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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Alfred Tarski Drei Briefe an Otto Neurath
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2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Luis Fernandez Moreno Putnam, Tarski, Camap und die Wahrheit
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Es werden zwei Einwände Putnams gegen die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit untersucht. Pumam behauptet, nach dieser Wahrheitskonzeption seien die Äquivalenzen der Form (W) logisch notwendig oder logisch wahr, und die Wahrheit eines Satzes hänge von seiner syntaktischen Struktur und davon ab, wie die Welt ist, aber nicht von der Bedeutung des Satzes. Bei der Untersuchung dieser Einwände wird gegen Putnam geltend gemacht, daß Camaps Bestimmung einer Sprache durch semantische Regeln nicht tautologisch ist, und es werden wichtige Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen der Semantik Tarskis und Camaps festgestellt
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Alan Richardson Metaphysics and Idealism in the Außau
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The received view of the anti-metaphysics of Camap's Aufbau finds that it rests exclusively on verificationism. Alberto Coffa has recently put forward an interpretation of the antimetaphysical stance that claims that Camap was confusedly moving from ontological to semantical ideahsm. After raising objections to both of these views another interpretation is put forward. The crucial aspect of Camap's rejection of metaphysics rests on his reinterpretation of epistemology as the logic of objective knowledge. This leads to a rejection of metaphysics inasmuch as the peculiar status of logic as the framework constitutive of the possibility of rational inquiry means that it neither needs nor allows of completion or interpretation by traditional metaphysics. This view of Camap's is compared to the views of the Marburg and Southwest NeoKantians.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
M. T. Liske Metaphysik und Erkenntnistheorie bei Kripke: Kritische Betrachtungen zu „Naming and Necessity"
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Kripkes These soll widersprochen werden, die modalen Begriffe ,notwendig' bzw. ,kontingent' (Metaphysik) seien auch extensional von den epistemischen ,a priori' bzw. ,a posteriori' (Erkenntnistheorie) verschieden. Nur auf Aussagengehalte als ihr Subjekt bezogen, werden beide Begriffspaare vergleichbar. Geht es aber nicht um die notwendigen (wesentlichen) oder kontingenten Eigenschaften einer Sache (die essentialistische modalitas de re, z.B. die Identität einesIndividuums mit sich), sondem um die notwendige oder kontingente Geltung eines Aussagegehaltes (modalitas de dicto), dann ist bedeutsam, wie eine Aussage über einen solchen Sachverhalt begründbar und erkennbar ist. So ist auch die Referenz nie ohne Kenntnis eines Allgemeinbegriffs möglich.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
David Widerker Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous Monism
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Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist the stronger Cartesian argument.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Heinz Dieter Heckmann How Not to Make Mind Matter More: (Or why Fodor's cure for epiphobia doesn't work)
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Epiphenomenalism (with respect to the intentional) may be construed as the claim that intentional events as such are causally inert. If property-dualism is true, that is if intentional properties aren't identical with or reducible to physical properties, then epiphenomenalism is inevitable. Some philosophers (most notably Fodor) have argued that their irreducibility notwithstanding intentional properties are causally responsible properties (or at least supervenient upon causally responsible properties). The arguments supporting these promising allegations aren't convincing. Given the tmth of property-dualism, there is no (Fodorian or any other) escape-route from epiphenomenalism.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Daniel Laurier Rationality and Intentionality: A Defence of Optimization in Theories of Interpretation
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The view that in radical interpretation, the interpreter should aim at optimizing the rationality of agents is defended. A distinction and a parallel is drawn between linguistic interpretation and psychological interpretation. Both can be taken to be governed, in part, and in somewhat different ways, by a principle of rationality. Such approaches have been criticised on the ground that they make it impossible for a speaker or an agent to have wildly irrational or false beliefs. It is argued that the so-called principle of simulation isn't a serious altemative, and that the counter-intuitiveness of the optimization-based approaches has been exaggerated.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Sherrill Jean Begres Metaphor and Constancy of Meaning
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The prevalent theories of metaphor in the literature, with very few exceptions, involve a conversion of either meaning or reference from the literal meaning or reference of the metaphor to either a corresponding simile or to a metaphorical meaning or reference. In this essay an altemative to the conversion view - i.e., a constancy theory - is offered that requires no such conversions. H.R Grice's notions of conversational maximes and implicatures provide a conceptual framework within which to account for metaphors in a totally literal context. A selection procedure is suggested as the mechanism by which one can interpret metaphors and distinguish them from other figures of speech.
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Uwe Meixner Eine logische Rekonstruktion der platonischen Prädikationstheorie
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In diesem Aufsatz wird eine axiomatisierte logische Rekonstmktion der Platonischen Prädikationstheorie vorgeschlagen, aufbauend auf der Ähnlichkeitsrelation. Die Theorie ist konsistent und trivial. Selbst-Prädikation bereitet darin keine Schwierigkeiten und das Dritte-Mann-Argument wird als harmlos aufgezeigt. Es werden Kriterien dafür, daß etwas ein Standardgegenstand (eine Form oder Idee) ist, aufgestellt und ausgeführt, daß diese die Platonische Ideentheorie implizieren. Die Grenzen von Piatons Prädikationstheorie werden klar gemacht; sie ist von der adjektivischen (linguistischen) Prädikation abgeleitet und kann ontologisch nur diesen Typ der Prädikation abdecken, nicht aber substantivische Prädikation. Schließlich wird gezeigt, daß die Existenz Gottes in der Platonischen Prädikationstheorie bewiesen werden kann.
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Miroslav Prokopijević Justice, Social Choice and Relativity
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The notion of justice is not some inwardly homogeneous, simple and objective one. Assumed the gains and losses on the one side and the relative levels of welfare on tiie other side play the cmcial role as criteria for being just, there are at least the four different, mutually exhaustive and irreducible conceptions of justice - cardinal and ordinal utilitarianism and moderate and radical egalitarianism. The first and fourth theories rely on just one criterion, whereas theories two and three rely on two criteria each. These two theories are more refined but not more just: Their acceptability depends on normative persuasion. Thus, by introducing the intensity of preferences into analysis, the whole discussion of the concept of justice becomes more comprehensive but also more complicated.
review articles
11. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Johannes Brandl Was sind Ereignisse?: Eine Studie zur Analytischen Ontologie
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12. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Klaus Puhl Selbstbewußtsein
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13. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Thomas Pogge Constructions of Reason
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critical notes
14. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Peter Simons Das System der Leibnizschen Logik
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15. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Jan Woleński Computing and Logic: Mathematics and Language
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books received
16. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 43
Books Recieved
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