This is a reflective paper on the future of human life in the context of the finitude of our universe. A teleological approach is recommended and imagination is presumed to be the key to ushering in an advanced form of life that incorporates the advances of the new technological age we have begun to inhabit. The amazing possibilities of the coming posthuman age come with a great risk, however: we may be following seductive techno-visions that will bring an end to human life long before its natural demise. Reflecting on life along these lines leads one to a local and pragmatic perspective on human achievement and a more generalized understanding of consciousness.

The logic of intentional verbs and constructions has been intensively studied over the last twenty years in different logical fields : pure logic, philosophy of logic, logic for AI and logic computer science. There is little interaction among these scientific communities. In this paper I shall bring together the more significant results which have been obtained and offer an up to date status quaestionis. I will reduce logical technicalities to a minimum. and lay emphasis on what is philosophically and ethically significant in the recent formalizations of intentional verb and adverbs.

The design of the following paper is to establish an interpretative link between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Hilbert’s foundational program. Through a regressive reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781), we can see the motivation of his philosophical project as bound with the task to expose the a priori presuppositions which are the grounds for the possibility of actual knowledge claims. Moreover, according to him the sole justification for such procedure is the (informal) proof of consistency and (architectonical) completeness. Hilbert tried to strip Kant’s philosophy of its last anthropomorphic vestiges which led to the formulation of his “finite standpoint” and the prooftheoretical methods for axiomatic reconstruction of classical mathematics. Therefore, contrary to the received view, the proofs of consistency and completeness which were envisaged as part of his metamathematical program were not conceived as a means to secure to epistemic basis of mathematical knowledge. Accordingly, the program itself was not confuted by Gödel’s theorems and remains as viable as ever.

The dispute over Socrates’ apparent endorsement of hedonism in the Protagoras has persisted for ages among scholars and students of Plato’s work. The solution to the query concerning the seriousness and sincerity of Socrates’ argument from hedonism established in the dialogue is of considerable importance for the interpretation of Plato’s overall moral theory, considering how blatantly irreconcilable the defense of this doctrine is with Plato’s other early dialogues. In his earlier works, Socrates puts supreme importance on virtue and perfection of the soul, so the puzzle apparent in the Protagoras merits a thorough examination.Several scholars have argued that, since Socrates’ defense of hedonism in this work clashes significantly with his views on morality in other dialogues, Socrates must only have been defending hedonism ironically, or with the intention of “diagnosing” his opponent’s point of view. In this paper, I examine the approaches according to which Socrates didn’t in fact mean to defend hedonism, but merely used it as a diagnostic tool; I argue that there is no compelling evidence for this resolution of Socrates’ defense of hedonism, and that the views that attempt to defend it really have no convincing grounds for it apart from the desire to reconcilethe Protagoras with other Socratic dialogues.

The paper starts by describing the distinction between substantialist thought and functionalist thought. According to philosophical functionalism the object of human knowledge is always a result of an inner construction, and not a passive reflection of the outer world. The Critique of Pure Reason was the first modern materialization of this new philosophical program. One of the most important results of the Kantian criticism was the reconstruction of the concept of ontology. The possibility of ontology, according to its new concept, was given by the idea of identity between the possibility of reality, pertaining to human thinking andknowledge, and that which we call “reality”. The entire German Idealism took over this new concept of ontology. The specific Hegelian undertaking in the Phenomenology of Spirit was to show that this identity is not posited at the beginning, but is described in its development for consciousness. The study tries to show that this undertaking is a functionalistic one because here reality, as an object of consciousness, receives its specific configuration on the ground of the logical unity of the moments belonging to each form of consciousness and to their totality.

The paper deals with Freud’s attitude towards religion. It developed from a rather ironic and anecdotal criticism in his youth to fundamental writings about the origin and the future of religion in his later life. Freud believed that "the voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing” and would overcome religion. Because of the "undeniable conflict” between religion and science Freud expressed his strong opinion, that all believers should be prevented from attending university.

