Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we tum to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (1 22), where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is of the genus and the specific difference; 2) essential predication (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is either of the genus or of the differences (or their genera); 3) the predication of accidents per se 4) and of simple accidents (ώς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεἲσθαι); and 5) accidental predication (κατἁ συμβεβηκός κατηγορεἲσθαι). However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication (άπλὢς). In effect, the “predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the statement of the essence of the subject (or its definition). On the other hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been - and in our opinion wrongly so - challenged in modem times.

In Aristotle’s thought, dialectic results not only from a consolidated historical-philosophical tradition, but also from his own original conception of the virtualities of speech in general, as well as those of the philosophical and scientific speech in particular. In this essay I try to describe synthetically the history of the pre-aristotelic dialectic, and to draw up an inventory of the various acceptions that dialectic takes in the works of the Stagirite. It is possible to identify four dialectics in Aristotle, that is to say, four levels of application of the language and knowledge theory that the Stagirite develops in the Topics and other logic treaties. In its critic - or peirastic - dimension Aristotle’s dialectic seems, mainly as praxis of contradiction, somehow to reach the universality proper to sapiential knowledge.

Il s’agit d’abord d’éclairer le motif d'ousia, à partir de trois principes qui rendent possible de comprendre le mouvement des vivants, les étants qui le sont «par eux-mêmes», puis selon les quatre sens du «motif» qui donne ce mouvement et enfin selon la pair dunamis / entelecheia. Ensuite, on considère son double rapport au temps, celui qui le lie au mouvement et celui qui l’oppose aux accidents, rapport qui a été masqué dans la traduction latine des deux sens d'ousia dans les Catégories par substance et essence respectivement, devenues ‘intemporelles’. Dans une deuxième partie, on pose la question de la place de la Physique d’Aristote (qui s’occupe de l’être de l’étant en tant que se mouvant) dans l’ensemble de son oeuvre : c’est en elle qui sont définis et argumentés ces motifs, lesquels, d’une part, rendent possibles ses divers traités scientifiques et, d’autre part, sont repris dans les livres de la Métaphysique (s’occupant de l’être de l’étant en tant qu’étant). La Physique est ainsi l’une et l’autre, une philosophie - avec - sciences. Les considérations finales concernent la façon dont, à travers nommément d’Aquin et d’Occam, l’infidélité à Aristote de l’aristotélisme médiéval et européen a rendu possible que la pensée européenne se fasse à partir de lui et contre lui.

Book Lambda of the Metaphysics by Aristotle presents us a mysterious expression: τὁ κινοὒν άκίνητον, which most of the translators render as the Unmoved Mover. Our aim is to prove that that translation is false, because it is not aware, in our view, of the difference established by Aristotle between “the god” and this movens immobile. Therefore, based on excerpts of Metaphysics Book Lambda we try to set light upon two different styles (grammatically, syntactically speaking, etc.) used by Aristotle: one when referring to an abstract principle (the so called “unmoved mover”), a physical explanation for the movement, and another when talking about “the god”. In the last case it is possible to experience a somehow passionate description, almost an expression of faith which compared to that “ cold” movens immobilis, makes us wonder if, as tradition suggests without questioning, “the god” and movens immobilis are for the philosopher the same being.

The concept of eudaimonia put forward by Aristotle in the first Book of his Nicomachean Ethics reflects an attempt to synthesize and clarify a well known concept in the Greek society, in popular as well as in more restricted intellectual circles, giving it a new scope and conceptual consistency. Ordinarily translated as happiness, well-being or prosperity, this concept frequently had a subjective sense, describing the lives of those who lived well or were eudaimon; but it also had an objective sense, establishing a life conducting rule for everyone who wanted to be happy or eudaimon. In the present paper we give an account of the meaning and operative range of the concept of eudaimonia and show the eudaimonia's guiding role in the Aristotelian ethical project, namely as its founding principle and final horizon, its relations with the good and virtue, as well as with the nature of man and the generation of a new modality of being. Finally, we establish that the concept of eudaimonia is central to an ethics seen as a life project.

Aristotle’s practical philosophy should be seen as an organic whole, in which ethics and politics are intimately connected, in a relation of mutual dependency. This happens for several reasons, of which I shall mention two: first, because man is a political animal by nature, since it is inside a community that conflicts are created that lead to questions about right and wrong; second, because it is inside a community that these conflicts are solved, and character formation takes place, through the legal imposition of a certain conduct. These are the two topics discussed on this essay.

In the Treatise On the Heavens II, 1 [ 40 ], Plotinus rejects the explanation of Aristotle who, in De caelo I, 2-3, considers the “fifth body”, ether, the incorruptible matter of celestial bodies and heavens and, hence, different from the sub-lunar world’s four elementary bodies (fire, air, water and earth). Plotinus’ argument at tempts to found the kind of perpetuity which numerical identity implies -the identity which is proper of heavens and celestial bodies- on the harmony that reigns between their body and soul. This way, the Plotinian exeges is of the Aristotelian Treatise integrates the themes already raised in the Platonic Phaedrus and Timaeus. In this article I attempt to expound: 1 ) the concepts of perfection and the cosmological dualism in Aristotle, 2) the problem of the cosmos’ perpetuity, 3) the Plotinian search of a more satisfactory explanation, and 4) the theme of the two regions: sub-lunar and supra-lunar.

