The present author attempts to analyze the following problems concerned with the authenticity of arguments of contemporary physics:(1) What is the nature of difficulties in determining the authenticity of physical theorems?(2) Since quantum mechanics includes a priori, formal-logical, mathematical and conventional elements a question arises whether such features as objectivity and authenticity can be attributed to it.Re 1 (a) Contemporary physics, recognizes an extremely active role played by the cognizant subject in the cognition of physical reality (e.g. an instrument disturbs a physical process);(b) the quantum theory merely establishes the probable occurrence of phenomena as an unmistakable description of a course of events is out of question;(c) contemporary physics proposes statistical, indeterministic descriptions of phenomena and the necessity of employing multi value logics;(d) faced with complicated microphysical processes physics is forced to construct their models as well as simplify and idealize; cognition of reality is accomplished by means of successive approximations.Re 2. In spite of numerous difficulties discussed above the present author maintains that attributes of objectivity and authenticity can be ascribed to theorems of contemporary physics if the range of objectivity and authenticity is not arbitrarily limited to the realm of common cognition. There is no reason to attribute the two features solely to these arguments which are applicable to the commonly recognized material world. Physios cognitively 'reaches’ the reality in the definite aspect to such an extent as it is permitted by the very structure of the microcosm and the employed methods of physical examination.

The situation in contemporary philosophy of science concerning the structure of scientific itheoreis is this: (beginning in the 1920s it became commonplace for philosophers of science to construe scientific theories as axiomatic calculi which are given a partial observational interpretation by means of correspondence rules. This analysis, commonly referred to as the received view on theories has been widely assumed by philosophers of science in dealing with other problems in the philosophy of science. In the 1950s, however, this analysis began to be the subject of critical attack- challenging its very conception of theories and scientific konwledge (for example, explanation). At the same time various alternatives to the received view have been erected but none of them enjoys widespread acceptance. Such alternative analyses of theories are exemplified by descriptive, Weltamschaugen and semantic approaches. All of them presuppose the rejection of the received view which belongs today to the history of philosophy.The aim of this essay is not to provide a historical account of analysed views on theories. Rather it merely is a sketchy and systematic account of the main theses which are characteristic for standard and descriptive analyses of theories. In doing so, theses of the standard position are analysed on views of Carnap and Hempel, the main supporters of axiomatic account and the second one on views of Achinstein and Bromberger who have proposed a broder concept of theory.

The article is concerned with the problem of testability of empirical theory and particular theoretical theorems being of current significance for the theory of science. It aims to systematize opinions of several writers discussing the so-called propositions of Duhem-Quine. The first part of the article analyzes propositions of theoretical holism as compared to propositions put forward by old. empirism. P. Duihem formulated the following propositions of theoretical holism: (a) the observational consequence cannot be educed from a single hypothesis; (b) a single hypothesis cannot be conclusively falsified by experimental findings; (c) an isolated hypothesis cannot be conclusively verified by means of one or several crucial experiments; (d) a single hypothesis cannot be conclusively verified by way of induction from the performed observations. The first two propositions were developed by W.V.O. Quine who claimed that a falsified hypothesis might be preserved if other statements of the system in which the hypothesis occurred were altered. The second part of the article discusses criticism of the propositions by A. Grünbaum as well as objections to the criticism raised by such writers as P. L. Quinn, J. W. Swanson, L. Sklar, F. Seaman, G. Wedeking, L. Landon and J. Agassi. The author concludes that the discussion is not over. Most writers, however, agree with the propositions which are moreover confirmed by the actual scientific practice.

The first part of the article discusses H. Reiehembach’is attempt to employ many valued logic to overcome causal anomalies in quantum mechanics. It aims to present the criteria which guided the American logician in the construction of his logical system. The second part of the paper analyzes certain propositions of Reichenbach. His argumentation is not always coherent. It is demonstrated that the term "indefinite" belongs to physics rather than semantics. The language of Reichenbach’s logic as compared to the language of'classical propositional calculus seems artificial. A successful attempt to translate the trivalent language of the American logician into the language of bivalent logics is mentioned as well. The question of applicability of many valued logics to physical theories is briefly discussed. The possibility of application of non-classical logics different than multivalent systems, to science is sketched.

Scientific maturity of contemporary cosmology requires more systematic study of its methodology. The concepts of „locality” and „globality” are discussed in the framework of the cosmological extrapolation problem. Cosmological extrapolation is ruled by the so-called cosmological principles which always contain observationally un verifiable assumptions. A new „cosmological principle” is proposed and briefly discussed; it postulates that space-time should be mathematically inextendible manifold. Modern cosmology appears to be not only a science about the structure- -evolution of our Universe but also a science about assumptions that are to be made in order to render such a science possible.

