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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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30
Piotr Boltuc
An Ethics Grounded in Metaphysics
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Why is there something rather than nothing? This question, formulated by Leibniz, constitutes the basis of modern European ontology. In many ways this can be termed the main question of philosophy; but if so, a similar but less attended to question comes to mind, which I shall call the second best question of philosophy. The second best question of philosophy: Why is it better that there is something rather than nothing? seems to constitute a natural basis for moral theory. The latter question often appears in philosophy of religion, in arguments leading to the thesis that God the Creator is good. Yet, modern moral philosophy tended to shy away from such a direct grounding in metaphysics. Not anymore. Luciano Floridi’s ethics based on anti-entropy is still a new and somewhat understated theory; having originated from information ethics it seems to have a hard time establishing itself as a general moral theory. But the potential of becoming a major alternative to the main positions in moral theory is there. It is my goal in this paper to highlight the promise, as well as certain difficulties, of Floridi’s theory. I will also undertake to move the work on anti-entropy ethics one step further, towards becoming a general moral theory.
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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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30
Jalalul Haq
Politics of A-humanism in Derrida
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Derrida, especially in his late work Politics of Friendship (1997), has introduced the concept of ‘a‐humanist’ politics in the context of his general project of the deconstruction of politics as following upon his showing all such words as state, nation, democracy, justice, law, community et al to be fundamentally breached by their own opposites. All these notions may be retained at one level but also transcended and transgressed by confronting them with their binaries. Derrida’s entire discursive endeavour indeed is characterized by the motifs of transgression and extratranscendence. All the notions of rationality, sanity, normality, morality etc. need to be aporetically transcended and breached. Even the ‘humanity’, the least innocuous of the terms, would be supplanted by the opposite of ‘ahumanity’. ‘Is it possible’, asks Derrida, ‘without setting off loud protests on the part of militants of an edifying or dogmatic humanism, to think and to live … the experience of a certain ahumanity, beyond or below the commerce of gods and men?’ The politics, here, ‘exceeds the measure of man, without becoming a theologem’ (p.294). What could one say about this politics which resists becoming a ‘theologem’ but is still a politics, a politics beyond politics, politics of mysticism in other words. Itcertainly saves us from the dangers of certitude, of dogmatism, even of opinion. But does it also not deprive us of our own selves i.e. our humanity, our community and nation, our values and our God. Is the commitment to a voluntary death our only fate. Is the messiah of Derrida a saviour who saves or is he one who facilitates our death by coming into life himself? Is he the symbol of life or death – death of others, and then of himself.
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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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Fabio Minazzi
Preti's Philosophical Thought and His Contribution to A Priori Historization
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TGiulio Preti, born in Pavia (Italy) in 1911 and dead in Djerba (Tunisia) in 1972, represents one of the most subtle Italian thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century. After graduating in 1933 discussing a thesis about The Husserl’s historical significance, he connected more and more to the Antonio Banfi’s lesson of critical rationalism and he elected him as his master. Starting from Banfi’s The principles of a reason theory (1927), Preti studied in depth the program of historization of the Kantian transcendental both in books such as Idealism and positivism (1942), and in Praxis and empiricism (1957), in Rhetoric and logic (1968), and then in his numerous essay studies, later collected in fundamental posthumous volumes, Philosophical essays (1976, 2 vol.). Preti’s decisive problem is the following question: how is it possible to historicize human knowledge without a relativization? According to Preti, in order to answer this question, it is necessary to acknowledge the objectivity of scientific knowledge. The objective knowledge mustn’t be confused with an absolute knowledge or, least of all, with a subjective, or toutcourt relative, knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to avoid either opposite poles, but specular, in which the different epistemologicaltraditions of the last century are, on the contrary, stopped. In Preti’s opinion, the objectivity of knowledge arises from the eidetic, linguistic and operative structures, within the limits of which develops a determinate form of human scientific knowledge. In other words: every scientific knowledge, structured into a particularscientific theory and relating to a particular technological heritage, consists of a precise theoretical-practical horizon, that determines, with Husserl’s words, a specific “ontological region”, or, with Bachelard’s words, a specific “ontogenesis”. So Preti recovers the heuristic rule of the Kant’s transcendental reason. Nevertheless, unlike Kant, Preti believes the aprioristic structures of our ideas always have a conventional and historical foundation. In this way, the Kantian a priori changes into an historical and relativistic a priori. Certainly in Kant’s opinion an historical and relativistic a priori would have looked like a “round-square”, an authentic contradiction, a pure logical impossibility. According to Preti, on the contrary, this paradoxical aspect is the true distinctive feature of scientificknowledge objectivity, which has no more any eternal or absolute value, but is always built by men born to die and is always bound to determinate historical forms of civilization. Starting from these assumptions, Preti builds, in this way, a research programme on the possibility to individualize a form of “critic ontologism”, which hasn’t any more connection with the claims and the traditional metaphysical structures of the “Being qua Being”. On the contrary, Preti thinks the only “being” we can rationally talk about is the one constituted within the different cognitive ambits. Philosophy then must be able to develop a “meta-reflection” on different knowledge elaborated by single sciences. According to Preti, in fact, philosophy is the formality of human culture, it is, in other words, a form of self-reflection by the human culture about itself. Therefore philosophy has no more any privileged subject, but it must be always able to reflect, with great theoretical humility, on the different cognitive forms, in order to study languages, structures, methods, extension and limits of the human knowledge. In this way Preti’s “critic ontologism” is a kind of historical-objective transcendentalism, able to study the different configurations of the technical-scientific heritage produced by mankind during his history.
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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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Jean Ferrari
Comment Repenser La Philosophie Aujourd’hui?
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Avant de vouloir repenser la philosophie aujourd’hui, ne faudrait-il pas, d’abord, penser l’aujourd’hui de la philosophie, c’està-dire se demander quelles sont les différentes conceptions qu’au XXème siècle on a données de la philosophie, ou encore ce que les philosophes font sous le nom de philosophie, bref faire une sorte d’inventaire de l’univers philosophique. Défi impossible à relever tant sont diverses les activités de ceux qui se disent philosophes, mais il est possible de relever une rupture entre la philosophie traditionnelle, attachée à son histoire, à des recherches régionales hautement spéculatives, et une conception plus populaire de la philosophie, répondant aux besoins manifestés par nos contemporains, à la recherche de repères dans un monde incertain. C’est ce que je voudrais developer.
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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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Julia Urabayen
Repensando la sociabilidad humana con Bergson
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La philosophie de Bergson, plus concrètement sa dernière oeuvre Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, porte une grande attention aux problèmes des sociétés contemporaines: la violence et la guerre. Le Français souligne les difficultés qui existent pour arriver à une vraie coexistence et, comme philosophe, il se demande quelles sont les sources de la sociabilité humaine. C’est seulement lorsque l’homme travaillera pour établir une relation adéquate entre son ego intérieur et son ego extérieur, qu’il sera prêt à coexister avec les autres personnes qui habitent dans le même monde. De plus, Bergson pense qu’il y a deux sources de sociabilité, l’obligation et l’ouverture, et il a l’intention de mettre en relief l’importance de la seconde afin d’établir la démocratie, vue comme la meilleure option pour la coexistence humaine.
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