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i. new approaches to divine hiddenness
1. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Eleonore Stump Eleonore Stump
Theology and the Knowledge of Persons
Teologia I Wiedza o Osobach

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The aim of the paper is to discern between philosophy and theology. A philosopher is looking after impersonal wisdom, a theologian searches for a personal God. This differentiation is fundamental because knowledge of persons differs from knowledge that. The author shows how taking into account the fact that theology is based on the second-person knowledge changes the way one should approach the hiddenness argument.
2. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Paul K. Moser Paul K. Moser
Experiential Dissonance and Divine Hiddenness
Dysonans Doświadczeniowy i Boże Ukrycie

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Our expectations for human experience of God can obscure the reality and the presence of such experience for us. They can lead us to look in the wrong places for God’s presence, and they can lead us not to look at all. This article counters the threat of misleading expectations regarding God, while acknowledging a role for diving hiding from humans on occasion. It contends that, given God’s perfect moral character, we should expect typical human experience of God to have moral dissonance, that is, experiential conflict in morally relevant ways. We shall see the evidential or cognitive importance of how humans respond to such dissonance. Our failing to respond cooperatively with God can result either in our obscuring evidence of divine reality or in God’s hiding divine self-manifestation for redemptive purposes aimed at our benefit.
3. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Miłosz Hołda, Dominique Lambert Miłosz Hołda
The Problem of Divine Hiddenness in the Context of Science
Problem Bożej Ukrytości w Kontekście Nauki

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The aim of the paper is to try to find a solution to the problem of divine hiddenness, which in the context of science takes the form of the question of why, if God exists, science can completely ignore Him and yet explain away so much. We formulate the “argument from hiddenness in the context of science” modelled on the “argument from hiddenness” proposed by J. L. Schellenberg and show possible ways to refute this argument. We also propose a refutation in the form of “explanatory absconditheism,” the best expression of which is the thesis of “articulation” of scientific and theological ways of explaining the world. We also argue that the thesis of “explanatory absconditheism” can be extended to the entire discussion of divine hiddenness, providing possible response to the “argument from hiddenness.”
ii. discussions with j. l. schellenberg
4. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
J. L. Schellenberg The Hiddenness Argument
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5. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Travis Dumsday Travis Dumsday
From Satan’s Wager to Eve’s Gambit to Our Leap: An Anselmian Reply to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness
Od Zakładu Szatana, Przez Podstęp Ewy, Do Naszego Skoku

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While St. Anselm does not supply us with an explicit discussion of the problem of divine hiddenness (PDH) as it is typically conceived today—namely, as an argument for atheism—he is keenly aware of the existential difficulty posed by our seeming lack of access to God. Moreover, he provides the ingredients for an interesting and heretofore neglected approach to the PDH, one rooted in multiple Christian narratives about lapses from knowledge-infused states of grace, both angelic and human. The goal of this paper is to draw out that Anselmian approach explicitly, and to provide at least a rudimentary assessment of it.
6. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Jeff Jordan Jeff Jordan
The Argument from Divine Hiddenness and Christian Love
Argument z Bożego Ukrycia i Chrześcijańska Miłość

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In the paper it is argued that the conceptual resources of Christianity topple the hiddenness argument. According to the author, the variability of the divine love cast doubt on the soundness of Schellenberg’s reasoning. If we understood a perfect love as a maximal and equal concern and identification with all and for all, then a divine love would entail divine impartiality, but because of conflicts of interest between human beings the perfect, divine love cannot be maximal.
7. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Marek Dobrzeniecki, Derek King Marek Dobrzeniecki
The Theology of Hiddenness: J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness, and the Role of Theology
Boże Ukrycie I Rola Teologii

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The paper explores Pascal’s idea according to which the teachings of the Church assume the hiddenness of God, and, hence, there is nothing surprising in the fact of the occurrence of nonresistant nonbelief. In order to show it the paper invokes the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Church as the Body of Christ, and the Original Sin. The first one indicates that there could be greater than nonbelief obstacle in forming interpersonal bonds with God, namely the ontological chasm between him and human persons. The assumption of the human nature by the Son of God could be seen as a cure for this problem. The doctrine of the Church shows it as an end in itself, and in order for the Church to have meaning and to exist there has to be nonbelief in the world. Finally, the dogma of the Original Sin shows that there is no category of purely nonresistant nonbelief. The paper also addresses Schellenberg’s “accommodationist strategy” from the perspective of the Christian theology and in the last part it investigates what should be the influence of the fact of the hiddenness on theology’s take on the divine revelation.
8. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Ryszard Mordarski Ryszard Mordarski
Benevolence or Mercy?: The Problem with the First Premise of the Hiddenness Argument
Dobroczynność Czy Miłosierdzie?

