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Displaying: 1-20 of 39 documents

1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Carlo Penco, Massimiliano Vignolo Some Reflections on Conventions
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In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the traditional approach to semantics. Devitt’s main line of argument is an inference to the best explanation: nearly all cases that linguistic pragmatists discuss in order to challenge the traditional approach to semantics are better explained by adding conventions into language, in the form of expanding the range of polysemy or the range of indexicality (in the broad sense of linguistically governed context sensitivity). In this paper, we discuss three aspects of a draft of Devitt’s Overlooking Conventions, which was discussed at a conference in Dubrovnik in September 2018. First, we try to show that his rejection of Bach’s distinction between convention and standardization overlooks important features of standardization. Second, we elaborate on Devitt’s argument against linguistic pragmatism based on the normative aspect of meaning and show that a similar argument can be mounted against semantic minimalism. While Devitt and minimalists have a common enemy, they are not allies either. Third, we address a methodological difficulty in Devitt’s view concerning a threat of over-generation and propose a solution to it. Although this paper is the result of collaboration the authors have written different parts. Carlo Penco has written part 1, Massimiliano Vignolo has written part 2 and part 3.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Esther Romero, Belén Soria Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with Devitt’s What-Is-Said
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In his forthcoming book, Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with Linguistic Pragmatism, Michael Devitt raises, once again, the debate between minimalism and pragmatism to defend the former. He claims that, by taking some overlooked conventions into account, a semantic notion of what is said is possible. In this paper, we claim that a semantic notion of what is said is not possible, especially if some overlooked compositional conventions are considered. If, as Devitt defends, verbal activity is more linguistically constrained, compositional linguistic rules should be included in his catalogue of overlooked conventions and this entails an important challenge to the minimalist claim that the semantic view of what is said can handle all context relative phenomena. In this paper, we argue that, when conventions concerning compositionality are not overlooked, modulation should be added to the two qualifications (disambiguation and saturation) accepted by Devitt in the constitution of what is said. Thus, what is said is not always literally said and the traditional semantic view of what is said cannot be saved.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Andrea Bianchi Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and the Gricean Project: Some Notes from a Non-Believer
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In this paper, I focus on the alleged distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. I begin by discussing Saul Kripke’s notion of speaker’s reference and the theoretical roles it is supposed to play, arguing that they do not justify the claim that reference comes in two different sorts and highlighting that Kripke’s own definition makes the notion incompatible with the nowadays widely endorsed Gricean project, which aims at explaining semantic reference in terms of speaker’s reference. I then examine an alternative account of speaker’s reference offered by Michael Devitt within his causal theory and express some doubts about its suitability for explaining proper name semantic reference. From all this, I conclude that there is at least some tension between Kripke’s chain of communication picture and the attempt to explain (Griceanly, so to say) semantic properties in terms of speakers’ mental states.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Dunja Jutronić The Qua Problem and the Proposed Solutions
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One basic idea of the causal theory of reference is reference grounding. The name is introduced ostensively at a formal or informal dubbing. The question is: By virtue of what is the grounding term grounded in the object qua-horse and not in the other natural kind whose member it is? In virtue of what does it refer to all horses and only horses? The problem is usually called the qua problem. What the qua problem suggests is that the causal historical theory in the final analysis depends on some kind of unexplained intentionality. This is a great problem since the whole project is an attempt to explain intentionality naturalistically. In this paper, I have two aims: (i) to discuss the most important attempts at solving the qua problem; and (ii) to evaluate the solutions. (i) I focus on the following attempts for the solution of the qua problem: Sterelny (1983), Richard Miller’s (1992), mentioning briefly more recent attempts by Ori Simchen (2012) and Paul Douglas (2018). I also concentrate on the attempts in mind and brain sciences as presented by Penelope Maddy (1983) and more recently by Dan Ryder (2004). (ii) In evaluating the solutions, I argue that when a metaphysical question “what is to name” is replaced/or identified with the question about the mechanism of reference, namely “in virtues of what does a word attach to a particular object”, then the final answer will/should be given by neurosemantics. The most promising attempt is Neander’s (2017), based on the teleological causal explanation of preconceptual content to which the conceptual can be developed, as Devitt and Sterelny suggested in their work (1999).
