The article discusses classical views of representatives of sacrological trend in the study of religion (E. Durkheim, W. Windelband, N. Söderblom, R. Otto, M.Scheler, J. Hessen) on the relation of religion to other fields of culture. Due to general importance of the arguments, the systematic review of the opinions permits to discern within the trend certain development of the interpretation of the relation. This pattern is revealed in the headings. Part II seems essential. It presents, among other things, Scheler’s arguments founded upon critical analysis of traditional notions of religious consciousness as either undifferenciated, comprehensive or synthetizing cultural consciousness in general. These arguments seem to prove the substantial distinctiveness of the intentional structure of religious consciousness in relation to other types of cultural consciousness. Distinctive character of the substance is eventually proved by the substantial distinctiveness of the object of religious consciousness, i.e. sacrum. The consciousness-intention pattern must be taken into consideration since the discussed problem cannot be solved at the level of historical data. Distinctive character of the substance in particular types of consciousness justifies the discussion of autonomy of both religion and other fields of culture. It does not exclude, on the other hand, the presence of other cultural elements in religion or of religious elements in particular fields of culture as well as their functional interrelationship which is virtually indispensable. Distinctive character of the substance of religious consciousness in relation to other types of consciousness (religion and other fields of culture) also effects definite understanding and interpretation of the sacrum-profanum relation, epistemological and methodological character of the study of religion, criticism and self-criticism of religion and religious pluralism. These consequences are mentioned in the final discussion.

The author poses the question how to understand the term "analytical ethics” as applied to the ethics practised nowadays in the English-speaking countries. He holds that this is a collective term applied to certain English-speaking philosophers prompted by the method they employ rather than by the ethical or metaethical views they express. The writers often differ considerably in the latter respect, while the method of practising ethics which they pursue is an attempt to emulate the best traditions of the scolastic method particularly concerned about precise formulation of problems. The author demonstrates that discourse of the method Amercian and British philosophers have managed to solve conclusively at least some ethical problems, this being an argument in favour of dissemination of the method.

Distinguishing many aspects of ethical judgement is of fundamental importance for determination of the relation of autonomous ethics to Christian ethics. Such a moral judgement as „One ought to tell the truth” claims, for instance, that1) telling the truth is the proper way of realizing a moral attitude; 2) maintaining a moral attitude constitutes a duty; 3) this duty is something that actually takes place. Accordingly, different terms are introduced to describe particular aspects of the ethical judgement. These are: 1) aspect of rightness, 2) aspect of obligation, 3) existential aspect. The problem of determinability of the moral jedgement in the above aspects is put forward. The recognition of the ethical judgement in the aspect of obligation and the existential aspect is founded upon a particular experience (intution) and thus in this aspect ethics is an epistemologically autonomous branch, methodologically independent of other branches. The solution of the ethical judgement in respect of rightness requires further information about man, often supplied solely by philosophy and theology. Thus, ethics in the aspect of rightness is a branch methodologically dependent upon proper anthropological arguments. Besides, due to its existential aspect the ethical judgement is open to metaphysical interpretation and therefore ethics becomes metaphysics of moral obligation as the sui generis being-ness.

The author presents the contemporary discussion of the problem of determining general ethical judgements in respect of rightness. Two distinct doctrines have emerged from the discussion. The teleologists claim that rightness of any act may be determined solely by referring to its effects. The deontologists, on the contrary, maintain that rightness of at least some acts may be decided independently of their results. The present author agrees with the teleologists that the question of rightness of an act is settletd by the effects, though similarly to the deontologists he holds that at least some acts judged in this manner always are either right or wrong. Thus the essence of the problem does not consist in the manner of judging rightness of an act, but in the possibility of justifying general ethical judgements in respect of rightness, within the teleological theory.

The notion of human needs usually constitutes a point of departure for the determination of the essence of work, the present article following the same pattern. It is founded upon an earlier extensive philosophical analysis of needs [cf. Human needs and action, Roczn. Filoz. KUL XXIII (1975), No 2]. The analysis of needs alone cannot reveal the essential aspects of work. It is, however, necessary since it leads to the image of man as a non-self-reliant dynamic being and being-in-the-world. These problems are presented against a background of brief analyses of man’s relation to society and nature.Finally, the following definition of work is suggested: work constitutes an aspect of man’s active behaviour towards the world, subject to moral norms. It results from his non-self-reliance revealed in needs and is accomplished in the human act (actus humanus) aimed at subordinating the world in order to satisfy the needs indirectly. Work has an ambivalent character, that is to say it is characterized by pairs of contrary features, such as difficulty-facility, necessity-freedom, suffering-joy.