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The first premise of J. L. Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument equates God’s love with a positive relationship to human beings. To illustrate this relationship, the human model of parental love is used, based on the standards of the modern American liberal world, not on the biblical standard. As a result, we attribute to God a narrowly understood horizontal relationship towards people, which is completely alien to the understanding of love developed in the Christian tradition. When we refer to the classical theism that recognized love as the central attribute of God, we will see that it should be understood in a vertical model, consisting in the offering of good and mercy. This understanding undermines the benevolent theism and replaces it with the merciful theism or theism of mercy. Ultimately, this makes the first premise of the Hiddenness Argument very questionable and the whole argument calls for a significant revision.
9. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Pavel Butakov Pavel Butakov
Divine Openness for Physical Relationship
Boża Otwartość na Fizyczną Relację

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The success of the atheistic hiddenness argument depends on the “consciousness constraint” it imposes on the divine-human loving relationship: namely, that this relationship requires human conscious awareness of being in the relationship with God. I challenge the truth of this proposition by introducing the concept of a physical relationship with God that is not subject to this constraint. I argue, first, that a physical relationship with God is metaphysically possible; second, that its plausibility is supported by natural theology; and third, that a perfectly loving God would prefer physical relationships with human beings over consciousness-constrained relationships, because a perfectly loving God would prefer to preserve the integrity of human freedom of participation and allow inclusion of all people regardless of their natural cognitive capabilities. I also offer an interpretation of apparent divine hiddenness in the light of the idea of God’s openness for physical relationships.
10. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Jean-Baptiste Guillon Jean-Baptiste Guillon
“You Would Not Seek Me If You Had Not Found Me”—Another Pascalian Response to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness
„Nie Szukałbyś Mnie, Gdybyś Mnie Nie Znalazł” – Inna Pascalowska Odpowiedź Na Problem Bożego Ukrycia)

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One version of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness is about people who are looking for God and are distressed about not finding him. Having in mind such distressed God-seekers, Blaise Pascal imagined Jesus telling them the following: “Take comfort; you would not seek me if you had not found me.” This is what I call the Pascalian Conditional of Hiddenness (PCH). In the first part of this paper, I argue that the PCH leads to a new interpretation of Pascal’s own response to the problem, significantly different from Hick’s or Schellenberg’s interpretations of Pascal. In short: for any person who is distressed about not finding God, and who (for this reason) seriously considers the Argument from Hiddenness, the PCH would show that their own distress constitutes evidence that God is in fact not hidden to them (because this desire for God has been instigated in them by God himself). In the second part of the paper, I set aside the exegetical question and try to develop this original strategy as a contemporary response to one version of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness, which I call the “first-person problem.” I argue that the PCH strategy offers a plausibly actual story to respond to the first-person problem. As a result, even if we need to complement the PCH strategy with other more traditional strategies (in order to respond to other versions of the problem), the PCH strategy should plausibly be part of the complete true story about Divine Hiddenness.
11. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Jacek Wojtysiak Jacek Wojtysiak
How to Be a Christian Ultimist? On Three Lessons J. L. Schellenberg and the Christian Theist Can Learn from Each Other
Jak Być Chrześcijańskim Ultymistą? O Trzech Lekcjach, Których Mogą Sobie Wzajemnie Udzielić J. L. Schellenberg I Chrześcijański Teista

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In this text, in discussion with J. L. Schellenberg, I develop a position that I call Christian ultimism. This position lies between Schellenberg’s simple ultimism and traditional Christian theism. Christian ultimism is more apophatic than personalistic, though it more clearly emphasizes the presence of a supra-personal and communicative element in the Ultimate Reality. The proposed position is resistant to a philosophical version of the hiddenness argument, but it must answer to the challenge of the theological problem of the lack of universal access to Christian revelation. Schellenberg’s idea of deep time both magnifies this problem and provides the tools for solving it: the awareness of deep time does not allow us to judge the future, but it does allow us to hope for a revelation accessible to all at the eschatological end of time.
12. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
J. L. Schellenberg J. L. Schellenberg
Comments for My Colleagues
Komentarze dla Moich Kolegów

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In the paper, the originator of the hiddenness argument, J. L. Schellenberg, responds to papers that challenge his reasoning. In his remarks he puts an emphasis on the concept of divine love and he explains why it is not only connected to the idea of the Christian God. He also clarifies his position on ultimism.
iii. other essays on j. l. schellenberg’s philosophy
13. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Marek Pepliński Marek Pepliński
The Hiddenness Argument and the Ground of Its Soundness
Argument z Ukrycia i Podstawa Jego Trafności

