This paper defends a rigorous reading of Hume’s critiques of arguments for the existence of God and of the belief in God against interpretations that endorse Humean theism, deism, and fideism. The latter include Donald Livingston’s theist reading, J. C. A. Gaskin’s “attenuated deism” reading, and Edward Kanterian’s “humble fideism” reading. I also examine whether Hume’s rejections of a positive theology commit him to agnosticism or atheism. My innovative challenge to such conclusions maintains that, while elements of both agnosticism and atheism are found in Hume, these denote, respectively, a meth­odology and an incidental implication of his philosophy. But neither sufficiently captures his constructive vision for a society, individual psychology, and system of knowledge guided by naturalist principles and aims. For this, an alternate conception is needed that describes Hume’s philosophy of religion beyond mere atheism.

This paper seeks critically to elucidate Hume’s views on pleasure and the good, in particular his evaluative hedonism, and to show that evaluative hedonism is in certain respects at least as significant a component of his philosophical ethics as sentimentalism. The first section explains his notion of pleasure, and how it is, in an important sense, prior to desire. The following two sections show how this conception of pleasure and its relation to desire leads Hume to accept evaluative hedonism, as well as a form of psychological hedonism, and to give pleasure a key role in his metaethics. The paper ends, as do both the Treatise and the second Enquiry, with the distinction—a false one, according to Hume—between virtues and natural abilities, and an attempt to bring out the implicit challenge Hume is making to non-hedonist accounts of value, especially those that postulate “moral” value.

Throughout his writings, Hume extols the benefits of an attribute he calls “Strength of Mind,” which he defines as the “prevalence of the calm passions over the violent” (T 2.3.3.10). But there is some question as to how he thought a person could attain this important trait. Contemporary scholars have committed Hume to the view that only indirect and social methods, such as state punishment or sympathetic pressure, could effectively cultivate it. Yet a closer examination of Hume’s corpus reveals a more direct approach applicable at the individual level. Though rarely achieved and difficult to execute, self-government of the passions is possible according to Hume. The key to success lies in harnessing the power of habit. In its most sophisticated form, the process centrally involves cultivating a certain transformative connoisseurship, the ability to appreciate regularities in one’s own mental activity and thereby alter it.

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of moral judgment is best understood if it is read in light of Hume’s explanatory project. I first lay out the textual support to show that Hume’s account of justice in the Treatise includes both approval of a motive that gives rise to the virtue of justice, and approval of a system of conduct, irrespective of a motive. I then argue that we can allow for such plurality in Hume’s theory of moral judgment if we view it in light of his explanatory project: finding unifying causes for disparate phenomena. Hume offers a unified theory of moral judgment because he can show that the different approvals are explained by the same causes. Finally, I argue that viewing Hume’s account of moral judgment in light of his explanatory project allows us to appreciate a further distinction between the moral judgment of the natural and the artificial virtues: while judgments of the former are fully explained by the causes of a certain motive, the latter are only fully explained by the causes of the motive in the context of a convention, which in turn is partially constituted by non-approved motives.

Traditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for regularity accounts of causation. But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared—namely the skeptical realism of Wright, Craig, and Strawson, and the quasi-realist projectivism of Blackburn—and since then the interpretative debate has been dominated by the contest between these three approaches, with projectivism recently appearing the likely winner. This paper argues that the controversy arose from a fun­damental mistake, namely, the assumption that Hume is committed to the subjectivity of our conception of causal necessity. That assumption generated tensions within the regularity account, which the skeptical realist and quasi-realist alternatives, in very dif­ferent ways, purported to resolve. But a broader and more balanced view of the textual evidence, taking due account of the relatively neglected sections where Hume applies the results of his analysis, tells strongly in favour of an objectivist regularity view, both in respect of causation and causal necessity. Despite some complications, the upshot is a far more straightforward reading of Hume than those that have hitherto dominated this long-running debate.