The aim of this paper is to show the connection between the desire and the experience of the One, in Plotinus. Our main conclusion is that, in spite of the language of the solitary evasion towards the One and Only, we can indeed find in Plotinus works the search and the living experience of the most universal and intimate principle and origin of all and every being, which appears everywhere. This is not a separated transcendent but the transcend of all existential, vital and intellectual duality in an experience of eternal union. Beyond all thought and expression, there’s the source of all philosophical truth, meaning and eloquence.

In this paper, making use of the constitutional comparison method introduced by Aristotle, I aim to argue on the similarities and differences that can be established between, on the one hand, the process that led to the approval of the American Federal Constitution and its consequences and, on the other hand, the process of approval and respective consequences of the Treaty that establishes a Constitution for Europe. To accomplish the aforementioned aim I have used criteria such as the relation ship between federated States and the federal central power, the acquisition of citizenship, the possibility of secession, the checks and balances’ system, the relationship between the Constitution and other laws and the extent of federal integration. The most recent European Union political process is looked into, in the light of issues related to philosophy, law and political science. The standpoint is that Europeans could learn from the complex and contradictory process that occurred more than two centuries ago, as well as from the thought contained in the vast literature produced at the time. Many of the questions and issues that confront Europe nowadays have already been raised and discussed and we should be looking at the different answers they provided, thus enriching our current choices, and improving our decision making process.

This reflection on ethics has starting point problem: the authenticity. What does one understand by authenticity in human life? Will not authenticity be a beautiful dream, a wandering of philosophers? Our everyday experience fully shows the use of the mask. So, we can ask ourselves: 1) Why should it be otherwise? 2) Could it be otherwise? 3) Which means should one use so that it is otherwise? There seem to exist in nature and history three forces in continuous fight: 1st) the ones that cause the misfortune that now we experience. 2nd) the ones that impel us to refuse the misfortune, that is, the ones that motivate us in search of happiness. The 3rd is, perhaps, our voluntary and conscious contribution to awakening. So our problem is not - what must I do?, but - how must I be? The difference has to do with the basic difference between morality and ethics and has roots in our history. My proposal suggests that it is not enough that we dream or desire to act well to actually act well. It is necessary that we have knowledge (of ourselves and the others) and that we have power, mainly on ourselves. However, our experience shows how fragile is the knowledge that we possess of ourselves (and so refusing the well-known socratic invitation “know thyself") and how fragile is that power, because we are constantly carried along by what we do not want to do (and so we ignore Lao Dzi’s lesson “the one that wins the others is strong; but the one that wins himself is really powerful"). But there is more: though we do what we want, who is it in ourselves that wants what we want? Thus, a practical inquiry on ourselves seems primordial in order to verify which forces act in us and, eventually, to start trying to understand them and to guide them in a more beneficial direction for all the community of living beings of the planet that we inhabit together. Being so, ethics is not only a set of theoretical principles, but over all a set of exercises, guided by a knowledge, that could be able to lead us to a different way of being.

An article by Moulines presents an interesting argument against semantic realism, using Calderôn’s play La Vida en Sueño as a literary device to develop his point. He introduces in the play a new character, a realist philosopher who tries to persuade Prince Segismund to abandon the anti-realist position he maintains, after the experience he undergoes in the play. I introduce a second imaginary realist, who argues for conjectural realism instead of the semantic variety, by means of several sceptical arguments intended to defeat scepticism itself, throwing it in the same boat as anti-realist solipsism.

La tradition hébraïque, la philosophie d’Aristote, l’impérialisme romain et le christianisme qui les synthétise, ont comme thèse, non seulement la distinction mais la supériorité de la nature humaine face aux autres espèces vivantes. La raison ou la capacité de raisonnement, la conscience et le langage sont des attributs exclusifs de l’espèce humaine, affirment les philosophes moralistes traditionnels. Tous ceux qui les possèdent sont égaux. Les autres êtres, destitués de ces attributs spécifiques, sont différents. Cette différence biologique responsable de cette distinction justifie tous les abus et même la destruction des animaux au profit exclusif des humains. Au XVII siècle la théorie mécaniciste de la nature des organismes vivants, appliquée par Descartes aux animaux, a corroboré l’héritage moral judéo-chrétien. Cet article présente d’abord la thèse de Descartes sur la quelle la philosophie morale traditionnelle se bâtit; en deuxième place vient la reconstitution des arguments conservateurs directe ou indirectement dérivés de cette tradition. Finalement il montre les risques et les limites de l’adoption de ces arguments en ce qui concerne la morale contemporaine, affectant non seulement les intérêts des animaux mais aussi ceux des sujets humains non paradigmatiques.

The aim of this paper is to present, in a clear and accessible way, Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism. I stress that what distinguishes Davidson’s monism from other identity theories of the mind is the conjunction of an identity thesis (viz. every mental event is a physical event) with an anti-reductionist argument, according to which there are no strict psychophysical laws.