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news and notes
1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
NEWS AND NOTES
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features
2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Anna Peterson Environmental Ethics and the Social Construction of Nature
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Nature can be understood as socially constructed in two senses: in different cultures’ interpretations of the nonhuman world and in the physical ways that humans have shaped even areas that they think of as “natural.” Both understandings are important for environmental ethics insofar as they highlight the diversity of ways of viewing and living in nature. However, strong versions of the social constructionist argument contend that there is no “nature” apart from human discourse and practices. This claim is problematic both logically, insofar as it fails to deconstruct the notion of culture, and ethically, insofar as it categorically privileges human activities and traits.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Mick Smith To Speak of Trees: Social Constructivism, Environmental Values, and the Future of Deep Ecology
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The power and the promise of deep ecology is seen, by its supporters and detractors alike, to lie in its claims to speak on behalf of a natural world threatened by human excesses. Yet, to speak of trees as trees or nature as something worthy of respect in itself has appeared increasingly difficult in the light of social constructivist accounts of “nature.” Deep ecology has been loath to take constructivism’s insightsseriously, retreating into forms of biological objectivism and reductionism. Yet, deep ecology actually has much in common with, and much to gain from, some varieties of constructivism and can add a new dimension to constructivism’s own critique of current ideologies.
discussion papers
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Eric Katz A Pragmatic Reconsideration of Anthropocentrism
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For much of its brief history, the field of environmental ethics has been critical of anthropocentrism. I here undertake a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism. In the first part of this essay, I explain what a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism means. I differentiate two distinct pragmatic strategies, one substantive and one methodological, and I adopt methodological pragmatism as my guiding principle. In the second part of this essay, I examine a case study of environmental policy—the problem of beach replenishment on Fire Island, New York—as a pragmatic test of anthropocentrism. I conclude that the debate between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism needs to be expressed in non-absolutist terms, i.e., in a language that permits compromise, flexibility, and a pluralism of values. Thechoice between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism as the basis of both environmental policy and environmental ethics is highly contextual and thus requires a subtle examination of the concrete policy situation.
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Peter S. Wenz Pragmatism in Practice: The Efficiency of Sustainable Agriculture
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Bryan Norton advocates using the perspectives and methods of American pragmatism in environmental philosophy. J. Baird Callicott criticizes Norton’s view as unproductive anti-philosophy. I find worth and deficiencies in both sides. On the one hand, I support the pragmatic approach, illustrating its use in an argument for sustainable agriculture. On the other hand, I take issue with Norton’s claim that pragmatists should confine themselves to anthrpocentric arguments. Here I agree with Callicott’s inclusion of nonanthropocentric consideration. However, I reject Callicott’s moral monism. In sum, I support pragmatic moral pluralism that includes nonanthropocentric values.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Jennifer Welchman The Virtues of Stewardship
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What virtues do good stewards typically have and can these virtues move people to be good stewards of nature? Why focus on the virtues of stewards rather than on trying to construct and defend morally obligatory rules to govern human behavior? I argue that benevolence and loyalty are crucial for good stewardship and these virtues can and do motivate people to act as good stewards of nature. Moreover,since it is a matter of dispute whether rational considerations can move us to perform a given act in the absence of disposition to do so, I argue we should try to determine which moral dispositions (if any) will motivate people to be concerned for the environment so that the development of environmentally sensitive character may be encouraged.
book reviews
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Susan J. Armstrong Being and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Metaphysics
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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Chris J. Cuomo Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory and Political Action
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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
David Schmidtz In Nature’s Interests?: Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics
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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Sara Ebenreck Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern
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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Holmes Rolston, III Environment and the Moral Life: Towards a New Paradigm
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referees
12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
REFEREES 1999
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index
13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
INDEX FOR 1999
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news and notes
14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES
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features
15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Robert Sparrow The Ethics of Terraforming
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I apply an agent-based virtue ethics to issues in environmental philosophy regarding our treatment of complex inorganic systems. I consider the ethics of terraforming: hypothetical planetary engineering on a vast scale which is aimed at producing habitable environments on otherwise “hostile” planets. I argue that the undertaking of such a project demonstrates at least two serious defects of moral character: an aesthetic insensitivity and the sin of hubris. Trying to change whole planets to suit our ends is arrogant vandalism. I maintain that these descriptions of character are coherent and important ethical concepts. Finally, I demonstrate how the arguments developed in opposition to terraforming, a somewhat farfetched example, can be used in cases closer to home to provide arguments against our use of recombinantDNA technologies and against the construction of tourist developments in wilderness areas.
