The purpose in this text is to focus on one of the possible use of broadly psychoanalytic concepts in history: the analysis and treatment of historical testimonies by witnesses of “traumatic events”. A number of historians have proposed that some witness accounts could be understood as “elaborations of the past”, in the technical psychoanalytic sense. My interest is in the question whether the discourse of the psychoanalytic patient and the historical testimony by the traumatized witness possess the same epistemological status, as claimed by the historians alluded to. My view is that the claims of similarity should be resisted.Is philosophyrelevant to everyday life? Is it not too abstract and general? The knowledge of priests, psychologists or physicians is as abstract and general, yet its relevance is not contested. Is not its relevance limited to the case of the rare sage which is both able to discuss complex philosophical matters and ready to adopt “the philosophical attitude” to life? Such popular notions ignore controversies with regard to the existence of such sages, the content of their alleged wisdom, or the nature or impact of their “philosophical attitude”. Modern philosophy is generally much more skeptical, realistic, pluralistic and therefore “democratic” thanthe elitist classics. It does not trust myths about the “good life” of the wise, nor ignore their preoccupation with death.

The decline of communism in Eastern Europe in years 1989-1991 was a big surprise for Western Sovietology. The sudden disappearance of the object of research would undermine the reason of existence of the whole science. For this reason, in the first half of the 90s Western scientists tried to answer following question: why Sovietology was not able to predict the demise of communism. The purpose of my paper is not to make one more analysis of factors responsible for this failure of social sciences but reconstruction of theories which accurately predicted the demise of communism. It is possible to point out two scholars whopredicted the collapse of communism at the turn of the 70s and 80s. One of them is Randall Collins, an American sociologist who elaborated in 1978 Geopolitical Theory. The second of them is Leszek Nowak, Polish philosopher, who in 1979 elaborated theory of historical process – non-Marxian historical materialism. In the last part of my paper I compare these two theories. Despite obvious differences, these theories share striking similarities: model status, antagonistic vision of society, grand scope of applicability and belonging to the periphery rather than to mainstream of social sciences. Maybe, this last feature is one of the necessary conditions of making accurate predictions in social and historical sciences.

The paper starts by stating that the concept of progress, which is a key factor in the Enlightenment programme on the philosophy of history, has vanished from our society of risk, and posits whether it is possible today to rethink the philosophy of history. The second part refers to the negation of this philosophy by Badiou and Lyotard, due to the disappearance of the “modern subject”, which lay at its heart. There are many “histories”, but there is no single “History”. The third part of the paper seeks to counteract that negation through the Sartrean concept of “alienation”, which involves a change in human relationships (“reification”), resulting from the “subject matter worked by praxis”. This is a concept that allows us to speak today of a universal history, whose “no-subject” would be that “worked subject matter”. The paper concludes by affirming that the aim of philosophy today is not to “contemplate the world” or “change the world” but rather to “take care of the world”.

Many historians and philosophers emphasize the great importance of periodization for the study of history. There is no doubt that periodization is a rather effective method of data ordering and analysis, though it deals with exceptionally complex types of processual and temporal phenomena. For any periodization its basis is a very important point. One can choose different bases for periodization if he constantly uses the same criteria. According to the theory that we propose, the historical process can be subdivided more effectively into four major stages. The transition from any of these stages into another one is the change of all basic characteristics of the respective stage. As the starting point of such a change we propose the production principle that describes the major qualitative stages of the development of the world productive forces. We single out four principles of production: Hunter-Gatherer; Craft-Agrarian; Industrial; and Information-Scientific. As an additional basis of our periodization, by means of which the chronology of the beginning of each respective stage may be worked out, we propose the threeproduction revolutions: the Agrarian or Neolithic Revolution; the Industrial Revolution; and the Information-Scientific Revolution. There are many traditional discussions in philosophy of history that have dealt with issues having to do with the relevance and suitability of the use of broadly psychoanalytic concepts in history (Certeau, 1995; Mudrovcic, 2003). In these discussions some have noted a number of very abstract connections between the concepts and techniques of historiography and those of psychoanalysis. In this text, however, I want to focus on a potential, more concrete point of contact considered only relatively recently: the analysis and treatment of historical testimonies by witnesses of “traumatic events”.

