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Volume 13, Issue Supplement, 2015
Dualismes: Doctrines religieuses et traditions philosophiques

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Displaying: 1-10 of 32 documents

1. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Fabienne Jourdan Introduction
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i. origines et figures orientales
2. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Jean Kellens Les origines du dualisme mazdéen
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The discussions about the origin of mazdean dualism are concentrated upon the interpretation of the Gathic stanza Y30.3 which opposes two mental powers called mainiiu and usually translated by «spirit». The divergence of the understandings led to a controversy on the nature of this dualistic opposition : is it philosophical, cosmic or religious ? Do these various distinctions remain relevant now we know that this stanza is not a piece of a sermon, but of a liturgical recitative ?
3. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Nele Ziegler Enuma elish, le récit babylonien de la création
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The Babylonian Poem of Creation Enuma Elish tells the story of Apsu and Tiamat begetting the first generations of gods, of Marduk vanquishing Tiamat and creating from its corps the whole universe. Can the story of this fight be a hint to a dualistic vision of the universe in Mesopotamia ? The author stresses some arguments against this conclusion even if some of the main elements of dualistic cosmologies are present : combatting forces, non‑existence – creation of the universe, male – female opposition.
4. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Lionel Marti L’Enuma elish – une oeuvre dont la pérennité et le propos ont marqué les esprits: (réponse a N. Ziegler)
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5. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Ivan Guermeur Du dualisme et de l’ambivalence séthienne dans la pensée religieuse de l’Égypte ancienne
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In his De Iside, Plutarch uses the example of the Osirian myth and the cases of Osiris, Horus and Typhon (Seth) to define his doctrine of dualism which according to him offers an explication for the philosophical problem of the existence of Good and Evil. Since the philosopher has based himself on Egyptian mythology, the present study seeks to elucidate what the documentation of “pharaonic” Egypt teaches us about the conception of an opposition between Good and Evil, about the place that the complex figure of Seth takes within this concept, and about the typically Egyptian binary way of thinking.
6. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
François Chenet Le dualisme de l’Esprit et de la Nature du Sāṃkhya
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Sāṃkhya, which is one of the oldest systems (darśana) of Indian Philosophy, advocates an uncompromising dualism in its theoretical metaphysical teachings. There is a fundamental dualism or split at the very heart of reality, and this dualism or split is the fundamental fact of existence.According to Sāṃkhya, there are two co‑present and co‑eternal realities. The first one is the principle of pure Consciousness, the Puruṣa, which is inactive, indifferent, eternally free and Alone. Puruṣa is the soul, the self, the spirit, the subject, the knower. The other of the two co‑present and co‑eternal realities of Sāṃkhya is Nature or Prakṛti : it is the primordial and unconscious “stuff ” of the entire unmanifest and manifest world, whereas Puruṣa is the presupposition of individual consciousness. Nature or Prakṛti is the ultimate material principle and thus the substratum from which manifest, in the presence of the self (puruṣa), the gross and subtle bodies including the mental organs of all living beings. But Sāṃkhya is not a dualism of mind and body or even a dualism of subject and object.In classical Sāṃkhya the world is not derived from consciousness, nor is consciousness derived from the world. The classical Sāṃkhya refuses to understand the world simply as a product of consciousness. It refuses to see the world as an illusory projection of consciousness, and thus it rejects any idealistic monism. Similarly, it refuses to see consciousness simply as a product of the world, and thus it rejects any kind of materialism or naturalism. Thus, it steers an intermediate course or path between the Indian notion of a conscious, cosmic Self or its equivalent, which is the ground of all being, on the one hand, and the notion of a conscious self, which is only an empirical, relative construction, on the other. It maintains, rather, a fundamental dualism, the opposite poles of which function in a kind of dialectical interaction. The fact of consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreductible realities in constant interplay with one another. Though quite separate and unconnected, Spirit and Nature mutually interact to bring about the process of creation, self‑awareness and, finally, enlightenment. But Spirit or Puruṣa and Nature or Prakṛti are always only in proximity to one another, never in actual contact. This is a puzzling notion if one thinks of Puruṣa and Prakṛti as two things. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are two realities of a completely different order.Right knowledge is the knowledge of the separation of the Puruṣa from the Prakṛti. The individual soul (jīva) has to realize itself as the pure Puruṣa through discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.From a rational point of view, classical Sāṃkhya can be regarded as a bundle of contradictions. Some problems regarding its interpretation are the problem of the nature of the Sāṃkhya dualism and the problem of the connection or relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Sāṃkhya system clings to spiritualistic pluralism and dualistic realism, but its very logic indeed impels it to embrace idealistic monism or absolutism.
