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Displaying: 1-16 of 16 documents


articles
1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Thomas P. Hohler Phronēsis Transformed: From Aristotle to Heidegger to Ricoeur
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The article begins with Aristotle’s discussion of phronēsis for ethical life, only to discover the absence of a universal dimension. This issue of parochialism as opposed to a kind of universalism is a structural element of this paper. Secondly, Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of phronēsis creatively transforms phronēsis to highlight a tension between ethics and fundamental ontology—a tension overcome in the paper’s third section devoted to Ricoeur. Thus, Ricoeur’s post-critical phronēsis is shown to possess a universal dimension while disclosing ontologically. Phronēsis responds to the need for universalization to overcome the parochial limitation but also incorporates an ontological disclosive power. Ricoeur’s post-critical phronēsis is a plural, collective, and public argumentation. Phronēsis is inventive and productive in resolving conflicts between legitimate universal claims or demands and is ontological.blabla
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Katherin Rogers Anselm and His Islamic Contempories on Divine Necessity and Eternity
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Anselm holds that God is simple, eternal, and immutable, and that He creates “necessarily”—He “must” create this world. Avicenna and Averroes made the same claims, and derived as entailments that God neither knows singulars nor interacts with the spatio-temporal universe. I argue that Anselm avoids these unpalatableconsequences by being the first philosopher to adopt, clearly and consciously, a four-dimensionalist understanding of time, in which all of time is genuinely present to divine eternity. This enables him to defend the divine perfections in question, and the claim that God creates “necessarily,” while still maintaining the position that God knows singulars and acts in the physical world—in one, immutable, and eternal act.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Michael Rota The Moral Status of Anger: Thomas Aquinas and John Cassian
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Is anger at another person ever a morally excellent thing? Two competing answers to this question can be found in the Christian intellectual tradition. JohnCassian held that anger at another person is never morally virtuous. Aquinas, taking an Aristotelian line, maintained that anger at another person is sometimes morally virtuous. In this paper I explore the positions of Cassian and Aquinas on this issue. The core of my paper consists in a close examination of two arguments given by Aquinas in support of his view. The first involves the usefulness of anger in the moral life; the second focuses on the nature of the human being as a composite of soul and body.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
James M. Jacobs On the Difference Between Social Justice and Christian Charity
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The notion of justice implies that what is given is owed to the recipient; charity, on the other hand, acknowledges the reality of a free gift that is not owed to the recipient. This difference is obscured in contemporary liberal societies where, because of the absence of transcendent metaphysical commitments, the demandsof social justice replace charity. A Thomistic analysis, however, recognizes a metaphysical order as the basis for justice. This order limits the sphere of justice and so allows for acts of charity motivated by love for God. If we do not recognize this distinction, we reduce all charitable acts to acts of justice and therefore ignore themost important debt of all: the debt humans owe to God that can only be repaid by loving Him and our neighbor.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Joshua Schulz Grace and the New Man: Conscious Humiliation and the Revolution of Disposition in Kant’s Religion
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Kant’s discussion of radical evil and moral regeneration in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone raises numerous moral and metaphysical problems.If the ground of one’s disposition does not lie in time, as Kant argues, how can it be reformed, as the moral law commands? If divine aid is necessary for thisimpossible reformation, how does this not destroy a person’s moral personality by bypassing her freedom? This paper argues that these problems can be resolved by showing how Kant can conceive the moral law itself as kind of grace which, willed properly, makes moral regeneration possible without destroying the autonomy of the individual.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
H. M. Giebel Ends, Means, and Character: Recent Critiques of the Intended-Versus-Forseen Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect
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In this essay I first provide a brief explanation of the principle of double effect (PDE) and the propositions that it entails regarding the distinction betweenintention and foresight (I/F distinction) and the distinction’s relevance to ethical evaluation. Then I address several recent critiques of PDE and the I/F distinctionby influential ethicists including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and Jonathan Bennett. I argue that none of these critiques issuccessful. In the process of refuting the critiques, I also give prima facie reason to believe that the I/F distinction is relevant to evaluation of agents and their actions and that PDE is a defensible ethical principle.
discussion
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Patrick Lee Evil as Such Is a Privation: A Reply to John Crosby
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I reply to an article in the ACPA Proceedings of 2001 by John Crosby in which he challenged the position that evil as such is a privation. Each of his arguments attempts to present a counterexample to the privation position. His first argument, claiming that annihilation is evil but not a privation, fails to consider that a privation need not be contemporaneous with the subject suffering the privation. Contrary to his second argument, I explain that the repugnance of pain is consistent with its being good in the appropriate context. Against his third argument I contend that he mistakenly supposes that a choice’s being opposed to the good is incompatible with its being evil because of a disorder. I conclude by briefly reviewing one central argument for the privation position and contrast it with Crosby’s arguments, which, in addition to their other problems, fail to specify any intensional content, beyond repugnance in the case of pain, for the concept of evil.
8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
John F. Crosby Doubts About the Privation Theory That Will Not Go Away: Response to Patrick Lee
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Towards the end of his response to me, Lee presents an argument for the necessity of interpreting all evil as privation. I counter this argument by showingthat it works only for what I call “formal” good and evil, but not for what I call “contentful” good and evil. In fact, evil that is “contentful” presents a challenge tothe privation theory that I had not discussed in my article. I then proceed, in the second part of my response, to revisit the three cases of evil that in my original paper I had presented as challenges to the privation theory. I engage Lee’s objections to these three counterexamples and I try to explain in a new way why the principle of badness in each of them, especially in pain/suffering and in moral evil, is not just a lack or a deficiency.
book reviews
9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Charles S. F. Burnett The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics
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10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Jason T. Eberl Human Dignity in the Biotech Century: A Christian Vision for Public Policy
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11. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Gregory Bassham What Are We to Understand Gracia to Mean? Realist Challenges to Metaphysical Neutralism
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12. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Bruce V. Foltz The Foundations of Christian Bioethics
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13. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Daniel A. Dombrowski Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God
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14. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Philipp W. Rosemann Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la sacra doctrina. Avec l’édition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences
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15. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Gregory B. Sadler Philosophy Between Faith and Theology: Addresses to Catholic Intellectuals
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books received
16. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Books Received
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