In 1965 L. A. Zadeh introduced the concept of fuzzy sets. Sets as understood by Cantor constitute a particular case of fuzzy sets. In 1967 J. A. Goguen makes further generalization introducing the so-called L-fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets are a particular instance of L-fuzzy sets. These are successive generalizations of a classical (normal) concept of set.The notion of fuzzy set or L-fuzzy set may be employed in solving various problems of contemporary science and technology.The present article is a survey informing the philosopher reader about the essence of the concept of fuzzy set, discussing more important operations which may be performed upon fuzzy sets and mentioning the concept of fuzzy relation. It also mentions the main applications of the fuzzy set theory exceeding the realm of mathematics where the motion of set belongs to the essential concepts. In mathematics fuzzy categories, fuzzy topologicalspaces, fuzzy modules etc. are employed. The notions of fuzzy algorithm and fuzzy automaton etc. also seem acceptable. We may speak as well of fuzzy languages and fuzzy grammars or fuzzy sentences. The logic employing fuzzy sentences seems more adequate to achieve formalization of both physical theories and natural language than the ’distinct’ logic, i.e. devoid of fuzzy sentences.The study of the theory of fuzzy sets and its numerous applications is being carried out at present.

In the paper the connection between the idea of model in mathematic meaning and in the meaning of phisies model is considered. The cases when these ideas have simillar and when different meaning were discussed. The possibilities of existence of improved assumptions of classical mechanics are also mentiened.

The author’s aim is to compare standards of rationality as suggested by Popper and Lakatos. The main part of the article is preceded by a general presentation of a dynamic approach to science practised by the two philosophers. Next, the standards are discussed, while the final part of the paper shows the results obtained by the writers as well as the conclusions drawn by the present author. It has been found out , among other things, that (a) rules included in the standard suggested by Popper are precisely defined and restrictive; norms proposed by-Lakatos, on then other hand, are more slack and liberal, sometimes to such an extent that they cease to be norms; (b) the standard suggested by Lakatos is applicable to analyses carried out by historians of science rather than to actual research; (c) unlike Popper Lakatos claims that an experiment exercises little influence upon decisions concerning either acceptance or rejection of a theory since he attributes to it verifying rather than falsifying role (Popper stresses the falsifying function); Lakatos emphasizes more than Popper the part played by theoretical factors in the development of science; (d) Lakatos’s model of rationality is more consistent with the actual course of science: it results from the restrictiveness of Popper’s standard as opposed to the liberal rules suggested by the other writer. Finally, a more general conclusion is drawn. It has been observed that the more precise and restrictive the suggested standards are, the more they depart from the actual research procedures. Relaxing the restrictions brings rules closer to research practice, albeit at the expense of their normative function which declines. Thus it has been observed that the historical description constitutes the most adequate model of the actual development of science.

These days hypotheses are made in a different manner than in the 19th century. Not is frequently a hypothesis results from a necessity to systematize new facts which do not fit the accepted pattern. Fig. 1. The author develops the electronic model of life first introduced in 1967. Fig. 2. The empirical foundation of the model of life includes the semi conductivity of aminoacids, DNA and RNA, saccharides, plant and animal tissues as well as pyro- and ferroelectriical properties of organic compounds and tissues, and possibly superconductivity. The present author finds interpretation of the bioelectronic model in technological semiconductor devices since substratum, structural and functional analogies seem conclusive. A living system would work similarly to a technological device — electron movement in semiconducting protein mass, propelled by the chemical energy of metabolism. This is presented by the ’test tube of life’ Fig. 3. The cross-section of the ’hot line of life’ shows quantum coupling of chemical reactions and electronic processes. The rhythm of anabolism-catabolism demands stimulation by the energy of photons and phonons generated in quantum electronic processes. Fig. 4.The author develops his concept of bioplasma first introduced in 1967. It is the heuristic conclusion from the electronic model of life. Bioplasma is a state of living matter analogous to the solid state plasma, but characteristic only of coupled quantum electronic and chemical processes in the protein medium. Electrons of metabolism and molecular structures (delocalized) together with semi-particles of photons sfthd phonons may be treated as the protein solid state plasma. Fig. 5. Bioplasma may constitute a description of life since it combines corpuscdlar and wave features. Fig. 6. Foundations of the model and conditions of its interpretation are empirically proved. The heuristic conclusions require confirmation.

The article takes up the problem of a distinct (specifis) charakter of the animate being as opposed to the inanimate being, considered from the point o£ viefw of natural philosophy inspired by Aristotelian and Thomistie tradition. It consists of two parts. Part 1 presents historical development of the problem and Part 2 deals with the philosophical interpretation of a distinct character of the animate being. The former is an historical survey which shows varying presentation of the problem in course of the development of human thought. It aims at demonstrating the causes, both within and outside the system for either isolating or not this type of being from the entire structure of the world. The latter discusses an attempt to solve the problem. It tries to prove that the truth of the existence of a fundamental difference between the animate and the inanimate being is evident from direct experience as well as confirmed by natural science which enhances common experience and reveals further research possibilities of philosophical approach. Since the truth of a distinctive character of animate objects cannot be comprehended by means of common experience it is necessary to discuss the problem at philosophical level. If this angle is chosen metaphysical theories of a complex character of being must be employed to interpret such an instance of being as the animate being. The article demonstrates an attempt to employ the theory of a complex character of being as consisting of quality and quantity as well as substance and affection. The function of the category of individual substance is stressed in particular. It is in this category that an attempt to show a specific character of animate being should be perceived.