Cover of Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents


articles
1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Daniel Mario Weger Is Representationalism Committed to Colour Physicalism?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The circularity problem states that the representationalist about phenomenal consciousness gives a circular explanation if she adopts the classic view about secondary qualities, such as colours, that characterises them as dispositions to produce experiences with a specific phenomenal character. Since colour primitivism faces severe difficulties, it seems that colour physicalism is the only viable option for the representationalist. I will argue that the representationalist is not committed to colour physicalism because she can adopt an anti-realist theory of colour. My diagnosis is that the alleged commitment to colour physicalism rests upon the acceptance of colour realism which is due to the approval of externalist versions of representationalism, such as tracking representationalism. I will argue that the representationalist can deal with the circularity problem by adopting figurative projectivism, which holds that colours are contingently non-instantiated properties that only figure in the representational contents of colour experiences.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Joby Varghese Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research?: A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A general criterion for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic values is that the former promotes the attainment of truth whereas the latter does not. Daniel Steel (2010, 2016) is a proponent of this criterion, although it was initially proposed by McMullin (1983). There are at least two consequences of this criterion; (i) it always prioritizes epistemic values over non-epistemic values in scientific research, and (ii) it overlooks the diverse aims of science, especially the aims of regulatory or policy-oriented science. This criterion assumes the lexical priority of truth or lexical priority of evidence. This paper attempts to show a few inadequacies of this assumption. The paper also demonstrates why epistemic priority over non-epistemic values is a problematic stance and how constraining the role of non-epistemic values as ‘tiebreakers’ may undermine the diverse aims of science.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Sandy C. Boucher Cladism, Monophyly and Natural Kinds
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Cladism, today the dominant school of systematics in biology, includes a classification component—the view that classification ought to reflect phylogeny only, such that all and only taxa are monophyletic (i.e. consist of an ancestor and all its descendants)—and a metaphysical component—the view that all and only real groups or kinds of organisms are monophyletic. For the most part these are seen as amounting to much the same thing, but I argue they can and should be distinguished, in particular that cladists about classifi cation need not accept the typically cladist view about real groups or kinds. Cladists about classification can and should adopt an explanatory criterion for the reality of groups or kinds, on which being monophyletic is neither necessary nor sufficient for being real or natural. Thus the line of reasoning that has rightly led to cladism becoming dominant within systematics, and the attractive line of reasoning in the philosophical literature that advocates a more liberal approach to natural kinds, are seen to be, contrary to appearances, compatible.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Pavel Arazim Identity of Dynamic Meanings
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Inferentialism has brought important insights into the nature of meanings. It breaks with the representationalist tradition that sees meanings as constituted primarily by representing some extra-linguistic reality. Yet the break with tradition should be pursued further. Inferentialists still regard meanings as static, and they still do not entirely abandon the idea of fully determined meaning. Following Davidon’s ideas about meanings as constituted only in the course of a specific conversation, I propose a dynamic account of what meanings are. They are described as entities belonging to the dynamic realm of Henri Bergson’s duration. The inhabitants of this realm live in constant movement and development which is more essential to them than the stages that this development goes through. My account brings about a rejection of the notion of strict literal meaning and therewith also of the contrasting notions such as ambiguity. Meaning is understood as a dynamic entity that is characterized rather by its history than by its nature.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu Empty Higher Order States in Higher Order Theories of Consciousness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
According to higher order (HO) theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious when there is a HO state about it. However, some HO states do not seem to be about other existing mental states. It is possible to resolve this problem since targetless HO states resemble HO states that misrepresent but the assumption that HO states always target other existing mental states is at odds with the theory since HO states are not only necessary but also sufficient for phenomenal consciousness according to the theory. Given the sufficiency of the HO states for consciousness, there is a need to understand the emergence of HO states as a non-random phenomenon to avoid the difficulties caused by targetless HO states. I suggest it is possible to develop such an understanding by thinking of HO states as predictive states in accordance with the predictive processing theory of the mind.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Bojan Borstner, Niko Šetar Non-Stupidity Condition and Pragmatics in Artificial Intelligence
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) (Harnad 1990) is commonly considered one of the central challenges in the philosophy of artificial intelligence as its resolution is deemed necessary for bridging the gap between simple data processing and understanding of meaning and language. SGP has been addressed on numerous occasions with varying results, all resolution attempts having been severely, but for the most part justifiably, restricted by the Zero Semantic Commitment Condition (Taddeo and Floridi 2005). A further condition that demands explanatory power in terms of machine-to-human communication is the Non-Stupidity Condition (Bringsjord 2013) that demands an SG approach to be able to account for plausibility of higher-level language use and understanding, such as pragmatics. In this article, we undertake the endeavour of attempting to explain how merging certain early requirements for SG, such as embodiment, environmental interaction (Ziemke 1998), and compliance with the Z-Condition with symbol emergence (Sun 2000; Tangiuchi et al. 2016, etc.) rather than direct attempts at symbol grounding can help emulate human language acquisition (Vogt 2004; Cowley 2007). Along with the presumption that mind and language are both symbolic (Fodor 1980) and computational (Chomsky 2017), we argue that some rather abstract aspects of language can be logically formalised and finally, that this melange of approaches can yield the explanatory power necessary to satisfy the Non-Stupidity Condition without breaking any previous conditions.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Jan Heylen, Leon Horsten Strict Conditionals: Replies to Lowe and Tsai
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Both Lowe and Tsai have presented their own versions of the theory that both indicative and subjunctive conditionals are strict conditionals. We critically discuss both versions and we find each version wanting.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Matko Gjurašin John Perry, Frege’s Detour: An Essay on Meaning, Reference, and Truth
view |  rights & permissions | cited by