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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Bronisław Bombała Application of Martin Heidegger’s Ontology to Management Sciences
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The paper proposes to apply Martin Heidegger’s ontology to management sciences, especially those that are used for diagnosis and synthesis of social and ethics problems. Phenomenological analysis shows that ethical management is extremely difficult. A major barrier is a strong technocratic paradigm (instrumental rationality). Contemporary management sciences unfortunately constantly based on the technocratic paradigm. It seems that we should abandon in education and managerial action the technocratic model and introduce the personalistic phenomenological model. Personalistic phenomenology allows the construction of stable foundations of management sciences. Martin Heidegger’s ontology is one of the major inspiration in the creation of a new paradigm of management. In my phenomenology (phenomenological praxeology), the main instrument (method) is a “phenomenological lens”. Phenomenological lens focuses on what is ontological and what is ontic, existential and existentic – in Heidegger’s sense. It allows for more accurate analysis of the object – both from the philosophical (ontological) and scientific (ontic) perspective. Phenomenological lens is the key concept of the phenomenological praxeology and, at the same time, a crucial instrument in the diagnosis and development of an organization. As a meta-method, it gives a view of the object from different perspectives and acts as a “binder”, linking diverse factors affecting this object.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Simona Cresti Semantic variation of indexicals in Edmund Husserl and John Perry
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This paper deals with the semantic theory of indexicality expressed in Logical Investigations, integrating it with some aspects of John Perry’s work on the same topic. My intention is to show some unexpected affinities between these two studies and draw attention to the value of their different conclusions. In particular, I will refer to the problem of the role of intuition to understand whether and in which sense the context of utterance is semantically determining within the expressive act. Moreover I will try to clarify the way the indexical meaning is described by Husserl and Perry: their solutions are similar as far as they split the meaning sphere in a twofold partition – roughly consisting of a descriptive and indicating part on one hand, and a content on the other one – but nevertheless different because of the ontological status granted to the content. This will appear to be related to the different way they interpret their common choice to make the act, and not the object, the key of the argument.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Minakshi Das, Archana Barua Re-visiting Intersubjectivity in Edmund Husserl: A Phenomenological Exploration of Self and its Other by J. N. Mohanty
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Phenomenology always seeks to bracket, in order to achieve personalistic aspect of human being. We gain access to others through empathy by way of appresenting the transcendental realm which is enriched through the incorporation of the alter ego into its fold. In this paper primarily an attempt is made to examine and understand how Edmund Husserl tries to establish a relationship between subject and subject by emphasizing his concept of the ‘I’ and the ‘other’, a type of community which is intersubjective in nature. As a Husserlian phenomenologist, J. N. Mohanty refers to the concept of cultural identity in order to explain Husserl’s concept of the self and its others. In this regard Mohanty emphasizes the concept of the ‘home culture’ and the ‘other culture’. This paper will try to explore Mohanty’s explication of cultural identity in terms of authentic empathy that itself is a disclosure of a relationship between the subject and its other on a subject –subject basis.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
René Dorn Phenomenological Reason and Critical Theory
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The war shattered project of Critical Theory to harmonize Historical Materialism and Phenomenology is being restarted at the very moment Phenomenology enters the world of the social and Historical Materialism enters the field of contemporary mainstream epistemic production. The early attacks on phenomenology up to Heidegger from the side of Critical Theory concern the subjectivism detached from society and history displayed by this method, leading to what Guenther Anders had denounced as “Pseudo-Concreteness” in 1948. Critical Theory was influenced intensely by phenomenological thought, even if the phenomenological programme had long time been a battle against the dialectical method of historical materialism and empirical approaches founding on it. After the “Dialectics” of Schleiermacher, the dialectical and teleological method was avoided in the phenomenological tradition. The historical goal of this paper is to locate this allergy in a quarrel much older than the beginnings of modern phenomenology in the field of Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling and Hegel.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Andrea S. Pace Giannotta Phenomenality and Intentionality: a Phenomenological Problem