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The paper refers to the argument from hiddenness as presented in John Schellenberg’s book The Hiddenness Argument and the philosophical views expressed there, making this argument understandable. It is argued that conditionals (1) and (2) are not adequately grounded. Schellenberg has not shown that we have the knowledge necessary to accept the premises as true. His justifications referring to relations between people raise doubts. The paper includes an argument that Schellenberg should substantiate its key claim that God has the resources to accommodate the possible consequences of openness to a relationship with finite persons, making them compatible with the flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship that may come to exist between them. At the end of the text, I propose to treat the argument as a rejection of an anthropomorphic God.
14. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Piotr Biłgorajski Piotr Biłgorajski
Ultimism: A Philosophy That Wants to Be a Religion
Ultymizm – Filozofia, Która Chce Być Religią

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Ultimism is the view that there is a metaphysically and axiologically ultimate reality in relation to which it is possible to achieve the ultimate good. John Schellenberg believes that ultimism is the backbone of every religion, while the differences between religions arise from different views of what the nature of the ultimate is. Schellenberg tries to show that if there is progress in religion, then it is most reasonable to assume that we are only at the beginning of the inquiry into the ultimate. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemological and methodological objections can be raised against ultimism. It will present an epistemological argument, pointing to the cognitive limitations of imagination, and a methodological argument, questioning the feasibility of Schellenberg’s project.
artykuły
15. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz Elżbieta Łukasiewicz
Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective
Dlaczego Nadzieja Nie Może Być Cnotą Epistemiczną

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There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.
16. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Wanda Bajor Wanda Bajor
Body–Soul and the Birth and Death of Man: Benedict Hesse’s Opinion in the Mediaeval Discussion
Ciało–Dusza A Narodziny I Śmierć Człowieka

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This issue was discussed with regard to chosen commentaries to Aristotle’s treatise De anima, formed in the so-called via moderna mainstream, in particular those of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Laurentius of Lindores. In such a context, the Cracovian commentaries referring to Parisian nominalists were presented by those of Benedict Hesse and Anonymus. The analyses carried out above allow one to ascertain that although William of Ockham’s opinion questioning the possibility of knowledge of the soul in the field of philosophy, nominalists of the late Middle Ages did not resign from speculation on the beginning (birth) and the separation (death) from the body of the soul, also the fate of the soul after death. They focused on the nature of the matter – human body (embryo, semen) and his relation with the soul (forma) – in the moment of birth. In the aspect of death 14th century scholars undertook the struggle, which was one with the justification of the psycho-physical unity of the human being existing after death solely as an immortal soul. In both thems, they tried to find their solutions, while if they could not solve these aporeticals questions – they had the courage to admit, that is not possible by solely relying on the natural forces of reason. They had to refer to the teaching of christianity, without however falling prey to fideism. This was a methodical endeavour based on the experience that natural reason in searching for the truth is not capable of its own efforts to attain to certain concepts and might on occasion err, it is then that faith becomes its guide and supplies it with more acceptable solutions. This is the courage of one of the greatest philosophers – Plato, who said that you have to have this “great courage” to undertake only probable knowledge, when another is not possible.
17. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Marcin Ferdynus Marcin Ferdynus
O uporczywej terapii oraz środkach zwyczajnych i nadzwyczajnych w polskim kontekście bioetycznym: Na marginesie dwóch debat Polskiego Towarzystwa Bioetycznego
About Persistent Therapy and Ordinary and Extraordinary Means in the Polish Bioethical Context

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W artykule rozważam opinię mówiącą o rezygnacji z terminu „uporczywa terapia” i o potrzebie zastąpienia go terminem „terapia medycznie daremna”. Ponadto zastanawiam się nad przydatnością podziału środków medycznych na zwyczajne i nadzwyczajne. Opowiadam się przeciwko odrzuceniu terminu „uporczywa terapia”, jak również staram się pokazać, że klasyfikacja środków medycznych, która łączy pary pojęć „proporcjonalne/nieproporcjonalne” i „zwyczajne/nadzwyczajne”, może stanowić skuteczną pomoc w podejmowaniu decyzji o rezygnacji z uporczywej terapii zarówno dla lekarza, jak i dla pacjenta. Przedmiotem refleksji czynię wypracowaną przez Polską Grupę Roboczą ds. Etyki Końca Życia definicję uporczywej terapii oraz jej zmodyfikowaną wersję. Zasadniczym kontekstem prowadzonych analiz są opinie niektórych autorów biorących udział w debatach zorganizowanych przez Polskie Towarzystwo Bioetyczne na temat uporczywej terapii oraz terapii medycznie daremnej.
18. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Jacek Filek Jacek Filek
Ambiwalencja greckiej nadziei
Ambivalence of Greek Hope

