On the occasion of the centenary of the publication of the first volume of Principia Mathematica, this article aims to shed some light on Whitehead’s philosophy of mathematics, to differentiate Whitehead’s version of logicism from Russell’s, and to show the unity of Whitehead’s thought. These aims rely on Whitehead’s basic insight that mathematics is the study of pattern.

This paper provides a brief critique of Jaegwon Kim’s evaluation of the achievements of materialist physicalism and then goes on to examine the case for panpsychism and the main objection that has been raised against it, i.e., the composition problem. The object of this examination is to lay bare the fundamental assumptions underlying both the main argument in support of the theory and the objection against it. Whitehead’s panexperientialism has a fair claim to be regarded as the most elaborate version of the theory ever produced. Once the logical structure of the composition problem has been clarified, however, it becomes possible to see that—contrary to what has been argued by David Ray Griffin in his important book, Unsnarling the World-Knot—even Whitehead’sversion of the doctrine fails to provide a satisfactory solution. The paper is brought to an end with a general reflection on the shortcomings of current critiques of panpsychism. Whitehead’s panexperientialism cannot be accepted as it stands and panpsychism as a general philosophical position is not supported by a conclusive proof; nevertheless, the notion that experience is a pervasive feature of reality has the unquestionable merit of being a wholly adequate response to a real philosophical perplexity.

If the Category of the Ultimate requires every actual entity to be, as Whitehead says, both a processing subject and a superject existing objectively immortal, death of a personally ordered social nexus seems impossible since a personal nexus cannot die unless it has a last member. How that is possible is examined, concluding that actual entities of necessarily existing personal societies always have enough creative power to integrate their physical prehensions into new satisfaction/superjects, but others in contingently existing personal societies inevitably do not.

This article examines the strongest case to date in favor of a Whiteheadian atheism. But this case proves inadequate to account for genuine novelty.

This essay responds to Lewis Ford’s “Allan’s Atheism,” in which he assesses a recent essay of mine that finds God an unnecessary and indeed coherence-destroying addition to Process and Reality. I clarify my position by showing how Whitehead’s notions of physical purpose and aesthetic determination adequately account for the novelty required for an actual occasion’s concrescence and for increases in achieved value. I then criticize Ford’s claim that genuine novelties must have a divine origin and that in Adventures of Ideas the Eros of the Universe refers to God.

This article questions the commonly accepted belief that God, like a ceramic potter, is able to control the outcome of events even as the potter controls theoutcome of the clay-throwing process. However, those who are familiar with the artistic process of creating with clay know well that this is a symbiotic dynamicbetween the creator and the clay, as is that between God and human events.

This articles summarizes the deep and extensive influence of Whitehead’s thought on the Chinese academy in recent years.