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The contemporary debate on phenomenal intentionality, in philosophy of mind, is focused on the discussion of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. The aim of this work is to show that this theme is a crucial issue also in Husserl’s phenomenology. After making a survey of some theoretical options that are at play within the so-called “phenomenal intentionality research program” (Kriegel), I will show how these issues take form within the phenomenological perspective. I will do that, in particular, thematizing the fundamental distinction between static and genetic level of the phenomenological inquiry. Furthermore, I will claim the need to maintain a clear distinction between phenomenal content and phenomenal character of experience. In conclusion, I will claim the importance of Husserl’s analysis of the temporal self-manifestation of subjectivity, in order to clarify the relationship between phenomenality and intentionality.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Mara Grinfelde Are Nonintentional Phenomena Possible?: An Evaluation of Jean-Luc Marion’s Response
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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the possibility of noninten-tional phenomena in the contemporary phenomenology, based on the phenom-enological works of French thinker Jean-Luc Marion and the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl. It is shown that in determining nonintentional phenomena Marion operates with a very narrow understanding of intentionality, which he incorrectly ascribes to Husserl, and that nonintentional phenomena he is describing (saturated phenomena – for example, taste of wine) are in fact intentional in the broad (Husserlian) sense of the word. It is argued that nonintentional phenomena in Marion’s phenomenology are equated with non-conceptual phenomena and are possible only based on a narrow understanding of intentionality understood as conceptualization, which is not substantiated. It is demonstrated that if intentionality is understood more broadly as the constitution of any temporal unity – conceptual and nonconceptual – Marion cannot justify the possibility of nonintentional phenomena. Despite Marion’s inability to account for the possibility of nonintentional phenomena at the end of the paper the possibility of nonintentional phenomena based on the broad understanding of intentionality is suggested.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Undi Gunawan, Bunga Yuridespita The Narrative Possibilities on Reading Museum Architecture Case: Museum Fatahillah, Jakarta, Indonesia
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This paper is an investigation of spatial-narrative possibilities on reading Museum Architecture. This paper is trying to point out that by investigating the museum’s poetic image through its architectural qualities, the spatial-narrative possibilities can emerge. The ongoing phenomenological tradition in architecture diverse in its directions, but yet the issue of poetic image and its narrative emergence become the ongoing issues. This paper is investigating poetic image of architectural space by its poetic image. Poetic spatial image consists of its formal image and material image. Architectural formal image is the conceptual aspect of its phenomena, while the material image is the physical qualities. The poetic image is occurring on its basic ‘archetypes’ of how the space is being embodied. There are three parts of embodied spatial experience. First, the poetic image is occurring when the body encounters the architectural elements. Second, the poetic image while the body moves spatially. And the third, the poetic image when the body is resting spatially.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Ken Kamiya A Reply to Dummett’s Critique of Continental Philosophy from a Heideggerian Standpoint
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In Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Michael Dummett tries to explain the divergence of the analytic school and the phenomenological school. The linguistic turn, characteristic of the former, is deemed necessary to overcome the “ontological mythology” seen in Frege and Husserl. Dummett explains this mythology as the result of the “extrusion of thoughts from the mind”, or in other words, the denial of the subjectivity of thoughts. This leads him to consider the linguistic turn as an alternative to the mythology, in that language is an objective institution external to the individual mind that can embody thoughts. Dummett’s critique of ideal meaning as well as his proposal of the linguistic turn as an alternative to this ontological mythology is more or less compelling. Far less persuasive is his claim that this is precisely what constitutes the fundamental divide in contemporary philosophy. The claim implicit in his argumentation is that Continental philosophy has as its defining characteristic the dogma of a realm of ideal meaning. This claim, however, is untenable. In fact, Heidegger’s position concerning ideal meaning is actually quite close to that which Dummett defends.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Yuto Kannari Fundamental Ontology and Metaontology: The Problem of Beings as a Whole in Heidegger
