Developing a way to address troublesome issues in areas such as urban planning is a chal-lenging undertaking. It includes making decisions that involve humans, nonhumans, future generations, and historical and cultural artifacts. All of these groups deserve consideration, but not equally. Figuring out how to approach this topic involves overcoming the problem of moral prioritization. The structure of weak anthropocentrism can help with this problem, suggesting that future research on the environmental aspects of metropolitan regions should make use of its applicability. Despite its strengths, weak anthropocentrism must be expanded to address complicated urban issues. A multitiered weak-anthropocentric measure, a “complex moral assessment,” is needed to address these concerns.

Because of rapid industrialization and urbanization, many natural resources in China have increasingly been degraded. In response to this situation, China haslearned from the United States about one of its best ideas, national parks. This idea triggers many philosophical questions. How is wilderness interpreted in theUnited States? What are the philosophical foundations for the concept of intrinsic value in wilderness? Can Chinese philosophy accept wilderness? To answer these questions, the idea of intrinsic value in wilderness and the Western philosophical foundations for this idea need to be examined as well as the concept of topophilia which may better represent the Chinese people’s attitude toward nature, but which currently influences the Chinese people’s negative attitude toward wilderness. It may be possible to improve Chinese affection for wilderness in terms of topophilia by following two principles: the principle of emotion and theprinciple of practice.

Both Max Hallman and David E. Storey rightly argue that Nietzsche is critical of anthropocentrism in his later philosophy. However, both also claim that Nietzsche, in his early philosophy, is still held captive to an anthropocentric view, particularly in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” the third of his Untimely Meditations. Neither, however, explores Schopenhauer’s own nonanthropocentric, sentiocentric approach to ethics and its influence on the early Nietzsche. An exploration of this background and a closer reading of the essay and its larger contest within the Untimely Meditations reveal that Nietzsche’s very first work in ethics advances not only a metaphysical nonanthropocentrism, but also nonanthropocentric axiological and ethical considerations, too.

Environmental ethics and environmental justice have followed widely disparate paths, and this disassociation has resulted in an analytical schism. On the one side, environmental ethics embraces humankind’s relations with nature; on the opposite side, environmental justice embraces human-to-human relations via the medium of nature. Hans Jonas’ work is a bridge that crosses this conceptual divide: he spotlights the narrow correlation between human identity and responsibility, and insists on their inextricable bond with nature. However, this bond is a de facto bond that all human beings have with each other.

Environmental virtues have become an essential ingredient in an ethics of nature. An account of environmental virtues can contribute to this ethics of natre by exploring the virtues that the gardener displays in cultivating and caring for plants. An approach that relates to the virtues of gardening is helpful in explicating a more general approach in a certain domain of interaction with nature. Good gardeners get involved in processes of natural growth and decay, they are aware of their position within the garden, and they endure ambivalences in nature. This relational account of the virtues of gardening is also exemplary in processes of active co-designing of nature and in landscaping.

Machin defends a new approach to climate change, which some claim is an “original” and “lucid” contribution that will “revitalize” the debate. Drawing on Slavoj Žižek’s interpretation of parallax and Chantal Mouffe’s radical democracy, Machin focuses on negotiation rather than moral argument, arguing that we should embrace disagreement. In the process of defending her view, Machin dismisses Naomi Klein, and various moral philosophers, arguing that framing the debate in terms of moral argument is ineffective, divisive, and ultimately leads to extremism and climate change denial. However, Machin does not challenge, or engage with, the extensive empirical evidence that suggests that the growth in climate change denial was the result of the “Merchants of Doubt” coordinating campaigns of misinformation, and Machin’s rejection of other views is often based on misrepresentations. Furthermore, Machin’s arguments commit her to an implausible relativism, and the view she defends is morally bereft, and would leave corruption and corporate influence unchecked. Contrary to Machin’s assertions, the history of the abolition of slavery demonstrates that moral argument has a crucial role to play in social change and progress, and should be a crucial part of any democracy, as should a commitment to truth, consistency, and scientific knowledge.