The transformation of the relations between reflection and reality and between concepts and their correspondent objects into themes represents even in the present a field for most heated discussions. The joining of conceptual schemes corresponding to the intellect and reality represents a problem which is still to be solved. A solution to this problem was proposed by R. Carnap in his extremely ambitious project from Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). Overlooked for a long time, this work has returned to the philosophical spotlight in recent years, because philosophers finally realized that Carnap’s project comprises almost allthe major themes of contemporary epistemology, such as the relation between theory and reality, between concepts and experience, the major lines of a phenomenology and of a “logic of experience” or the status of language and of the concepts of science. Situated at the confluence of some philosophical traditions such as neo-kantian philosophy, the logical analysis of Russell and Wittgenstein, but also phenomenology, Carnap’s program in Aufbau starts from some premises such: the need to control experience (= major stake of any scientific knowledge); the orientation towards form of the modern concept of scientific knowledge (under Kant’s direct influence); the assertion of a concept of knowledge mostly relational or structural (issue resulted in the orientation towards form of modern knowledge); the need for a methodology engaged in a constructive way and modelled on mathematical thinking; our reporting to the instance of sensitivity in the formation of experience (under E. Mach’s influence).

J. L. Austin’s article ‘Truth’ is a remarkable example of his method of ordinary language analysis by which he investigates the notoriously recalcitrant philosophical concept of truth. This paper attempts to specify the character of Austin’s truth conception, defending the view that despite his opinion of it being a semantic one, it is actually of a mixed nature. Correspondence is what determines the truth or falsity of a statement, but semantics delineates the segment of the world to which our statements correspond. An explication of the notions of demonstrative and descriptive conventions is given in order to add flash to the outlinegiven by Austin.

Having recently acquired national minority status, Roma in Serbia were and still are the most frequent target of social distance practiced by the majority people as well as other minorities. Apart from refusing to socialize with them, the majority has created a series of negative stereotypes and prejudices, with few examples of positive attitude. The Serbian media have rarely stood up against such tirades, usually fuelling or, more often than not, instigating them.Having ascertained the conditions through the analysis of several empirical reports, the authors in this work suggest a list of concrete acts in the media, whose realization would contribute to the genuine appreciation and overcoming of the unenviable position of the Romani national minority in our country, as well as the countries in the region.

This essay explores the distinction between trust and confidence and its relevance to the terms of social solidarity in contemporary societies. It compares a moral community of trust to communities of confidence and questions the consequences of such distinctions for our ability to abide by and live with difference. It presents the idea of tolerance as a plausible if under-theoretized concept for how to live with ethnic and religious differences in our new multicultural societies.

Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastic tradition have defined the noetic content of Christian faith, fide, as a sort of ungrounded belief — not knowledge — motivated by grace. Calvin and the Reformed tradition, instead, have seen that content as a sort of knowledge made possible by grace. Both theologians agree that faith produces trust in God, but the way they respectively understand the ground of such trust depends upon their respective ways of understanding the noetic content of faith. The aim of the present paper is to to explain in what sense Christian faith, as understood by John Calvin, is or involves a certain kind of trust or reliance.

My remarks on trust follow an anthropological perspective. Referring to an everyday-knowledge of trust in ordinary language, trust is understood as a functional relation, which develops into many varieties, mostly in the social sphere, but also in the religious and subjective sphere. Further remarks relate to an ontogenesis of trust, to the element of cognition in trust, trust in oneself, in God and in nature.

