections on the sublime. I consider Julian Young’s recent discussion of this topic and the Heideggeran pantheism to which it leads him. I conclude that, while there is much insight in Young’s reflections, there are crucial weaknesses in his position that point towards the plausibility of re-configuring it in more theistic and / or Platonic terms.

The article analyzes Anselm of Canterbury’s development of three meanings of “nothing” in the Monologion, and a fourth in three later works: De casu diaboli, one of his letters, and his Incomplete Work. By focusing exclusively on the points where the meaning of nothing is first presented and then successively redefined, we can see that Anselm rejects the idea of creation ex nihilo by arguing that the things created by God had some form of existence before they were created, and that creation refers not to coming into existence but to coming into being. In the three later works Anselm extends the meaning of nothing to show that it has a surprisingly positive content, since it is a term of negation that has meaning only in terms of what it excludes or negates. Anselm’s analysis of nothing seems to presage many modern discussions this subject.

For Plotinus, although the One and the Intellect are transcendent sources of the cosmos, they are also omnipresent within it. At first, the mutual omnipresence and transcendence of the One and the Intellect seem contradictory, but their omnipresence and transcendence are perfectly consistent outcomes of the relation of the cosmos to the One and the Intellect. For the perfection of the One entails both that the One has power to generate and that it is mutually transcendent and omnipresent in the universe. Plotinus extends his principles of perfection, transcendence, and omnipresence to include the relation of the body to the soul by explaining that the soul can transcend the body while the body is within it. Hence, Plotinus is able to fashion an efficient and consistent metaphysics in which Godcontains the universe and the soul contains the body without denying the transcendent perfection of either.

This essay critiques the ontology and epistemology of African philosophy, with particular attention to Odera Oruka’s sage philosophy project, one of the most influential schools of thought in African philosophy. Oruka posits an absolutist ontology that holds to a conception of epistemology as presuppositionless and transcendental. Against this, I argue for a critical contextual epistemology that proffers a view of epistemology as embodied, linguistically performed, social, ideological, rhetorical, and contextual. I argue, ultimately, that a critical contextual epistemology is not only useful for charting new directions in African philosophy but also may illuminate productive intersections between African philosophy and Western philosophy.

In this paper I will argue that a false assumption drives the attraction of philosophers to a divine command theory of morality. Specifically, I suggest the idea thatanything not created by God is independent of God is a misconception. The idea misleads us into thinking that our only choice in offering a theistic ground for morality is between making God bow to a standard independent of his will or God creating morality in revealing his will. Yet what is God is hardly independent of him, and in coupling a perfect being theology with the doctrine of divine simplicity we discover that God’s “reason” is God. Accordingly, obeying the truths of goodness that we humans speak of as contained in the divine wisdom hardly impugns the divine sovereignty. By modifying divine command ethics to give primacyto God’s love or justice, thinkers such as Robert M. Adams, Philip L. Quinn, and Edward J. Wierenga admit the repugnance of this picture in spite of their verbal allegiance to divine command ethics. Accordingly, they implicitly concede that basing morality on God’s sheer power should not be the preferred option for the Christian theist.

Hume’s destructive account of miracles has been thought by many to exclude the possibility of rationally accepting testimony to supernatural events. Here I argue that even if one grants that his argument works with respect to testimony about miracles, it does not succeed in showing that all testimony to the supernatural is inadmissible, since room is left open for religious experiences, especially those of an intersubjective kind, to function as evidence. If this is so, there is new reason to think that his exclusion of miracle claims might be unwarranted.

In Truth in Aquinas, John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock attempt to render a “radically orthodox” reading of Aquinas that rejects an autonomous realm of natural reason unaided by faith. I argue that Milbank and Pickstock’s account fails as a reading of Aquinas and is problematic as a theory of the relationship between faith and reason. After sketching Milbank and Pickstock’s understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, I examine Aquinas’s doctrines of grace and divine naming in order to show how they resist Milbank and Pickstock’s attempt to do away with the distinct and autonomous category of natural reason. I then conclude by considering how Milbank and Pickstock’s failure to preserve the integrity and autonomy of natural reason ironically tends toward fideism whilesimultaneously threatening to deprive faith of its meaning.