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Displaying: 1-10 of 13 documents


articles
1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
John G. Brungardt Charles De Koninck and the Sapiential Character of Natural Philosophy
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In his early career, Charles De Koninck defended two theses: first, that natural philosophy (understood along Aristotelian-Thomistic lines) and the modern sciences are formally distinct; and second, that natural philosophy is a qualified form of wisdom with respect to those particular sciences. Later in his career, De Koninck changed his mind about the first thesis. Does this change of mind threaten the coherence of his second thesis? First, I explain De Koninck’s original position on the real distinction between natural philosophy and the sciences and his reasoning for why natural philosophy possesses a qualified sapiential office. Second, I consider De Koninck’s change of mind and defend the conclusion that, even if the modern sciences are a dialectical extension of natural philosophy, the latter is still wisdom in relation to the former. Finally, I discuss both examples of this sapiential function and its limitations.
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Chad Engelland Perceiving Other Animate Minds in Augustine
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This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine’s treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition: the separation of invisible spirit and visible body. The immediate self-awareness of mind includes awareness of life: that is, of animating a body. Each of us animates his or her own body; seeing other animated bodies enables us to see other animating souls or minds. Augustine’s affirmation of animation lets us perceive that other minds are present, but Descartes’s denial of animation renders others ineluctably absent. Augustine’s soul is no ghost because his body is no machine.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Lička Perception and Objective Being: Peter Auriol on Perceptual Acts and their Objects
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This article discusses the theory of perception of Peter Auriol (c. 1280–1322). Arguing for the active nature of the senses in perception, Auriol applies the Scotistic doctrine of objective being to the theory of perception. Nevertheless, he still accepts some parts of the theory of species. The paper introduces Auriol’s view on the mechanism of perception and his account of illusions. I argue for a direct realist reading of Auriol’s theory of perception and propose that his position becomes clearer if we use the distinction between the first- and third-person perspectives that he seems to presuppose.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Turner C. Nevitt Aquinas on the Death of Christ: A New Argument for Corruptionism
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Contemporary interpreters have entered a new debate over Aquinas’s view on the status of human beings or persons between death and resurrection. Everyone agrees that, for Aquinas, separated souls exist in the interim. The disagreement concerns what happens to human beings—Peter, Paul, and so on. According to corruptionists, Aquinas thought human beings cease to exist at death and only begin to exist again at the resurrection. According to survivalists, however, Aquinas thought human beings continue to exist in the interim, constituted by their separated souls alone. In this paper I offer a new argument in favor of corruptionism based upon Aquinas’s repeated discussions of a central though so far neglected topic: the death of Christ. To the question, “Was Christ a human being during the three days of his death?” Aquinas always answered, “No.” Examining his reasons proves that corruptionism, and not survivalism, is the right interpretation of Aquinas.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Domenic D’Ettore “Not a Little Confusing”: Francis Silvestri of Ferrara’s Hybrid Thomist Doctrine of Analogy
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Fifty-plus years ago, Ralph McInerny’s The Logic of Analogy characterized Francis Silvestri of Ferrara’s doctrine of analogy as a confusing hybrid of the thought of Thomas Aquinas and of Thomas Cajetan. Since then, scholarship on fifteenth-century Thomism has flourished, thanks especially to the efforts of Ashworth, Bonino, Hochschild, Riva, and Tavuzzi. In light of these decades of scholarship, in this article I reconsider Francis Silvestri’s doctrine of analogy. I attempt to show the merits of his contribution to the Thomist tradition’s ongoing reflection on analogy, especially the dispute among Thomists and with Scotists over abstracting an analogous concept, the unity of the concept used analogously, and the use of analogy in demonstration. I argue that Francis’s hybrid succeeds in finding a place for analogy of attribution in names said analogously of God and creatures while still meeting Cajetan’s standards for answering Scotist objections to demonstration through analogous terms.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Han-Kyul Kim A System of Matter Fitly Disposed: Locke’s Thinking Matter Revisited
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In this paper, I address the controversial issue around Locke’s account of a “superadded” power of thought. I first show that Locke uses the term “super­addition” in discussing the nominal distinction of natural kinds. This general observation applies to Locke’s account of thinking matter. Specifically, I attribute to him the following three theses: (1) the mind-body distinction is nominal; (2) there is no metaphysical repugnancy between them; and (3) their common ground—namely, substratum—can only be characterized in terms of its functional role. Examining each thesis and their interconnections, this paper casts light upon the Lockean type of mind-body union in “a system of matter fitly disposed.”
book reviews
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Susan Brower-Toland Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge. By Therese Scarpelli Cory
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8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
David Deavel The Personalism of John Henry Newman. By John F. Crosby
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9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Christopher Toner A Philosophical Walking Tour With C. S. Lewis: Why It Did Not Include Rome. By Stewart Goetz
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10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
John Kronen Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era. By Daniel D. Novotný
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