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Displaying: 1-9 of 9 documents


articles
1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Dunja Jutronić Introduction
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2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Ernie Lepore, Matthew Stone Précis of Imagination and Convention
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We give an overview of the arguments of our book Imagination and Convention, and explain how ideas from the book continue to inform our ongoing work. One theme is the challenge of fully accounting for the linguistic rules that guide interpretation. By attending to principles of discourse coherence and the many aspects of meaning that are linguistically encoded but are not truth conditional in nature, we get a much more constrained picture of context sensitivity in language than philosophers have typically assumed. Another theme is the heterogeneous nature of interpretive processes, as illustrated by the distinctive interpretive profile of metaphorical and poetic language. Such effects remind us that the suggestions and connotations of an utterance are often best explained in terms of the hearer’s experiential engagement with language, without appeal to propositional content that the speaker somehow signals either semantically or pragmatically.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Esther Romero, Belén Soria Against Lepore and Stone’s Sceptic Account of Metaphorical Meaning
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In this paper, we discuss Lepore and Stone’s account of metaphor which is based on three of Davidson’s proposals: (i) the rejection of metaphorical meanings; (ii) the rejection of metaphors as conveying metaphorical propositional contents; and (iii) the defence of analogy as the key mechanism for understanding metaphors. Lepore and Stone defend these proposals because the non-sceptic strategy on metaphorical meanings, characterized in general by the negation of (i) and (ii), fails to come to grips with neither the power of metaphor nor the explanatory resources of traditional pragmatic theories. In this paper we show not only how our non-sceptic account of metaphorical meaning as a variety of ad hoc concept eliminates these diffi culties but also how it can solve two related difficulties that appear in Lepore and Stone’s account. One of them is that Lepore and Stone’s account involves the possibility of interpreting all metaphorical utterances literally (metaphors only have one meaning, the ordinary meaning) as a criterion of metaphorical identification; the other is that their proposal is not suited for explaining how speakers can agree or disagree when they use metaphorical utterances.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Daniel W. Harris Intentionalism versus The New Conventionalism
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Are the properties of communicative acts grounded in the intentions with which they are performed, or in the conventions that govern them? The latest round in this debate has been sparked by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone (2015), who argue that much more of communication is conventional than we thought, and that the rest isn’t really communication after all, but merely the initiation of open-ended imaginative thought. I argue that although Lepore and Stone may be right about many of the specific cases they discuss, their big-picture, conventionalist conclusions don’t follow. My argument focuses on four phenomena that present challenges to conventionalist accounts of communication: ambiguity, indirect communication, communication by wholly unconventional means, and convention acquisition.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Marilynn Johnson Cooperation with Multiple Audiences
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Steven Pinker proposes a game-theoretic framework to help explain the use of veiled speech in contexts where the ultimate aims of the speaker and hearer may diverge—such as cases of bribing a police officer to get out of a ticket and paying a maître d’ to get a table. This is presented as a response to what Pinker sees as the failure in H. P. Grice’s influential theory of meaning to recognize that speakers and hearers are not always cooperating. In this paper I argue that Pinker mischaracterizes Grice’s views on cooperation, and use this to refine a positive picture of what sort of cooperation is demanded by Grice’s Cooperative Principle. This positive picture serves to insulate the Gricean framework from objectors—including Pinker—who overstate the obligations entailed by the adoption of the Cooperative Principle. I then argue that the cases Pinker presents are best treated by recognizing that in each instance the utterance is formulated with two intentions towards two different audiences and detail a resulting revision to Pinker’s game-theoretic framework that reflects this proposal. I conclude by demonstrating how this proposed game-theoretic framework of cooperation with multiple audiences can be used to model the costs and benefits of other types of discourse, including political speech.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Jessica Keiser Coordinating with Language
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Linguistic meaning is determined by use. But given the fact that any given expression can be used in a variety of ways, this claim marks where metasemantic inquiry begins rather than where it ends. It sets an agenda for the metasemantic project: to distinguish in a principled and explanatory way those uses that determine linguistic meaning from those that do not. The prevailing view (along with its various refi nements), which privileges assertion, suffers from being at once overly liberal and overly idealized. By parsing the most prominent aims we use language to achieve, noting their relations of dependence and the specific type of uses they involve, I arrive at a novel metasemantic account: facts of linguistic meaning are determined by locutionary action.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Marco Ruffino Superficially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths
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In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.
book reviews
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Utku Özmakas The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault
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9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Iris Vidmar The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature
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