We can speak of a hermeneutics of “the good faith” or the “confiding mood”, centred on the intention of “sense reconfiguration”, and of another one, “suspicious”, malevolent, unconfident in the author’s sincerity or the plausibility of the message displayed by the “piece of work/creation”. Paul Ricoeur saw Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as “the three masters of suspicion” . Their hermeneutics obviously would have been cut in the pattern of distrust. Another tradition, ofAnglo-Saxon inspiration, encourages a rather different direction. Can one count on “trust” as a hermeneutic principle? What are the exigencies to be followed in the practice of an “optimistic” interpretation? Must there be encouraged a certain subjective availability of the interpreter, favourable to either the text, or the author? How efficient are the strategies based on doubt? What about the ones in which the “meaning” is outclassed by insensate or illicit exegetic intervening?We often oscillate between underbidding the meaning and taking it beyond the “letter” of the text or the intentions of the authors. Which one of the interpreter’s inclinations must be sustained and stimulated? The sceptic one, distrustful of the chances of textual performance or, on the contrary, the optimistic one, based on trust?

The chief aim of the paper is to argue for a two-level theory of trust consisting of basic and intentional trust. The paper sets out by comparing the concepts of trust and justice to highlight the double meaning of trust as a descriptive social phenomenon and an evaluative normative term. It is subsequently argued that the conceptions of trust known from political science and recent philosophical debates of trust do not capture this double meaning of trust as the former focuses on trust as a social phenomenon while the latter focuses on the normative aspect. As an alternative I develop a two-level theory of trust where basic trust, understood in accordance with sociologist Harold Garfinkel’s conception of trust, is combined with a conception of intentional trust as a willed response to breaches in the social expectancies. Finally, the social philosophical consequences of the two-level theory of trust are indicated in a brief recapitulation of the comparison of trust and justice.

Recent work in social and cultural studies of science and technology has shown that the ‘epistemic dependence’ of laypeople on experts is not a relation of blind trust, but typically and necessarily involves critical assessment of expert testimonies. Normative epistemologists have suggested a number of criteria, mostly of contextual nature since expert knowledge means restricted cognitive access to some epistemic domain, according to which non-experts can reliably evaluate expert claims; while science studies scholars have concentrated on how laypeople can come to warranted decisions about technical matters on non-technicalgrounds. Instead of addressing the problem transcendentally (how such decisions are possible) or normatively (how such decisions should be reached), this paper contrasts the recommendations available in the literature with the empirical findings of a rough case study concerning the public reaction to the H1N1 vaccine issue. Awareness of how lay people do come to such decisions may inform and refine normative philosophical investigations.

The aim of this paper is to analyze Robert Putnam’s and Francis Fukuyama’s theses and the views of many other their adherents about trust and social capital. At the beginning, basic concepts are defined, and a brief characterization of the arguments is offered. But in its major part, the article is critical. Firstly, a series of empirical research results are presented, which do not go together with and are even in direct contradiction to the points of the ideas under discussion. Secondly, an analysis is offered, presenting their theoretical setbacks: exaggeration of the role of trust and “free associations” in economic and political life, which in its turnleads to reversing causal relationships and concealing real problems; incorrect use of the idea of culture and the values linked to it where major parameters of power relationships remain concealed.

This article depicts empirical research conducted in the Western Balkans and Bulgaria (project Balkan Monitor 2006 conducted by the Gallup Europe) that is geared towards the trust that citizens have in national and international institutions, as well as people in general. Empirical research provides a realistic picture of trust as seen from the inside. According to the data collected, within the general population, the strongest percentage was given to neighbors, followed by the police and European Union. A considerable degree of attention was given to interreligious confidence and focus was placed on the number of adepts of a particular faith and the degree of confidence. From Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism to Protestantism, the degree of confidence diminishes, as well as the number of adherents, which points out to the relationship between minority and majority. The findings suggest that the degree of trust towards religious communities comes as a dominant attitude which means that these are the institutions that merit the greatest degree of trust. The exceptions are Albania and Kosovo where NATO comes first, whereas in Serbia NATO comes last. Ex- communists enjoy trust from 4% of the respondents whereas 24% completely rejects them. 8% of the respondents have a lot trust in people in general whereas 9% have no trust in people at all. For the purposes of this paper we will depict only a number of questions related to the degree of trust in various countries.