Contemporary caution of anachronism in intellectual history on the one hand, and currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity on the other, are two prevailing circumstances that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. Together these circumstances call for heightened awareness of our own interpretive presuppositions as historians: the former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that may be alien in the historical intellectual setting under study and the latter suggests caution in relying on our intuitions regarding subjectivity due to the specific and historicallycontingent characterisations subjectivity has attained in the contemporary philosophy of mind. In face of these enticements our paper explores subjectivity as a non-textual standard of interpretation. Taking into account recent methodological discussion and examples of denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that historical work should be conceived as a reflective investigation into what is and what is not genuinely historical. In particular, we show how subjectivity can function as a pre-conceptualized feature of the world that has an effect on our concept formation.

This article seeks to explain the transformation of culture using the mechanism of evolutionary theory. Social biologists have been dealing with this issue for many years now. However, these scholars have not sufficiently allowed for the importance of factors independent of genes. They have primarily thought of culture as nothing more than the expansion of genes, as an increase in the rate of genetic adaptation. Namely, they have focused less on culture itself and more on its natural origins. Even while accepting the dual inheritance model that the structure of biological genes and cultural transmission is different, this article seeksto take a step further. My aim is to show how culture that takes shape on the group level is explainable on the cultural genetic level. Seen from the point of view of culture genetics, the transformation of culture signifies the transformation in the frequency of a cultural gene. At this point, we are thus faced with the following questions: 1) Is it possible to concretize the units of culture genes? 2) What is the fundamental characteristic of a culture gene? and 3) What relationship is there between biological genes and cultural genes? This article will prove that it is indeed possible to concretize the units of culture genes, that the most substantialfundamental characteristic of a cultural gene is, as would be expected, to clone itself, and that cultural genes and biological genes exist within multiple relationships of cooperation, conflict, and reciprocity. Finally, this article will further concretize the dual inheritance model with a careful examination of its two patterns of evolutionary explanation, the reductionist on the one hand, and the non-reductionist on the other. This examination will conclude that, in terms of culture, the non-reductionist model is the most suitable.

This paper deals with two different meanings of the concepts of representation related to historiography. Both of them have different consequences when they attempt to give account of recent pasts in conflict. The first of them is representation as it is understood in cultural or social history –a sort of belief that people have about the world, especially with recent pasts that affect them. The other one is historical language or historiography understood -after the linguistic turn- as a representation of the past. The main objective of this paper is to show how these two meanings of representation collapse in a “history of the present” or in a“history of the recent past”.

Rethinking philosophy of history we see that the main concepts must be revised or specified especially <history> and <the world history>. It’s very important to use adequate notions. The world history is an integral process having dialectically contradictory tendencies. Humanism is an objective tendency of the world history but the alienated tendency prevails in the epoch of globalization. Collisions between civilizations are outcomes of the alienated capitalist world system. Many problems both in practice and in theory are connected with a fortune of humanism and a problem of mutual understanding between representatives of different cultures is among them. So philosophy of history must be revised in humanistic way and we must do our best to put the humanistic tendency into practice.

The analytical and self-critical bias of modern philosophy lets ideology expand to most significant world-view and value areas. Hence, philosophy of history escapes such problems as meaning of history, course of history, and self-identification in history. Ideology aggressively grasps these ideas and transforms them into its own primitive dogmas that usually serve as symbolical tools for political struggle or for legitimating ruling elites. This paper shows how it is possible for philosophy, in cooperation with the social sciences (especially historical macrosociology), to retrieve these problems of crucial world-view significance. A universal model of historical dynamics and the concept of values of general significance are described and integrated within a general frame for historical meanings: permanent self-test of human communities.