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Artykuł jest próbą odtworzenia myślenia Greków o fenomenie nadziei. Stwierdzona zostaje wielopoziomowa jej ambiwalencja. Najpierw jako spodziewanie się albo czegoś dobrego, albo czegoś złego. Następnie jako nadzieja negatywna (w znaczeniu nieuzasadniona, nierozumna i prowadząca do zguby) bądź pozytywna (w znaczeniu uzasadniona, rozumna i umożliwiająca ocalenie). Na koniec jako nadzieja moralnie dobra bądź zła w zależności od etycznej oceny jej przedmiotu. Stwierdzona zostaje też korelacja strachu i nadziei. Postawiony zostaje problem odniesienia nadziei do czasu. W tym kontekście są rozważane są poglądy Hezjoda, Tukidydesa, Platona, Arystotelesa i stoików.
19. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Andrzej P. Stefańczyk Andrzej P. Stefańczyk
Jakim rodzajem wnioskowania jest według Arystotelesa argumentacja przez przykład (paradeigma)?
What Kind of Reasoning is, According to Aristotle, the Argument by Example (Paradeigma)?

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Argumentem indukcyjnym w retoryce jest paradygmat (przykład); paradygmat jednak nie polega na przechodzeniu od wielu szczegółowych przypadków do pewnego uogólnienia, czyli uniwersalizacji wszystkich poszczególnych przypadków — jak normalnie w argumentacji z indukcji— lecz jest przejściem od jednego szczegółu do szczegółu innego, podobnego, przy czym wymaganym warunkiem jest to, że jeden i drugi konkretny przypadek należą do tego samego rodzaju. Paradygmat zatem nie jest indukcją w znaczeniu ścisłym, ale wydaje się bardziej spełniać warunki analogii. W artykule zostaje sformułowana teza, że u Arystotelesa występują trzy rodzaje wnioskowań: dedukcja, indukcja i wnioskowanie z przykładu; dla zaprezentowania specyfiki wnioskowania przez paradygmat są także analizowane różne typy wnioskowań, tzn. sylogizm apodeiktyczny, dialektyczny, indukcyjny, aby na tym tle wykazać odrębność wnioskowań przez paradygmat, które wydają się być pewnym rodzajem analogii. Prezentowany więc artykuł jest próbą podania charakterystyki i specyfiki argumentacji przez paradygmat u Arystotelesa w świetle jego Retoryki oraz pism logicznych (Analityki I i Analityki II, Topiki, O dowodach sofistycznych).
20. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Piotr Pasterczyk Piotr Pasterczyk
Model duszy wieloczęściowej jako starożytny horyzont pytania o ludzką wolę w świetle Etyki nikomachejskiej 1111b i Politei 437B – 440D
The Model of the Multipartite Soul as the Antic Horizon of the Question of the Human Will in the Light of the Nicomachean Ethics 111B and the Republic 437B – 440D

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Analiza pojęcia postanowienia (προαίρεσις) i rozumnego pożądania (βούλησις) w trzeciej księdze Etyki Nikomachejskiej 1111B prowadzi Arystotelesa do dyskusji problemu słabości woli (ἀκρασία) w kontekście stosunku między rozumem, pożądliwością i gniewem. Filozoficznym źródłem możliwości takiej dyskusji jest najprawdopodobniej tekst czwartej księgi Politei, w którym Platon dokonuje fundacji teorii wieloczęściowej duszy, umożliwiając tym samym odpowiedź na pytanie o różne od rozumu źródła motywacji ludzkiego działania. Tym samym Platon rozwiązuje aporię sokratejskiego intelektualizmu, w świetle której odpowiedzialny za ludzkie motywacje rozum znajduje się w sprzeczności do fenomenów działania pozbawionych cech rozumności i opanowania. Zestawienie tekstu Etyki 111B oraz Politei 437B – 440D otwiera horyzont pytania o możliwość platońskiej genezy ludzkich aktów wolitywnych, a w dalszej perspektywie także pojęcia ludzkiej woli. Owocem tego zestawienia jest bowiem próba interpretacji platońskiej teorii duszy w świetle arystotelesowskiego pojęcia ὄρεξις, za którego pomocą Stagiryta wyodrębnia trzy analogiczne do platońskiego rozumu, pożądliwości i gniewu (λογισμός – ἐπιθυμία – θυμός) elementy duszy, takie jak rozumne pożądanie, pożądliwość i gniew (βούλησις – θυμοειδές – ἐπιθυμητικόν). Dostrzeżenie możliwości platońskiej genezy aktów wolitywnych zdefiniowanych później przez Augustyna w kontekście pojęcia woli (voluntas) opiera się na stwierdzeniu związku między rozumnym pożądaniem interpretowanym przez Arystotelesa jak akt wolitywny (βούλησις) a interpretacją rozumu przez Platona nie tylko jako intelektu, ale także jako dynamiki jawiącej się z jednej strony w postaci siły erotycznej (Sympozjon, Fajdros), z drugiej strony zaś w postaci rozumnego pożądania (Hippiasz Mniejszy, Gorgiasz).