16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Yeuk-Sze Lo Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature as Subject
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It has been argued that human restoration of nature is morally problematic because artificially restored natural entities are artifacts, which are ontologically different from natural entities and hence essentially devoid of the moral standing that natural entities have. I discuss the alleged assimilation of restored natural entities to artifacts, and argue that it does not follow from the ontological differences, if any, between the artifactual and the natural that the former is morally inferior to the latter. This defense against the devaluation of restored natural entities is aimed at narrowing the ethical gap between the wild and thetamed, which is often endorsed by ecocentric environmental ethics.
17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
John Patterson Environmental Mana
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In Maori tradition, all creatures are naturally sacred or tapu, and cannot be used without ritual removal of the tapu, a symbolic acknowledgment of the mana of the gods concerned. Although there is a religious dimension to tapu, it is also the natural state of all creatures, reflecting the idea that they have intrinsic worth. The theist aspect of tapu can be bypassed: tapu is the mana of the atua or gods, whocan be seen as personifications of or indeed identical with areas of the natural world. In this way, the mana of the gods is seen as the mana of nature itself, and respect for the tapu of a creature turns out quite like the familiar idea of respect for its intrinsic value or its ecological value. We might conclude that the environmental mana of the human species is currently negative, and this conclusion in turn might persuade us to change our ways.
discussion papers
18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Jack C. Swearengen Brownfields and Greenfields: An Ethical Perspective on Land Use
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America’s industries and families continue to forsake cities for suburban and rural environs, in the process leaving nonproductive lands (brownfields) and simultaneously removing greenfield land from agriculturally or biologically productive use. In spite of noteworthy exceptions, urban regions which once functioned as vital communities continue in economic and social decline. Discussion or debate about the problem (or, indeed, whether it is a problem at all) invokes systems of values which often are not articulated. Some attribute the urban exodus to departure from personal ethical norms (e.g., substance abuse, violence, welfare addiction) by urban residents, as though ethical decline is driving the phenomenon. Others take the exact opposite stance, that social and economic decline follow the departure of the economic base. There is no consensus on what government should do about the problem, or whether government should be involved at all. I present elements of a land-use ethic which can accommodate the foregoing. I argue that government is already involved in the brownfields problem because urban flight is facilitated by public policies which de facto subsidize the process. I further argue that the debate invokes key—but unexamined—assumptions regarding limits. Where there are few substitutes for resources and the social cost of exploitation is high, government intervention in the market is necessary; “value-free” economic approaches need to be supplemented by values concerning what ought to be, i.e., what is desirable for society.
19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Jill LeBlanc Eco-Thomism
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St. Thomas Aquinas is generally seen as having an anthropocentric and instrumentalist view of nature, in which the rational human is the point of the universe for which all else was created. I argue that, to the contrary, his metaphysics is consistent with a holistic ecophilosophy. His views that natural things have intrinsic value and that the world is an organic unity in which diversity is itself a value requiringrespect for being and life in all their manifestations.
20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Sandy Marie Anglás Grande Beyond the Ecologically Noble Savage: Deconstructing the White Man’s Indian
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I examine the implications of stereotyping and its intersections with the political realities facing American Indian communities. Specifically, I examine the typification of Indian as ecologically noble savage, as both employed and refuted by environmentalists, through the lenses of cognitive and social psychological perspectives and then bring it within the context of a broader cultural critique. I argue that the noble savage stereotype, often used to promote the environmentalist agenda is nonetheless immersed in the political and ideological parameters of the modern project. Finally, I reassert the right and, more importantly, the authority of Native American peoples to ultimately define for themselves their respective identities and destinies.