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Una Stojnić, Ernie Lepore Expressions and their Articulations and Applications
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The discussion that follows rehearses some familiar arguments and replies from the Kripke/Putnam/Burge critique of the traditional Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein views on names and predicates. Its main contributions are, first, to introduce a novel way of individuating tokens of the same expression, (what we call “articulations”) second, to then revise standard views on deference, (as this notion is understood to pertain to securing access to meaning for potentially ignorant, and confused agents in the externalist tradition going back to Putnam and Burge) and lastly, to emphasize the often conflated distinction between disambiguation and meaning fixing. Our line on deference is that it is not, and should not be conceived as, an intentional mental act, but rather indicates an historical chain of antecedent tokenings of the same expression.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Marilynn Johnson Making Meaning Manifest
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In recent work Sperber and Wilson expand on ideas initially presented in Relevance (1986) and flesh out continuua between showing and meaning, and determinate and indeterminate content. Drawing on Sperber and Wilson’s work, and at points defending it from what I see as potential objections, I present a Schema of Communicative Acts (SCA) that includes an additional third continuum between linguistic and non-linguistic content. The SCA clears the way for consideration of what exactly is meant by showing, the motivations of speakers, how affect impacts expression, and metaphor. The SCA allows us to consider not only how but why we engage in certain forms of communicative behavior, and captures the incredible nuance of human interactions: said and meant, linguistic and non-linguistic, determinate and indeterminate.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Jessica Pepp The Problem of First-Person Aboutness
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The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first-person thoughts are about what they are about. I focus on a dilemma arising from this question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the seeming truism that first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems doomed to make any answer to the question unsatisfying. Contrary to a careful and enticing recent effort to both sharpen and escape this dilemma by Daniel Morgan, I will argue that the dilemma remains pressing both for broadly epistemic and broadly causal-acquaintance-based accounts of the aboutness of first-person thought.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Pavel Gregorić Aristotle’s Perceptual Optimism
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In this paper, I would like to present Aristotle’s attitude to sense-perception. I will refer to this attitude as “perceptual optimism”. Perceptual optimism is, very briefly, the position that the senses give us full access to reality as it is. Perceptual optimism entails perceptual realism, the view that there is a reality out there which is accessible to our senses in some way or other, and the belief that our senses are veridical at least to some extent, but it is more comprehensive than that. For instance, a perceptual optimist does not admit such things as qualities which are perceptible in principle but not by us or bodies too small to be perceptible. In this paper I argue that Aristotle is a perceptual optimist, since he believes that reality, at least in the sublunary sphere, is indeed fully accessible to our senses. In the first and largest part of this paper, I will show, in seven distinct theses, what Aristotle’s perceptual optimism entails. In the second and shorter part, I will put Aristotle’s position in a wider context of his epistemology and show why it was important for him to be a perceptual optimist.
9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Marko Delić Burge on Mental Causation
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The article discusses Tyler Burge’s views concerning the debate about the causal efficacy of mental properties, as found in his article “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice.” Burge argues that a proper understanding of kind-individuation and causal explanation in science gives strong prima facie reasons for believing that mental and physical properties are not mutually exclusive. He does so by analysing the strength of two metaphysical theses which standardly underlie the debate—token physicalism and the “Completeness of physics.” I present his analysis and argue that without an account of mental causation, his analysis does not support the conclusion that mental and physical properties are not mutually exclusive. Also, I question the methodological adequacy of Burge’s analysis for scientific practice.
10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Luka Boršić, Ivana Skuhala Karasman Heda Festini’s Contribution in the Research of Croatian Philosophical Heritage
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In this text we offer an overview of Festini’s works on history of Croatian philosophy. The article is divided in five parts in which we discuss Festini’s attitude towards Croatian Renaissance philosophers, eighteenth and nineteenth century Croatian philosophers, and two philosophers from the twentieth century (Vladimir Filipović and Marija Brida). Majority of Festini’s texts were published in the journal Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine.
11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Nenad Miščević Constructing a Happy City-State: In Memoriam Heda Festini
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The paper honors Heda Festini; it’s first part contains author’s personal memories of Heda. The central part of the paper addresses a favorite author of Heda Festini, Franjo Petrić, and his Utopia The Happy City-State. It then places the utopian construction on the map of contemporary understanding of political theorizing. Utopias, like the one due to Petrić, result from thought-experimenting; in contrast to purely epistemic thought-experiments they are geared to “guidance”, as Petrić puts it, namely advice giving and persuading. Political thought-experimenting can be understood to a large extent as work in ideal theorizing; a matter little noticed in the literature. Classical cases cover “ideal theory” in the sense of given, non-temporal arrangement; “ideal” either in a very limited sense of strict compliance (Rawls), or in a wider sense of normatively marked properties, not instantiated in actual political reality. Platonic tradition belongs to a third genus, “ideal” in the sense of recommended end-state; Utopias add to this theoretical quality the dimension of “guidance”, so that they are motivational, time-related ideal theories. The paper depicts these relations between thought-experimenting as a wider genus, and ideal theorizing as its prominent political-philosophical sub-species. The paper is thus a tribute to Heda Festini who helped me find my way to analytic theorizing, and help analytic philosophy to start serious institutional life in our native Croatia.
12. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Dušan Dožudić Identity between Semantics and Metaphysics
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In this paper, I consider several issues related to the concept of identity—the concept that is in many ways related to Heda Festini’s early philosophical interests. I specifically focus on discussion of the issues in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. I contrast two competing conceptions of identity—the objectual (according to which identity is a relation in which every object stands only to itself) and the metalinguistic (according to which identity is a relation between coreferential names)—and consider reasons these authors had for accepting or discarding one or the other. In addition, I consider how issues concerning identity relate to issues concerning identity statements.
book reviews
13. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Marko Delić Nicholas Shea, Representation in Cognitive Science
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14. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Ana Smokrović Rui Costa and Paola Pittia (eds.), Food Ethics Education
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15. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Hana Samaržija Ian James Kidd (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
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16. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Ivan Cerovac Maria Paola Ferretti, The Public Perspective. Public Justification and the Ethics of Belief
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philosophy of art
17. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Iris Vidmar Introduction
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18. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
David Davies Making Sense of ‘Popular Art’
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The aims of this paper are twofold: first, to identify a sense of ‘popular art’ in which the question, ‘can there be popular art?’ is interesting and the answer to this question is not obvious; second, to propose and defend a challenging but attractive answer to this question: challenging in that it draws some distinctions we might not initially be inclined to draw, and attractive in offering a productive way of thinking about the ontology, epistemology, and axiology of the kinds of artifacts proposed as examples of ‘popular art’. I take the ‘interesting’ question to be whether, given a way of distinguishing artworks from other kinds of artifacts, there can be artworks that meet the conditions set out by Noel Carroll for what he terms ‘mass art’. I sketch a way of thinking about the distinction between artworks and other artifacts—what I term the neo-Goodmanian approach—and then explore the implications of the neo-Goodmanian approach for the existence of ‘popular art’, and vice versa. In so doing, I subsume these issues under a more general problem for the neo-Goodmanian—what I term the problem of ‘fast art’. I argue that, while the neo-Goodmanian can embrace artworks that are ‘popular’ in the sense of being targeted at a wide audience, she should insist that there cannot be artworks that meet all of Carroll’s requirements for being ‘mass art’.
19. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
James R. Hamilton Aesthetic and Artistic Verdicts
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In this article I propose a way of thinking about aesthetic and artistic verdicts that would keep them distinct from one another. The former are reflections of the kinds of things we prefer and take pleasure in; the latter are reflections of other judgments we make about the kinds of achievements that are made in works of art. In part to support this view of verdicts, I also propose a way of keeping distinct the description, the interpretation, and the evaluation of works of art. (And along the way, I worry about whether we offer the same kinds of interpretations of the objects of our aesthetic pleasures, properly considered, that we clearly do offer with respect to works of art.) The thesis I propose—the achievement model—is not original with me. What is original, perhaps, is that it is posed as an alternative to two other views of artistic evaluation, namely the appeal to “ideal critics” and the appeal to one way of understanding our preferences with regard to works of art. I do not attempt to show that each of these alternatives meets with insuperable problems; but I do indicate what I take to be the substantive content of those problems. In the end, in order to flesh out the thesis I propose, I borrow some material from the literature on human well-being concerning how we determine what an achievement is.
20. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Stephen Snyder Artistic Conversations: Artworks and Personhood
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This essay explores claims made frequently by artists, critics, and philosophers that artworks bear personifying traits. Rejecting the notion that artists possess the Pygmalion-like power to bring works of art to life, the article looks seriously at how parallels may exist between the ontological structures of the artwork and human personhood. The discussion focuses on Arthur Danto’s claim that the “artworld” itself manifests properties that are an imprint of the historical representation of the “world.” These “world” representations are implicitly embodied in the artist’s style. The “world” that is stamped on the people of a historical period entails a point of view that influences how they might act, something like the logic that guides a conversation. This “conversational” logic is also extant in the artworks that artists of a given period create. This analysis of Danto’s account of how people are connected to their world clarifies Danto’s assertions that a parallel structure of personification in the artwork and the human exists. It also explains his claims that artworks themselves appear to be in a kind of dialogue.