1. In this paper have done what Niklas Luhmann always recommended us to do: I have drawn a distinction – or to be more precise, I have some distinctions. I have done so because I think, and you all know, that in the ongoing debates on so-called “globalization” there is not enough of distinction, and no distinction at all very often. And that is particularly unsatisfactory if the critique, or even the rejection, of globalization is at stake. 2. The first of my distinctions is between Europeanization (in Heidegger’s sense) and Americanization, as this term is meant usually today. These two concepts, and the processes they refer to, seem to be quite similar in so far as what is meant that a particular part of mankind at a given period of history has succeeded in becoming a hegemonic power on a global scale – economically, politically (and militarily) and/or culturally. One could think, and Heidegger himself really does, that those two processes have also in common that they are historically contingent: Nothing of this sort could have happened as well; other powers could have, and have indeed, played a similar role at other times; it could have come out completely different etc. etc. In my view, though, there should be made a distinction here because the world-wide success-story of modern science and technology has to be accounted for by causes and dynamics which are not only gradually, but qualitatively different from what we need to explain the globalization of, let’s say, American blue jeans, or T‐Shirts etc. 3. This brings me to the distinction between globalization and Americanization, which are identified nowadays very often, and that particularly so in order to attack and reject globalization as being nothing but Americanization. At this point, then, it seems to me necessary to draw distinction between (a) globalization as such – regarded to be a factual, complex and heterogeneous process that has to be analyzed in all its aspects by econonomists, sociologists etc and (b) universalization.

The document starts by skating that the concept of progress, which is key in the Enlightenment programme of philosophy of history, has disappeared in our society of risk, and wonders whether it is today possible rethinking the philosophy of history. The second part refers to the denial of philosophy of history by Badiou and Lyotard, as a consequence of the disappearance of the “modern subject”, which was the core of philosophy of history. There are many “histories”, but there is not one “History”. The third part of the paper looks for a way out from that denial, finding it in the sartrean concept of “alienation”, which involves a changein the human relationships (“reification”) as a consequences of the “subject matter worked by praxis”, which is a concept that allows us to speak today of a universal history, whose “no‐subject” would be that “worked subject matter”. The conclusion of the paper is that the aim of philosophy today is not to “contemplate the world” or “change the world” but rather to “take care of the world”.

Theorists of the Russian conservatism have made a considerable contribution to the development of axiology, the philosophy of history and comparativistics. In their studies of the local civilisations existing at different times and at different places they have focused on the dynamics of their origin, development, collapse or transformation into new civilisational forms. The best known slavophiles such as A. Khomyakov, K. Axakov, I. Kireyevskiy saw the mission of the Russian civilisation in synthesising Europe and Russia which has preserved the true Christianity – the Orthodoxy. According to N. Danilevskiy, the founder of the culturohistorical school of thought, Europe has an irreconcilable hostility towards Russia. He proves that Europe and Russia are two different culturohistoricaltypes (local civilisations). He understood Russia’s mission as that of unification of Slavic peoples. K. Leontiev develops the so-called theory of Byzantism, according to which the West is doomed and Russia will be saved thanks to its Orthodoxy and the oriental despotism underlying its statehood. He advocates a merger between Russian and oriental traditions. From the point of view of the proponents of the Eurasian theory such as P. Savitskiy, N. Trubetskoy, etc., the merger has already occurred, so Russians should be viewed as Eurasians and Russia as a Eurasian civilisation. Russian thinkers were criticising the so-called Eurocentrism in their efforts to prove that progress should be measured not only by the accumulation of material wealth, but also by the development of various spiritual aspects of human beings. The anthroposociogenesis does not have any predetermined patterns, its development is of co-evolutionary, often broken, discrete nature.

Globalization and humanization form two different yet complementary processes. Globalization of human personality is the criterion of social progress. Doctrine of social humanism combines two aspects of knowledge: globalistics and humanistics, the political and the historical points of view. The humanistic project of globalization goes through three consequent stages: conservative, liberal and social. These stages are three giant leaps in human history, the civilization revolutions. On the microhistorical scale they form political rhythm of globalization that determines three kinds of political revolutions. On every stage thepolitical ideologies fight to gain power but only a dialogue between conservative, liberal and social forms of humanism can provide realization of global project of humanity.