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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 59
林建德
Chien-Te Lin
傳統判教的哲學反思─試論學術與信仰間之可能平衡
A Philosophical Reflection on Traditional Pan Jiao
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現代化客觀的佛教學術研究,易於挑戰乃至否定傳統佛教既有觀點,如不承認佛經皆佛親說(包括「大乘非佛說」),各式的「判教」在史學考證下亦難有立足之地,天台五時判教即是一例。本文試著對此作進一步探討:首先,說明信仰與學術兩種立場的對峙;其次,學術研究雖在知識層次占了上風,但僅能視為是「一種」理解而非「唯一」觀點;第三,佛法之「宗教性」 重於以方便善巧引渡不同根機眾生,如「五時」的「時」除了「時間順序」 外或也指「時節因緣」;第四,傳統判教仍具有意義,背有亦有一套信仰邏輯以建立自宗合理性基礎;第五,除了以正誤、真偽評斷,「權實」應是更理想的評價語彙。最後,對於佛教史理解,或可藉「多重佛史」持多元開放態度而非定於一說。如此,以「歷史之錯誤」斷言傳統判教,就客觀學術雖言之成理,但就信仰實踐而言卻是「宗教之正確」,所以即便是「錯誤」也會是「美麗的錯誤」。
It is easy for modern academic research to challenge and even reject the traditional views of Buddhism. The denial of certain sutras, and also the rejection of Mahayana Buddhism, are cases in point. Various Pan Jiao (判教, “doctrinal classifications”) are untenable under the inspection of historical and philological study; Wu Shi Jiao Pan in Tiantai Buddhism is an instance. This article attempts to present six points to further explore this. First, I argue that there is certainly a conflict between the orientation of academic research and the practice of faith. Second, in terms of level of knowledge, while the academic approach has the upper hand, it is not the sole valid perspective for understanding Buddhism. Third, the religiosity of Dharma is concerned with facilitating the extradition of different humans. In this sense, the timing in the “five-stage distinction” emphasizes causes and conditions no less than chronological order. Fourth, the traditional view toward Buddhist teachings still has its value, insofar as the logic of belief provides a rational basis for this view. Fifth, Quan (權) and Shi (實) form better evaluative standards and criteria than correctness and objectivity. Finally, this study argues that it is better to hold a pluralistic and open attitude for interpreting Buddhist history. In this way, the five-stage distinction, while a “historical distortion” for an objective scholar, is actually “religious correctness” for the Buddhist practitioner. Even if it is an error, it is a “beautiful error.”
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 59
林修德
Hsiu-Te Lin
面對中國哲學研究立場分歧的一種嘗試
On Disagreements within Chinese Philosophy
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本文的核心論題是中國哲學研究方法,本文企圖指出研究關懷的重要性,強調研究關懷的根本分歧將導致研究立場及其進路的不同,並進而衍生出歧異且難以交流的學術意見。研究關懷是更深層的研究動機,研究者能嘗試在彼此相異的研究關懷中找到某些共通點,從而藉此建構出公共性的研究關懷網絡及其分工整合機制。本文嘗試以「求真」做為公共的研究關懷,倡議中國哲學研究關懷得以從傳統「澄清文本意涵『是』什麼?」的模式中,進一步連結「做為普遍真理的中國哲學該『如何』在當代具體實踐?」 的探究。
The main topic of the paper concerns “research methodologies in Chinese philosophy.” It looks like we are talking about more than one methodology. In this paper, I point out that the researcher’s concern plays an important role in academic judgment. Different researchers’ concerns lead to different stances and methods. And different stances and methods in turn lead to different conclusions. What I coin as “the researcher’s concern” might be provisionally understood as a sort of meta-motivation (something that motivates motives). I suggest that among these different concerns we may seek something common. This something common could then be the basis for a public network, which functions as an integrative mechanism encompassing and addressing those different concerns. This paper argues that “seeking truth” should be the common concern of research. It further argues that with this as the basis, the traditional mode of research, being concerned with the meaning of the text, should be integrated with the present concern with how to practice Chinese philosophy after modernity.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 59
林慈涵
Ci-Han Lin
《莊子》的判斷模式
The Two Modes of Judgment in Zhuangzi
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本文試圖將隱含於《莊子》的「判斷模式」明朗化,並由此顯現出兩種主體性。「固化主體」以「成心」為用,「成心三元素」中的「我」啟動固化機制,開展出「成心→同一化標準→分判價值→自己」的判斷模式,呈現出「已成」與「固定」的存在狀態;「虛化主體」則是以「鏡心」為用,「鏡心三元素」中的「他者」讓主體能如實接收物本身,開展出「鏡心→差異化標準→分判價值→自然」的判斷模式,呈現出「虛空」與「流動」的存在狀態。兩種主體分別是莊子的批判與理想。
This paper brings to light the two types of subjectivity implied in Zhuangzi’s modes of judgment. A person who has a “Fixed Subject” or fixed sense of self uses chengxin, or a thought pattern developed over time to think. This thought pattern develops over three stages; the subjective self comes to be fixed from this process. Through this analysis, the mode of judgment can be schematized as “chengxin → standardization → value of judgment → self.” From this process the subject has an “established” and “fixed” existence. A person who is an “Empty Subject” uses jingxin or sees things as they actually are. This mode of judgment also undergoes a three-stage formation/development, in which “the other” allows the subject to apprehend reality as it is in itself. The steps in such a judgement are: “jingxin → standard of differentiation → value of judgment → ziran (something in itself).” Under this mode, the self is “empty” or selfless and eternally “flowing”. These two modes present the subjectivity that Zhuangzi rejects and prefers respectively.
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