Cover of Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
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1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Olimpia Lombardi, Mario Castagnino, Juan Sebastián Ardenghi Mecánica cuántica: interpretación e invariancia
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RESUMEN: El propósito del presente trabajo consiste en analizar los vínculos entre la interpretación modal-hamiltoniana de la mecánica cuántica y las transformaciones de Galileo, a fin de poner de manifiesto que el grupo de tales transformaciones permite reformular la regla de actualización de un modo más básico desde un punto de vista teórico, aplicable a otras teorías cuánticas. Además se argumentará que, bajo esta nueva forma, la regla de actualización manifiesta explícitamente su invariancia frente al grupo de Galileo.ABSTRACT: The purpose of the present work consists in analyzing the links between the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation of quantummechanics and the Galilean transformations, with the aim of showing that the group of such transformations allows to reformulate the actualization rule in a theoretically more basic way, applicable to other quantum theories. Moreover, it will be argued that, under this new form, the actualization rule explicitly manifests its invariance with respect to the Galilean group.
2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Víctor M. Verdejo Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either)
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Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Joan Pagès Truthmakers for Negatives
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In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar’s way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen’s specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Manuel Pérez Otero La regla de la aseveración y las implicaturas conversacionales
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Williamson defiende la regla del conocimiento, RK, sobre las aseveraciones: debemos aseverar que p sólo si sabemos que p. En este trabajo exploro algunas consecuencias interesantes de RK: (a) en ocasiones, al hacer una aseveración correcta transmitimos (como implicatura) un significado no literal verdadero, que \sin embargo\ no podría ser correctamente aseverado; (b) ese tipo de implicatura se da, entre otros casos, en una cierta subclase de las implicaturas: las implicaturas argumentativas; (c) RK y la noción de implicatura argumentativa permiten explicar la tendencia a tratar de forma equivalente diferentes tipos de argumentos antiescépticos inspirados en Moore.Williamson defends the knowledge rule, KR, about assertions: one must: assert p only if one knows p. In this work I explore some interesting consequences of KR: (a) sometimes, when making a correct assertion we transmit (as an implicature) a true non-literal meaning which \nevertheless\ could not be rightly asserted; (b) this kind of implicatures are present, for instance, in a certain subclass of implicatures: argumentative implicatures; (c) KR and the notion of argumentative implicature allow for an explanation of the tendency to treat different kinds of Moore-like antiskeptical arguments as if they were equivalent.
5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Liza Skidelsky La versión débil de la hipótesis del pensamiento en lenguaje natural
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Entre los filósofos que consideran que pensamos utilizando representaciones simbólicas, P. Carruthers ha defendido, versus la hipótesis del ‘lenguaje del pensamiento’ (LDP), una versión débil de la hipótesis del ‘pensamiento en lenguaje natural’ (PLN). En este trabajo, me ocuparé, en primer lugar, de mostrar las razones por las cuales Carruthers, en su defensa de la hipótesis débil del PLN, siembra cierta confusión en la polémica entre el LDP y PLN. En segundo lugar, intentaré esbozar una salida de esta confusión, ofreciendo y evaluando dos opciones posibles, i.e. la estrategia trascendental y la de la inferencia a la mejor explicación revisada, para quien desee sostener una versión débil del PLN que no desvirtúe la polémica.Among the philosophers who believe that we think with symbolic representations, P. Carruthers has defended -against the ‘language of thought’ hypothesis (LOT)- a weak version of the ‘thinking in natural language’ hypothesis (TNL). In this paper, I will firstly state the reasons why I think that Carruthers throws the LOT-TNL debate into some confusion. Secondly, I will try to outline a way out of this confusion, offering and evaluating two possible options -i.e., the transcendental and the revised inference to the best explanation strategies- for those who wish to hold a weak version of TNL that does not distort the debate.
errata
6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Errata
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book reviews
7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Joan Roselló Moya The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege
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8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Pedro Jesús Teruel El reloj de la sabiduría. Tiempos y espacios en el cerebro humano
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books received
9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Books Received
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summary
10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Summary
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informantes
11. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Informantes de THEORIA (2005-2008) Referees for THEORIA (2005-2008)
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