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Displaying: 1-5 of 5 documents

1. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Mark Balaguer The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis)
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It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of humandecision-making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysicallyuninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and thequestion that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questionsabout the nature of human beings.
2. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Daniel Berthold Passing-over: The Death of the Author in Hegel’s Philosophy
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Criticism of Hegel has been a central preoccupation of “postmodern” philosophy, from critical theory and deconstruction to Lacanianpsychoanalytic theory and Foucauldian “archaeology.” One of the most frequent criticisms is that Hegel’s invocation of “absolute knowledge”installs him in a position of authorial arrogance, of God-like authority, leaving the reader in a position of subservience to the Sage’s perfectwisdom. The argument of this article is that this sort of criticism is profoundly ironic, since Hegel’s construction of the role of the Sage possessing absolute knowledge is in fact an elaborate mask covering over a radical project of disappearance of the author by which itbecomes the reader who is left to author the text. The article explores Hegel’s commitment to his own death as an author in his invention of anew method of demonstration, his epistemology, his philosophy of language, his theory of desire, and even in the seemingly least likelyplace of all, his portrait of “absolute knowledge.”
3. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Travis Dumsday On Cheering Charles Bronson: The Ethics of Vigilantism
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Vigilantes are a staple of popular culture, from Charles Bronson’s 1974 classic Death Wish, and its parade of sequels, to the latest batch ofBatman films. Outside of the fictional sphere, society continues to wrestle with vigilantism, notably in the current debates over the prudence and ethics of the Minuteman civilian border patrol group. And though vigilantism has been the subject of speculation and debate among criminologists, historians, and legal scholars, it has unfortunately been given scant attention by philosophers. Surely a topic of such prominence in popular culture, and continued relevance in real life, is ripe for treatment by applied ethicists. In this paper I seek to formulate a definition of vigilantism and then argue that there are conditions under which vigilantism is not only permissible but, at least for some, obligatory.
4. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Jim Vernon Free Love: A Hegalian Defense of Same-Sex Marriage Rights
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By revisiting Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, I mount a Hegelian defense of same-sex marriage rights. I first argue that Hegel’s account of theIdea of freedom articulates both the necessity of popular shifts in the determinations of the institutions of right, as well as the duty to struggle to progressively actualize freedom through them. I then contend that Hegel, by grounding marriage in free consent, clears the path for expanding this ethical institution to include all monogamous couples. Lastly, I close by sketching the specifically Hegelian reasons we ought to actively struggle to expand the institution of marriage.
5. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Sarah Wright The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues
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If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only adopting an internalist structure of the virtues will provide intellectual virtues that appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally, I argue that only an internalist structure of the virtues can explain why the intellectual virtues are valuable in themselves.