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Displaying: 1-20 of 33 documents


1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Daniel Burnston, Jonathan Cohen Perception of Features and Perception of Objects
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There is a long and distinguished tradition in philosophy and psychology according to which the mind’s fundamental, foundational connection to the world is made by connecting perceptually to features of objects. On this picture, which we’ll call feature prioritarianism, minds like ours first make contact with the colors, shapes, and sizes of distal items, and then, only on the basis of the representations so obtained, build up representations of the objects that bear these features. The feature priority view maintains, then, that our perception/knowledge of objects asymmetrically depends on our perception/knowledge of simple features. This paper has two aims. First, we will present evidence, drawn from a variety of perceptual effects, that feature prioritarianism cannot be true, since there are cases that speak against the priority of feature representations in perceptual processing. Instead, we claim that the evidence supports an alternative —-and more complex—- no-priority view. Second, we will offer a framework for a no-priority view that both captures the cases we cite and provides a more sensible architecture in which to understand a variety of productive projects in perceptual science, and show how the framework cross-cuts some recent discussions in philosophy of perception.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Joshua Gert Crazy Relations
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In The Red and the Real, Jonathan Cohen defends a relationalist view of color: the view that colors are constituted by relations between objects, perceivers, and circumstances. Cohen’s defense of relationalism is often ingenious, but it also commits him to some extremely counterintuitive—one might say “crazy”—claims. The present paper argues that the phenomena that are captured by Cohen’s ingenious defense of his interesting view can be captured equally well by a more “boring” view. Such a view distinguishes between colors and the ways that those colors appear to various viewers, takes colors to be relatively vague, and claims that other species with color vision simply see other colors. Since the boring view stays closer to common sense on many points, it is to be preferred.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Keith Allen Colour, Contextualism, and Self-Locating Contents
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This paper considers two accounts of the way that colours are represented in perception, thought, and language that are consistent with relationalist theories of colour: Jonathan Cohen’s contextualist semantics for colour ascriptions, and Andy Egan’s suggestion that colour ascriptions have self-locating contents. I argue that colours are not represented in perception, thought, or language as mind-dependent relational properties.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Cohen Redness, Reality, and Relationalism: Reply to Gert and Allen
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In this paper I reply to two sets of criticisms—a first from Joshua Gert, and a second from Keith Allen—of the relationalist view of color developed and defended in my book, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
(John) Barry Maund Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism/Eliminativism/Fictionalism
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Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that there is good reason to think that Colour Relationalism needs to be supplemented by some version ofan Error theory. In so doing, I examine, in detail, the issues raised in a paper by Janet Levin in which she engages in an instructive debate with Colin McGinn. Levin’s paper is important since Cohen places heavy reliance on her arguments, both in defending his relationalist theory against crucial objections, and in his dismissal of error theories.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Åsa Wikforss Color Terms and Semantic Externalism
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The paper discusses whether the color terms should be given an externalist semantics. In the literature on the semantics of color terms externalism is standardly taken for granted, and Twin Earth style arguments play a central role. This is notable given that few people would claim that semantic externalism applies across the board, to all types of terms. Why, then, should the color terms belong with this group of terms? I argue that the standard externalist strategies, introduced by Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, do not apply to these terms: The color terms do not function like natural kind terms, and the idea of semantic reliance on others does not apply to them. I conclude that the externalist arguments fail and that a version of internalism, more properly called ‘individualism’,applies to the color terms.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Kathrin Glüer Colors and the Content of Color Experience
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In previous work, I have defended a non-standard version of intentionalism about perceptual experience. According to the doxastic account, visual experience is a peculiar kind of belief: belief with “phenomenal” or looks-content. In this paper, I investigate what happens if this account of experience is combined with another idea I find very plausible: That the colors are to be understood in terms of color experience. I argue that the resulting phenomenal account of color experience captures everything essential to what has been called the “natural concept of color”. And I show that circularity worries are not aggravated by adopting this account instead of more standard forms of intentionalism—rather, they can be dispelled along the same lines.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Yasmina Jraissati Categorical Perception of Color: Assessing the Role of Language
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Why do we draw the boundaries between “blue” and “green”, where we do? One proposed answer to this question is that we categorize color the way we do because we perceive color categorically. Starting in the 1950’s, the phenomenon of “categorical perception” (CP) encouraged such a response. CP refers to the fact that adjacent color patches are more easily discriminated when they straddle a category boundary than when they belong to the same category. In this paper, I make three related claims. (1) Although what seems to guide discrimination performances seems to indeed be categorical information, the evidence in favor of the fact that categorical perception infl uences the way we perceive color is not convincing. (2) That CP offers a useful account of categorization is not obvious.While aiming at accounting for categorization, CP itself requires an account of categories. This being said, CP remains an interesting phenomenon. Why and how is our discrimination behavior linked to our categories? It is suggested that linguistic labels determine CP through a naming strategy to which participants resort while discriminating colors. This paper’s fi nal point is (3) that the naming strategy account is not enough. Beyond category labels, what seems to guide discrimination performance is category structure.