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After Being and Time, Heidegger presents the problem of metontology and nature as beings as a whole can’t be considered in environing world unlike the nature in Being and Time. How can we understand the connection between the fundamental ontology and metontology? If we presuppose nature as beings as a whole, which is apart from the world, does it mean that we accept a concept which is not examined philosophically? In this paper, by focusing on the transcendence and rewriting it as “Dasein overcomes the nature and leaps to the world”, I tried to interpret nature as beings as a whole in confrontation with the world. The world and nature are formed as complementary, and nature is not totally separated from the world. Although in our average everydayness we can’t be aware of nature, we can find such nature in anxiety and boredom as fundamental mood, and we realize that our world has been obtained from it. As this motif continues in The Self-assertion of the German University (1933) and In The Origin of the Work of Art (1935), we can say that it is not limited in the metaphysical term of Heidegger but is leitmotif of Heidegger’s philosophy.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Nicola Liberati Phenomenology and the Object’s Constitution through Technology
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The aim of my paper is to focus our attention on the effect of technologies in the constitution of the objects in our world following a Husserlian approach. I will analyze the relation among the subject, technology and world in order to clarify how the technologies are deeply involved in the constitution of the perceived object by the modification of its content in its “richness” and its inner horizon. Indeed, some devices become instruments to better and sharpen the subject’s perceiving skills and they are designed to create a sort of symbiosis with the perceiving subject by introducing themselves into the perceptual pole, classically constituted by the sole “naked” subject. The world becomes technologically embedded and a place where any kind of “nudity” is only an abstraction.
11. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Huamin Lin Intentionality: With or without Object?: An Investigation of Levinas’ Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality
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This paper aims to examine the argument between Husserl and Levinas on the issue of intentionality: for Husserl, the “noesis and noema” correlation is the basic structure of intentionality, every intentional act has “I-pole” and “object-pole.” However, for Levinas, there is kind of intentionality without object, that is the sensibility of intentionality, and this kind of intentionality keeps the otherness of the other. Levinas modifies Husserlian intentionality and applies a wider meaning to it: for Husserl it’s kind of conscious intentionality, but in Levinas, it represents a kind of bodily intentionality. With the challenge to Husserl’s priority of the presentation of intentionality in consciousness Levinas goes further into the ethical revelation on the face of the other. In Levinas’s view, the face of the other belongs to the exteriority which is totally outside of my consciousness, and the welcoming of the face and the work of justice condition the birth of truth itself.
12. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Caroline Miller Beyond the Shadows
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My interest for inquiry concerns the interpretation of narrative. I have explored and utilized some processes regarded as inherent in the phe-nomenological inquiry. Subsequently, I have struggled through inquiries seek-ing enlightenment as to the meanings, potentialities and possibilities of lived experience. Within this journey, I have searched for my own process. The link between artistic creation and perception and examination of lived experience manifested. With this intuition, I explored the works of artistic geniuses. A pattern appeared. Through percepts developed via prior concepts, I applied my understandings to three artists: Leonardo da Vinci, Johannes Vermeer and Wassily Kandinsky. Application of da Vinci’s processes of chiaroscuro and sfumato creates the foundation. However, it seemed something was missing for my purpose. The place at which perceptions coalesce seemed necessary: a tenuous, fluid, yet definite place. This edge became the soglia, the threshold from which understandings can be realised or rejected. With rejection comes the abyss. With realization come possibilities for finishedness. This continuum for application to lived experience moves through chiaroscuro, then sfumato, onto the soglia. The rigorous investigation of the scenario aims for clarity and peace. Thus is the lived life and the potentialities for the future explored.
13. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Cezary Józef Olbromski Temporalizations of Time: Edmund Husserl’s “Now (ness)”, “Present (ness)”, and lebendige Gegenwart
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The paper is a part of the author’s project founded after his basic phenomenological research about the notion of lebendige Gegenwart as compliance with the temporality of the “now”. The author presents and examines results connected with his research about Husserl’s various aspects of the [living] present. He continues Husserlian idea in order to describe the “now” using non/beyond temporal terminology. Additionally, there is used no deeper than psychological kind of transcendental reduction as the base of phenomenological method. The “now” is shown in the context of lebendige Gegenwart, the “actuality”, the “present” and a stream of the consciousness as immersed in flow of time. “Simultaneousness” is not considered. The author’s starts from uncovering some wrongs in interpretation of Husserl’s [lebendige] Gegenwart which have been made since the fifties of the 20th century by Husserl interpretors. Clarification and simplification of considered terms are a preparatory stage of the author’s explanation of the living present. Some examples given after psychological type of transcendental reduction complete the presentation.
14. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Irina Poleshchuk Ethical Inquiry as Doing Justice: Levinas’ Perspective in Contemporary Philosophy
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The paper “Ethical inquiry as doing justice: Levinas’ perspective in contemporary philosophy” examines the becoming of ethical inquiry within the structure of philosophical language developed in forms of the said and the saying. The notion of justice plays a central role in-questioning a philosophical gesture of the author in writing text. At stake Levinas’ view of justification thought as an event of “at this moment” that goes beyond differentiation of the said and the saying but at the same time it is originated and provoked by the saying. The paper also focuses on a problematic relation between a vision as an ethical processing of the subjectivity as it is presented in Totality and Infinity and an ambiguity of language described in Otherwise than Being. Such themes as text-for, one-for-the-other, disruption and displacement are taken into consideration to explain the necessity of the event of justice in philosophical language.
15. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Maria Pyrgaki Reading Variability and Landscape Dynamics in the Prehistoric Southeast Europe
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This paper explores philosophical approaches to landscape use and perception. I take as my starting point the phenomenological approach to experience a landscape. The human beings are constantly transforming the natural environment into landscape and space into the place of their daily activities. The present paper focuses on the Southeast Europe, a region of rich landscape diversity. This article examines landscape change in this area from the prehistoric period with particular emphasis on Neolithic period, epoch of profound landscape change. There are many examples in Southeast Europe where the imprint of these changes can be seen. The successive creation of prehistoric landscapes is a central theme in the history of human settlement. We can observe the creation of these prehistoric “palimpsests” that were marked on space by human interventions. This paper ends with some personal hopes for the future of the subject.
16. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Kristupas Sabolius Ontology and Phenomenology: Towards the Return of Imagination
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The contradictory function of imagination could be noticed as early as in Plato’s Sophist – eikon and phantasma dialectics reveals the process of confusion by which we are unable to unambiguously diagnose truth or deceit and accurately draw the line between reality and unreality. Both Sartre and Husserl admit that imagination is necessary to phenomenology and brings up new data that are important of the understanding of truth. The provision by Husserl also recognizes the nature of simulacrum experience and a dynamic cocktail of ontological tumult within imagination. However, phenomenology is concerned with safeguarding the craggy authority of the human mind directed towards ideal of universality. Conversely, as Heidegger notices in his interpretation of Kant, the deepest transcendental structures permit recognition of the primordial temporality characteristic of imagination. Thereby the grasp on the processes of the functioning of imagination assumes its most important and the most ambivalent role. It seems that what offers an unreliable view of the world – termed by Husserl as the “protean character of fantasy” – can provide a basis of pathways to form a relationship with a weakening or even a nearly disappearing ontology.
17. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Sandor Sajo Sense Formation and the Uncanny
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In my paper, I argue that experience, in the most general sense of the term, is sense formation taking place in the ontological framework of the threefold structure of ego, alter ego and world. I argue that there is no such thing as non-sense or, more exactly, non-sense necessarily implies sense too. As an example where the problem of sense vs non-sense is a crucial issue I analyze trauma and attempt to show that even there it is not non-sense but sense which has a traumatizing effect. The experience of the uncanny is in many respects similar to that of trauma. The type of uncanny that I am tackling consists of two moments: the familiar and the terrible, and the uncanny “effect” comes about as a result of their intermingling. I analyze the temporal nature of sense formation in the experience of the uncanny, with its retroactive and proactive moments. Finally, I analyze the self-reflexive type of the uncanny, arguing that there is an experience that I would call that of the meta-uncanny which consists in the very fact that what at first seems evidently and unambiguously terrible might always turn out to be ambiguous and possibly not terrible.
18. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Olena Shkubulyani Philosophy as Asceticism: F. Nietzsche’s Philosophical Project and our Modernity
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F. Nietzsche, by his critique of traditional philosophy and by creation of his own philosophical project, provided a fruitful development of philosophy during many years. He was able to do this thanks to a discovering by him of ascetic nature of philosophy. Natural, true asceticism - that is what distinguishes philosophy from abstract, narrowly rational thought, whose asceticism is enforced and unwilling. Destiny of philosophy is a constant renewing of thought and of life. Just in conformity with this destiny, it is “joyful” asceticism of sensuality, “mocking”, self-critical asceticism of reason, and “violent” creative asceticism of will. However, today, after a post modernistic intercepting of Nietzsche’s ideas we are to ask a question: has Nietzsche revealed ascetic nature of philosophy completely?
19. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Silvia Stoller Laughter and Intentionality: Reflections on the Phenomenology of Laughter
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A remarkable number of philosophies of laughter center their research on explosive laughter. When it comes to 20th century philosophers of laughter, this is true for Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Hélène Cixous and Helmuth Plessner among others. What those approaches share is the assumption that in explosive laughter people are rendered powerless. Others, as for example Georges Bataille speak of the entire loss of intentionality (Bataille 1988). But how far does the loss of intentionality and power really go? From this starting-point a reconsideration of the so-called loss of power seems to be at stake. I will discuss selected theories of laughter from the phenomenological tradition in order to show that the loss of power cannot be claimed to be total. With the help of Plessner’s phenomenology of the body in Laughing and Crying (1970) and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “operative intentionality” from his Phenomenology of Perception (1962), I will argue that a certain form of intentionality is a precondition for the act of laughter. In general, the paper aims at clarifying the phenomenon of explosive laughter and expounding on the debate over intentionality vs. non-intentionality from the perspective of phenomenology.
20. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Merve Rümeysa Tapınç Perceptual and Intuitional Experience in Merleau-Ponty and Bergson
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In this paper, I will depict how Merleau-Ponty treats perception as the subject’s most concrete and basic relationship to the world and secondly, I will explain why Bergson points out the limitations of perception by disclosing a more fundamental aspect of human experience, which is according to him, duration: the temporal aspect of perception. Both philosophers begin by understanding perception as they aim to depict consciousness in action. The distinction between these two philosophers is that while for Merleau-Ponty the priority is corporeal perception and the subject; for Bergson the priority is duration as according to Bergson, perception is an organization of memory and duration (time) which transcends consciousness and the subject. Referring to Bergson’s conceptualization of perception in a continuous relationship to memory, I will suggest that intuition, as an experience of the expansion and progress of memory, can reverse and transform the phenomenological experience of perception as well as habitual way of perceiving things. It will be shown that perception habitually responds to all members of a general type in the same way, but intuition aims at what is unique in the singular and particular object. As an enriching process of perception, intuition can contribute to our knowledge of the thing in itself and to the experience of novelty in perception. While Merleau-Ponty explains perception as a meaningful phenomenon in its multi-faceted aspects of being-in-the-world, Bergson emphasizes the limitations of this phenomenal and habitualized perception, and points out to the phenomenalization process in explaining the genesis of perception with duration and pure memory. Following this line of thought, it will be shown that while Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy emerges as a philosophy of indeterminacy and the ambiguity of existence, Bergson’s philosophy develops into a philosophy of creative process.