The woman being is a human being. This paper critiques gender politics and questions the mistreatment, the second class status and some of the socio-cultural gender roles of women. It posits critical education of men and women, sensitivity and sensibleness as the surest way out of the quagmire.

I present—in an extremely sketchy form—a model of two-level, open, plastic and multidimensional human nature. Due to the included attribute of multidimensionality this model opposes the reductive conceptions of man dominating in today’s philosophy. The main objective of the paper is the ontological status of man, especially the ontic foundation of multidimensional man. I demonstrate that this status remains a riddle; one only knows that from the ontological perspective man is a wholly exceptional object, not explainable by to-date ontological constructions.

A growing number of geologists, geophysicists, and other Earth scientists now claim that human caused changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere, oceans, and land are so pervasive as to constitute a new geological epoch characterized by humanity’s impact on the planet. They argue that these changes are so profound that future geologists will easily recognize a discernible boundary in the stratigraphy of rock separating this new epoch from the previous geological epoch, i.e., the Holocene. They propose to name this new geological epoch the “Anthropocene,” a term meaning the age of man. Common to this view is the claim that humans are now the ecologically dominant force on Earth. This paper compares the understanding of human self-identity developed by the defenders of the Anthropocene discourse with the understanding of human self-identity developed by radical ecologists. It concludes by arguing that only an ecologically and dialogically informed conception of human self-identity can provide an adequate point of departure for an ecologically benign form of human dwelling on this planet.

The author defines moralisation as cultural processes marked by a rise in moralistic argumentation (also in areas in which such argumentation has heretofore not played a meaningful role) to a degree which raises questions and doubts of a philosophical and sociological nature. This is developed on in detail in the sections “The moralisation of the world and suffering,” “The moralisation of everyday life and history,” “The moralisation of knowledge” and “The moralisation of human nature.” The closing section of the article, “Moralisation and morality,” focuses on the relation between the described moralistic approach and the changes broadly-understood moral awareness is undergoing in the contemporary world.

This paper examines four issues concerning human being as a multi-dimensional being. Firstly, the dualist and tripartite conceptions of human beings are discussed. The dichotomist (dualist, bipartite) view of human beings—according to which man comprises of spiritual soul and body—underscores in a strongly materialistic world the idea that faith, spirituality, belief, trust and confidence are soft options in daily life. Secondly, the author investigates the possibility of a differentiation and interchange of human fields of experience as components of human nature. In the African and Christian approaches taken into account in this paper, human being comprises a differentiated multiplicity of fields, components, dimensions and facets of experience integrated into a wholesome creature that experiences God, itself, other human beings and the natural environment. Each component of human being, though radically different, is of the same importance. Thirdly, the modern integral and differential conceptions of human being as a multi-dimensional entity are discussed. The approach in this paper is of postmodern non-reductionist type; according to it, human beings are comprised differentially of a multiplicity of fields, modes, dimensions and aspects of experience dynamically integrated in a union.

In the treatise on the construction of man De opificio hominis, Gregory of Nyssa argues that man is qualitatively superior to other natural creations of God. Man is created in the image of God, a condition not found, at least explicitly, for other creatures. It is up to him whether he will digest this image in question or not. Despite the superiority attributed to man, it is not claimed in any way that he shall behave towards the rest of nature by a way of domination.

The paper questions the scientific rather than ideological problem of an eventual biological successor of the mankind. The concept of superhumans is usually linked to Nietzsche or to Heidegger’s criticism or even to the ideology of Nazism. However, the superhuman can be also viewed as that biological species who will originate from humans eventually in the course of evolution.While the society is reached a natural limitation of globalism, technics depends on the amount of utilized energy, and the mind is restricted by its carrier, i.e. by the brain, it is language which seems to be the frontier of any future development of humans or superhumans. Language is a symbolization of the world and thus doubling in an ideal or virtual world fruitful for creativity and the modeling of the former. Consequently, the gap between the material and the ideal world is both produced by and productive for language.

Man is a being-in–the-world and at the same time he defies the dictates of nature; he is a being-off-the-world. Man tries to transcend the unconditionally given nature through invention, symbolization, representation and imagination. Man not only belongs to nature but also intervenes in the processes of nature. Man is duplex. This duplicity is also species-specific to man and can be termed as human transcendence. This implies not only the transcendence of external nature but also self-transcendence, i.e. transcendence of his ego-self. Self-transcendence not only makes morality possible but is also a the basis of formation of society. Further, it brings about a change in man’s attitude to nature. Nature is not seen purely as an object of utility, but also as a power, a force, having a telos or an end. In clarifying what we want to say, we study the positions of two figures, Friedrich Nietzsche and Rabindranath Tagore. This paper attempts to address the idea of man’s self-transcendence and its bearing on harmonious living with other individuals and with nature

From the dawn of human intelligence to the present era, the question ‘does God really exist?’ has been important for human being. Is there any proof of his existence? Philosophers, scholars, preceptors, monks and even atheists have tried to find the answer in their own ways. Various schools of Indian philosophy have also expressed their views about God’s existence. Some schools of Indian philosophy have accepted the ideas of karma (deeds), karmaphala (effects of deeds), rebirth etc. They have denied to admit the existence of God due to their own philosophical standpoint hence they have presented a series of arguments to refute the existence of God. Udayanāchārya, a famous Indian philosopher of the 10th century A.D., belonging to the Nyāya School, has shown some refined arguments to prove the existence of God. This paper presents his way of reasoning examining whether the belief in the existence of God is reasonable or not.