9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Zoltan Jakab Reflectance Physicalism About Color: The Story Continues
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A stubborn problem for reflectance physicalism about color is to account for individual differences in normal trichromat color perception. The identification of determinate colors with physical properties of visible surfaces in a universal, perceiver-independent way is challenged by the observation that the same surfaces in identical viewing conditions often look different in color to different human subjects with normal color vision. Recently, leading representatives of reflectance physicalism have offered some arguments to defend their view against the individual differences challenge. In this paper I challenge their defense. I argue thateven though individual differences are present in shape perception as well as in color perception, the mechanisms of shape perception and those of color perception differ in ways which make them completely different regarding their evidential status for certain identity claims. Thus comparing color perception to shape perception offers no support for identifying hues with reflectances. On the other hand, drawing a parallel between the temperature-mean kinetic energy of molecules (MKE) identification and the proposed hue-reflectance identities is no support for reflectance physicalism either, since there is an important disanalogybetween the two cases. While individual differences obtain in color perception, the effects of temperature (e.g., melting, thermal expansion) do not exhibit analogous variation, which makes the temperature-MKE identification unproblematic compared to the hue-reflectance identification. One motivation for this ongoing debate is that the success or failure of reflectance physicalism has far-reaching consequences regarding externalist theories of phenomenal consciousness.
10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Nenad Miščević Color: Semantic Realism οr Response-Intentionalism?
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Matthen’s semantic theory of color is compared and contrasted with a variety of dispositionalism, to be called response-intentionalism (since it claims that color is a disposition to produce intentional states involving color-looks. First, it is argued that the two theories are not so far from each other; Matthen might be a closed dispositionalist, since he does stress the causal power of surfaces to produce color representations (signs). Next, the pragmatist component of his theory is addressed. Can usefulness unify color? It seems that some degree of unity is required for a plurality of things to be treated as a group useful in a specifi c way: existence is prior to usefulness, not the other way around. Finally, the dispositionalism (including response-intentionalism) is defended against Mohan’s epistemological objection, according to which the dispositionalist cannot account for a priori nature of one’s knowledge of color looks; it is argued that it can,and that it can even use roughly the same means as semantic realism.
11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Mohan Matthen How Do We Know How Sensory Properties Appear? A Reply to Νenad Miščević
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The paper is a reply to Miščević (same volume). His objections are discussed and answered, in particular objections concerning Cartesian certainty in our knowledge of color.
12. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Peter Pagin A Note on the Phenomenal Sorites
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Is observational indiscriminability non-transitive? This was once an accepted truth, and it was used by philosophers like Armstrong and Dummett to argue against the existence of appearances (sense data, sensory items). It was objected, however, early on by Jackson and Pinkerton, and more recently by vagueness contextualists like Raffman and Fara, that the case for non-transitivity is flawed. The reason is the context dependence of appearance. I argue here that if we take context dependence properly into account, we still have (a modified version of) non-transitivity, and that therefore we still face the problem of appearances.
13. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Pavel Gregorić In Memory of Maja Hudoletnjak Grgić (1964–2010)
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14. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jakub Jirsa Sophists, Names and Democracy
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The article argues that the Euthydemus shows the essential connection between sophistry, right usage of language, and politics. It shows how the sophistic use of language correlates with the manners of politics which Plato associates with the sophists. First, it proceeds by showing the explicit criticism of both brothers, for they seem unable to fulfill the task given to them. Second, several times in the dialogue Socrates criticizes the sophists’ use of language, since it is totally inappropriate to fulfill the above-mentioned pedagogical task. I will show that this critique mirrors a deeper conflict between two different conceptions of language. Finally, the article suggests that the sophistic erroneous use of language has direct implications on their political theory, which Plato criticizes inthe Euthydemus as well as in the Republic.
15. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Karel Thein A Much Disputed “Whole” at Phaedrus 270
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The article discusses several possible interpretations of Socrates’ suggestion that we cannot “understand the nature of soul satisfactorily without understanding the nature of the whole” (Phaedrus 270c1–2). Against those who take the “whole” implied here for the cosmic whole, it argues that nothing in the Phaedrus justifies this interpretation. In the light of both Socrates’ conception of rhetoric in this dialogue and his image of the tripartite soul in the palinode, the “whole” whose knowledge is prerequisite to knowing the soul’s nature is better understood as either the whole of the composed soul or the whole soul-body compound. The real problem of the passage, the article concludes, is that we lack any clear criteria that would enable us to decide between these two readings. At the same time, the dramatic progress of the dialogue makes it possible to argue that Phaedrus briefly misunderstands Socrates’ meaning by reading in it some cosmological connotations. This possibility notwithstanding, it is more likely that, from the perspective of the tripartite soul and its actions and passions, “the whole soul-body compound” and “the whole soul” are two equally defensible solutions to the puzzle.
16. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Nenad Miščević Plato’s Republic as a Political Thought Experiment
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Plato’s Republic is a political thought experiment, claims the present paper. Thought-experimenting is announced in the story of the Ring of Gyges, and done in a thorough and systematic way through a series of political scenarios: community of goods, of women and children, educational system and the philosopher rule? The paper considers the longstanding issue of plausibility, putting it in the context of current debates about thought-experiments, and the issue of replaceability: can a given political thought experiment be replaced by an argument which features only norms and empirical information? The paper also puts the Republic thought experiment into a broad historical context, presenting it as the point of origin of utopian literature on the one hand, and the thought-experimental tradition in political philosophy on the other hand, contrasting it with the social-contract thought-experiment, also adumbrated in the Republic but fully developed in modern thought.
17. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Filip Karfík The Constitution of the Human Body in Plato’s Timaeus
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The author emphasizes the fact that the largest part of Plato’s Timaeus deals with human nature and offers a detailed account of the constitution of the human body. He then lists the parallels and the differences between the constitution of the world body and the human body. The central part of the paper deals with Plato’s explanation of the persistence of the human body within a bodily environment which causes its dissolution. The author pays a special attention to Plato’s theory of the apparatus which keeps running the processes of respiration, digestion and blood circulation. In the concluding section, the author raises thequestion of the relationship between human body and human soul. He shows that, in Plato’s Timaeus, the human body functions to a large extent independently from human soul. One possible reason for this theory is Plato’s conception of the immortal soul. While the human body exists in order to harbour the immortal soul, the latter does not produce and preserve it nor does it cause its dissolution. It only exercises cognitive and ruling functions in it as long as the body is able to hold together and to detain the soul.
18. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Pavel Gregorić The First Humans in Plato’s Timaeus
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Plato’s Timaeus gives an account of the creation of the world and of human race. The text suggests that there was a first generation of human beings, and that they were all men. The paper raises difficulties for this traditional view, and considers an alternative, suggested in more recent literature, according to which humans of the first generation were sexually undifferentiated. The paper raises difficulties for the alternative view as well, and examines the third possibility, advocated by some ancient as well as modern interpreters, according to which there were no first humans, strictly speaking. Although the latter view avoids the pitfalls of the former two views, it crucially rests on a metaphorical reading of the creation story in the Timaeus.
19. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Hynek Bartoš Aristotle on Methodological Approaches to the Study of the Human Soul
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This paper focuses on Aristotle’s methodology of science and its application to the study of the human soul. My aim is to contrast two significantly different methodological approaches and to formulate two pairs of premises that Aristotle employs in two clearly differentiated and independent fields of study, namely in his zoological works and in the works of practical philosophy. Acknowledging these principles, as I suggest, may shed a new light on the methodological difficulties that Aristotle indicates in the introductory chapters of his De anima.
20. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Péter Lautner Aristotle on the Intentional Nature of Emotions
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Emotions are characteristic activities/states in hylemorphic structure of the Aristotelian soul. Emotional activities/states are physiological processes/states as well, as it is particularly clear in anger. It raises the question about the origin of their intentionality. Sometimes sheer bodily processes can lead to emotions, which implies that intentionality in emotions might also originate in bodily processes. But Aristotle does not generalize this point in saying that all emotions are due to bodily processes. Moreover, since they are complex phenomena, involving opinion, representation, desire, pleasure and pain, their intentional nature must also be a certain amalgamate of the intentionality of the ingredients. It involves that the relevant kinds of pleasure and pain are also intentional states. On the other hand, besides establishing certain general similarities Aristotle does not seem to have worked out a unifi ed theory of emotions. To mention but one well-known example, most of the emotions he discusses in detail are based on representation, whereas hatred is supported by a general statement.