ii. dans la philosophie grecque et latine
7. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Gérard Journée Dualités présocratiques
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This papers tries to show at first that the dualism Plutarchus attributed in the De Iside et Osiride to most ancient thinkers, mainly «presocratics», has been largely influenced by the doxographical overview given by Aristotle at the beginning of the Metaphysics, which not only assumed that Empedocles was the first to introduce principles of Good and Evil, but also compared the theory of Anaxagoras to the alleged platonic dualism of the One and the Other. If dualities are quite present and important in some of the main theories of the so‑called presocratic philosophers, the question remains to determine in which cases these dualities can be compared to dualism in the sense this word has taken since Hyde. The second part of this article will thus consist to try to answer this question on the ground of three examples of thinkers for whom dualities played a crucial role : Alcmaeon, Parmenides and, chiefly, Empedocles, who had obviously linked Love and Strife to an axiological pattern in his Katharmoi.
8. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Anca Vasiliu Platon et l’invention aristotélicienne du dualisme platonicien
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Aristotle’s main grievances against his forebears, in the first instance Plato, but also Empedocles and Anaxagoras, rely on three theoretical standpoints : the status of the whole and the one, the separation or the immanence of the principle and its ability to act as a cause or not, and finally the possibility of engendering or producing from contraries. An analysis of the criticisms developed in Metaphysics Lambda 10 brings to light both the purpose and the flaws of the Aristotelian indictment. Arguably, Plato has brought things to existence from a secondary dualism, not from an immutable and separate principle, since, according to the Stagirite’s critical reading, the status of that principle remains ambiguous on the grounds that it is used both as an efficient cause and a universal predicate. From the encounter between the theory of causes and of being advocated by Aristotle against Plato and what Aristotle introduces as the Platonic theory of the principle, Ideas and Numbers, emerges a “dualistic” vision of Plato’s thought. However when one endeavours to locate and contextualize in the Dialogues the theses attributed to Plato by his rebellious disciple, that “dualistic” vision not only does not appear to be founded, but one can even find a criticism of the aptness of such interpretation. The example given is that of the fight of the Gods and the Giants in The Sophist ; in that fight between philosophers around the status of the being can be found a great many of the themes and positions mentioned in what is called in Lambda 10 a criticism of the forebears. Isn’t the “dualistic” interpretation of ancient philosophies ultimately the projection of a modern type of reading, sensitive to the mythologizing interpretation fashioned owing to the late popularity of Platonism ?
9. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Jean‑Baptiste Gourinat Les stoïciens et le dualisme
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The Stoic system is alternatively described as “dualist” because its physics relies on two principles, God and matter, or as “monist”, because these two principles are intimately linked, and belong to the same body. It is difficult to describe the Stoic system as monist, since every substance is a body, and the two principles, while united in the same body, coexist from all eternity since matter is not created by God. But it is inappropriate as well to describe it as “dualist”, because the inferior principle is completely passive and is not a cause, but endures the effect of the active cause. Moreover, matter is not responsible for evil, even if some interpreters, ancient and modern, claimed it : the only metaphysical principle which accounts for the existence of evil is the “affinity of the contraries”, according to which good cannot exist without evil and agent without patient, but this is not a dualist explanation.
10. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Fabienne Jourdan Plutarque développe‑t‑il réellement une pensée dualiste ?
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Plutarch is often seen as a dualist philosopher. Yet, when one studies the texts which are most often quoted to back such an opinion, the so‑called dualist doxographies in De Iside et Osiride and in De animae procreatione, one is actually lead to think otherwise. When they are replaced in their context, it so happens that these texts describe the conditions to obtain harmony and the mixing of the contraries which are both necessary to the birth and to the very existence of the universe. However, harmony and mixing cannot be obtained without the receptacle of the contraries that constitute them. Far from being a simple intermediary, this receptacle, which takes different aspects in the different treatises, is indeed a constituent principle according to Plutarch. Without it, there can be neither encounter nor opposition of the contraries, and so, paradoxically, precisely because it is a guarantee of dualism, it makes dualism disappear. Dualism then turns out to be a mere preparatory step in the elaboration of a really triadic philosophy.