We briefly review and discuss symbolic expressions of the cognitive architecture of the human mind/brain, focusing on the Quaternion, the Axis Mundi and the Tree of Life, and elaborate on a quaternary diagram that expresses a contemporary worldview. While traditional symbols contain vertical and horizontal dimensions related to transcendence and immanence, respectively, in the contemporary interpretation the vertical axis refers to diachronic processes as biological evolution and cultural history, while the horizontal axis refers to synchronic relations as the interactions of individuals in society. In spite of these differences, we claim that old and new symbols are similar, expressing the cognitive architecture of the human mind/brain in the world of experience.

I propose here an image of knowledge based on the concept of symbol: according to it, the relation of representation that constituting cognition is a symbolization. It is postulated that both the representing conceptual model, i.e. a pre-linguistic entity acquired in cognition, and the true sentence it generates are of symbolic and not of mirroring (copying) character. The symbolic nature of cognition carries dialectical tension. We have at our disposal conceptual models and true sentences which symbolically represent reality. However, it is not possible to lift the symbolic disguise over knowledge, because precisely this disguise is its essence. Reality appears only as symbolically, nonimitatively encoded. The proposed here symbolic realism rejects the traditional adopted dichotomy between, on one side, realism and the absence of the subject’s factors in the cognitive result, and, on the other, idealism and the subject as a factor which is viewed as inevitably leading to the idealistic nature of knowledge.

Collaboration must be based on careful representation and communication of each stakeholder’s knowledge. Using a foundational logical and epistemological point of view, we explore how such representation and communication can be accomplished. We tentatively conclude, based on careful delineation of logical technicalities necessarily involved in such representation and communication, that currently a complete representation is not possible. This inference, if correct, is discouraging. However, we suggest two actions. First, we can strive to make stakeholders more aware of the incompleteness of knowledge representations. Second, moderating one’s certainty of “Truth” should increase each stakeholder’s humility, thereby promoting the efficacy of collaborations.

Modern barbarity will soon get rid of the human species unless a new form of violence is found able to compete with the state, without turning into a new form a state. This new form is authoritative, legitimate intimidation. But what are the conditions to speak out authoritatively? Are they not distinctive state conditions? Moreover, does authority lie in the form of discourse? If not, because consentment has superseded mere submission, which are the authoritative sources of discourse which, though neither overtly nor primarily conflicting with the state, nor with corporations, could somehow not completely coincide with the interests of it and even work against it, though like it? This paper examines these questions.

This work attempts to address some basic feasibility concerns in the global taxation policy proposal. In recent years, moral-political philosophizing has extensively advanced the idea of transnational justice through volumes of scholarly literature. In moving the discussions beyond an ideational level and projecting it onto a practical realm, moral-political thinkers have proposed a global taxation policy, the proceeds of the implementation of which are meant to cater for the global poor. This proposal is morally laudable, given that it would substantially benefit the global needy. Nonetheless, the proposal raises some basic feasibility concerns, such as the moral and legal justifiability of the proposal; the nature of the object to be globally taxed and how it is to be globally taxed; the nature of the globalist institution to implement the proposal; the legitimacy challenge of the globalist institution, and the challenge of practical implementation of the proposal by the institution. If the proposal is to succeed, the critical issues ought to be constructively addressed. Given that institutionalism necessarily emerges in the feasibility concerns, an institutionalist approach is advanced in this work to constructively address them.

The importance of education can never be underplayed in any society as it is the most potent weapon given to man to transform, change and liberate him and society from the slavery of ignorance and backwardness. Education allows man to attain a rapid development in all ramifications. It should be known from the outset that universities in Africa are moulded on the foundation and systemic structure of the Western ideologies. There are salient multi-faceted and multi-dimensional barriers towards the pursuit of higher education in Africa. The aim of this paper is to examine the challenges of higher education in Africa, which hinders its process of producing a body of knowledge that will elevate the human condition and posit it for all-round development.

The article introduces an idea of practical philosophy, a philosophy which is aimed at changing a philosopher, not at developing philosophical knowledge. Philosophy is not another theory of being or knowledge, but a way of holding oneself in the state of being open (to truth). It is stated that this philosophy is based on differentiating the experience of the encounter (the entrance) and its conceptualization, that they are not equal. A philosophical concept not only points at the source of the philosophical thinking, but also eclipses it. The main obstacle for a philosopher is his/her own self, tempted by his/her own philosophy.