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Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents

1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Josep E. Corbí Self and Sense in a Natural World
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A subject is a being who has a life to lead. In this paper, I explore the array of resources that are available to us (i.e., Westerners at the turn of the millennium) to articulate and assess our lives. Specifically, I shall reflect on the impact that such matters may have on our naturalist conviction that the world ultimately consists of a causal network where notions such as sense and value have no direct bearing. Sometend to assume that an implication of our naturalist world-view is that the notions of sense and value are inevitably relative to the subject’s desires and inclinations. This is, however, a line of reasoning that I would like to resist. For I am convinced that this approach unnecessarily restricts the number of resources to which we can legitimately appeal in order to lead our lives. This restriction will turn out to be quite serious because, as we shall see, it dramatically distorts our perception of the relevance that social ties may have in the life of a subject, as well as the conditions under which a human life may escape the absurd.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos On Rational Choice of Final Ends
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This paper is a non-technical paper on the kinematics of rational decision-making. lt focuses upon Williams’s Regret argument. The Argument is directed against injunction implicit in standard decision theory and formulated by Rawls: a rational agent is always ready to act so that she need never blame herself “no matter how things finally transpire”. The purpose of this paper is to offer new insights into theweaknesses of the Argument, introducing new considerations regarding coherence of the self of the would-be repentant. The opaqueness of one’s future preference-structure is argued at length, stressing that standard decision theory cannot possibly allow that the decision tree is not comprehended at the time of making one’s choice, even if it is about one’s final end.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Isabella Muzio Emotions and Rationality
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This paper examines the sense and extent to which emotions can be thought of as rational. Through considering a number of examples, it argues (a) that there is more than one way of understanding the claims that we often make about emotions being “rational” or “justified”; (b) that none of the models of rationality already available to us can singly account for all of the various senses in which we think of emotions as rational; yet (c) that they can do so jointly, that is, by each explicating at least one of these senses. Thus, in the end it is suggested that, despite it not being right to identify emotions with either beliefs or actions, there is no obvious reason to believe that the claims we make about the rationality of our emotions need to be understood by appeal to any separate model of rationality, specific to the emotions, additional to the “cognitive” and “strategic” models already available to us for understanding the rationality of other states like beliefs and judgements on the one hand, and actions on the other.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija Trust and Epistemic Cooperation
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In this paper, I defend a certain moderate version of Humean evidentialism against a Reidian non-evidentialist’s position. My proposal of cooperative viewpoint of trust is based on the following theses: (i) epistemic cooperation is a necessary condition for us to attain knowledge (because of the scope and complexity of the task, capacity inequalities and background information, etc.), (ii) any form of cooperative activity, including division of labor, requires that cooperators trust one another, (iii) in contrast to Reidian non-evidentialism, justified trust cannot be blind but has to rely on some evidence, (iv) crucial evidence that the hearer can have is evidence about the trustworthiness of informants, i.e., their moral and epistemic character, (v) the fact that we depend on other people for most of our knowledge can be a good reason to weaken Humean epistemic self-reliance and to accept as epistemically responsible and rational the trusting partly based on epistemic forward looking reasons (gathering of information).
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Barbara de Mori Human Rights and Concept of Person: Some Ethical Remarks
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The paper critically discusses the proposal of identifying the subject of human rights by means of the concept of moral person, reflecting on the inherent connection between the concept of person and that of human rights in their moral dimension, that is, in the light of an ethics of human rights, an ethics in which human rights represent fundamental moral values. The thesis defended is that the concept of moral person lends itself more than any other to the role of subject of human rights, if conceived as a relational, communicative and representative social value, that is as “the concept of an individual human being whose features enable him to join some segments of his life with others”.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Matthew Nudds Common-Sense and Scientific Psychology
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In this paper I discuss the circumstances in which it would be right to revise a common-sense psychological categorisation -- such as the common-sense categorisation of emotions -- in the light of the results of empirical investigation. I argue that an answer to that question, familiar from eliminitivist arguments, should be rejected, and suggest that the issue turns on the ontological commitments of the explanations that common-sense psychological states enter into.
book reviews
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Predrag Šustar Inventare il giusto e l’ingiusto: Saggio sull’etica di John Leslie Mackie
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8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Aljoša Pužar Philosophy of Literature: An Introduction
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