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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 2
Christopher Menzel Wide Sets, ZFCU, and the Iterative Conception
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ZFCU is ZFC set theory modified to allow for the existence of non-sets, or urelements. The most natural conception of sets—the so-called iterative conception—is typically considered to provide the intuitive underpinnings for ZFCU. It is an easy theorem of ZFCU that all sets have a definite cardinality. But the iterative conception seems to be entirely consistent with the existence of “wide” sets, sets (of, in particular, urelements) that are too big to have a definite cardinality. This paper diagnoses the source of the apparent disconnect here and investigates possibilities for modifying the Replacement and Powerset axioms so as to allow for the existence of wide sets. Drawing upon Cantor’s notion of the absolute infinite, the paper argues that these modifications are warranted and preserve a robust iterative conception of set. The resulting theory is proved consistent relative to ZFC + “there exists an inaccessible cardinal number”.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 2
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir Having Value and Being Worth Valuing
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This paper explores the relationship between the ascription of value to an object and an assessment of conative attitudes taken towards that object. It argues that this relationship is captured by an a priori necessary truth that falls out of the mastery conditions for the concept of value: what has value is worth valuing, when valuing is understood to be a relatively stable conative attitude distinct from judging valuable. What kind of assessment of attitude is at stake? How are we to understand the worth-relation that holds between an object and the attitude? It is argued that deontological, evaluative and alethic eluciations of the worth-relation are wrongheaded. We should be looking for a mind-world relation that marks a success in how the emotional and motivational energies integral to valuing are directed: a success that does not consist in meeting a deontic requirement, in exemplifying value, or in representing truly.
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 2
New Books
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