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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
NEWS AND NOTES (1)
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features
2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Michael Martin Ecosabotage and Civil Disobedience
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I define ecosabotage and relate this definition to several well-known analyses of civil disobedience. I show that ecosabotage cannot be reduced to a form of civil disobedience unless the definition of civil disobedience is expanded. I suggest that ecosabotage and civil disobedience are special cases of the more general concept of conscientious wrongdoing. Although ecosabotage cannot be considered a form of civil disobedience on the basis of the standard analysis of this concept, the civil disobedience literature can provide important insights into the justification of ecosabotage. First, traditional appeals to a higher law in justifying ecosabotage are no more successful than they are in justifying civil disobedience. Second, utilitarian justifications of ecosabotage are promising. At present there is no apriori reason tosuppose that some acts of ecosabotage could not be justified on utilitarian grounds, although such ecosaboteurs as Dave Foreman have not provided a full justification of its use in concrete cases.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
John Lemons, Donald A. Brown, Gary E. Varner Congress, Consistency, and Environmental Law
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discussion papers
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
AIdo Leopold Means and Ends in Wild Life Management
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[Although research in wildlife management is repeating the history of agriculture, unlike agricultural research, which employs scientific means for economic ends, the ends of wildlife research are judged in terms of aesthetic satisfactions as governed by “good taste.” Wild animals and plants are economically valuable only in the sense that human performers and works of art are: the means are of the brain, but the ends are of the heart. Wildlife management has forged ahead of agriculture in recognizing the invisible interdependencies in the biotic community. Moreover, it has admitted its inability to replace natural equilibria and its unwillingness to do so even if it could. Because many animals do not exhibit their natural behavior under laboratory conditions, researchers are dependent on observation in the wild. The difficulties involved in isolating variables are especially clear in the study of the natural cycle. It is a problem which seems to defy the experimental method.]
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Eugene C. Hargrove, J. Baird Callicott Leopold’s Means and Ends in Wild Life Management
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6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Robert W. Gardiner Between Two Worlds: Humans in Nature and Culture
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In this essay, I set forth a view of humans as creatures living at once in two worlds: the world of nature and the world of culture. I explore some of the tensions and paradoxes entailed by this position, as weIl as the implications for ethics, both interhuman and environmental. I also critique the distortions entailed by ethical stances which draw too heavily on one polarity or the other without taking sufficient account of the discontinuities between them.
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Kelly Parker The Values of a Habitat
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Recent severe environmental crises have brought us to recognize the need for a broad reevaluation of the relation of humans to their environments. I suggest that we consider the human-nature relation from two overlapping perspectives, each informed by the pragmatic philosophy of expeIience. The first is an anthropology, according to which humans are viewed as being radically continuous with their environments. The second is a comprehensive ecology, according to which both “natural” and “nonnatural” environments are studied as artificial habitats of the human organism (i.e., as artifacts). The pragmatic approach has two features which make it promising as a way to ground environmental thinking. First, it allows us to avoid a human-nature dichotomy and the many problems which that dichotomy has traditionally engendered . Second, it ties environmental questions to a common cultural experience and a philosophical position from which environmentalists can effectively engage mainstreameducational and political discussions.
book reviews
8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Erik Haugland Banta Donald Edward Davis: Ecophilosophy: A Field Guide to the Literature
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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Richard A. Watson George Bradford: How Deep is Deep Ecology? and Return of the Son of Deep Ecology
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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Linda G. Lockwood Eugene P. Odum: Ecology and Our Endangered Life-Support Systems
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index
11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
INDEX TO VOLUME 12
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news and notes
12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
NEWS AND NOTES (2)
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referees
13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
REFEREES 1990
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14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
NEWS AND NOTES (3)
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news and notes
15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES (1)
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features
16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
John S. Dryzek Green Reason: Communicative Ethics for the Biosphere
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Exclusively instrumental notions of rationality not only reinforce attitudes conducive to the destruction of the natural world, but also undermine attempts to construct environmental ethics that involve more harmonious relationships between humans and nature. Deep ecologists and other ecological critics of instrumental rationality generally prefer some kind of spiritual orientation to nature. In this paper I argue against both instrumental rationalists and ecological spiritualists in favor of a communicative rationality which encompasses the natural world. I draw upon both critical theory and recent scientific intimations of agency in nature.
17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Thomas W. Simon Varieties of Ecological Dialectics
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A hierarchical ordering of approaches afflicts environmental thinking. An ethics of individualism unjustly overrides social/political philosophy in environmental debates. Dialectics helps correct this imbalance. In dialectical fashion, a synthesis emerges between conflicting approaches to dialectics and to nature from: Marxism (Levins and Lewontin), anarchism (Bookchin), and Native Americanism (Black Elk). Conflicting (according to Marxists) and cooperative (according to anarchists) forces both operate in nature. Ethics (anarchist), political theory (Marxist), and spirituality (Native American) constitute the interconnected interpretative domains of a dialectically informed ecophilosophy. In a world painted too often in blacks and whites, ecological dialectics colors the picture a more realistic gray.
discussion papers
18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
David M. Johns The Relevance of Deep Ecology to the Third World: Some Preliminary Comments
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Although Ramachandra Guha has demonstrated the importance of cross-cultural dialogue on environmental issues and has much to tell us about the problems of wildemess preservation in the Third World, I argue that Guha is partly wrong in claiming that deep ecology equates environmental protection with wilderness protection and simply wrong in calling wilderness protection untenable or incorrect as aglobal strategy for environmental protection. Moreover, I argue that the deep ecology distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism is useful in dealing with the two major problems which Guha identifies as undermining the health of the planetoverconsumption and militarism. Although it is true that preservation of wildemess will not be successful unless human social dynamics are taken into consideration, nevertheless, a biocentrism which integrates critical social theory can provide the basis for an ethic that undercuts the environmental degradation from overconsumption and militarism more effectively than a human-centered system.
19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Murray Bookchin Recovering Evolution: A Reply to Eckersley and Fox
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Robyn Eckersley claims erroneously that I believe humanity is currently equipped to take over the “helm” of natural evolution. In addition, she provides a misleading treatment of my discussion of the relationship of first nature (biological evolution) and second nature (social evolution). I argue that her positivistic methodology is inappropriate in dealing with my processual approach and that her Manichaean contrast between biocentrism and anthropocentrism virtually excludes any human intervention in the natural world. With regard to Warwick Fox’s treatment of my writings, I argue that he deals with my views on society’s relationship to nature in a simplistic, narrowly deterministic, and ahistorical manner. I fault both of my deep ecology critics for little or no knowledge of my writings. I conclude with an outline of a dialectical naturalism that treats nature as an evolutionary process-not simply as a scenic view-and places human and sodal evolution in a graded relationship with natural evolution. I emphasize that society and humanity can no longer be separated from natural evolution and that the kind of society we achieve will either foster the development of first nature or damage the planet beyond repair.
20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Alan Wittbecker Metaphysical Implications from Physics and Ecology
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I contrast metaphysical implications from physics and ecology and compare them through two concepts, the field, primary in physics and borrowed by ecology, and wholeness, postulated in ecology and borrowed by physics. I argue that several implications from physics are unacceptably reductive or erroneous and identify an old and a new ecology. Metaphysical implications from the old ecology are quite different from the new ecology, as weIl as from quantum or Newtonian physics.