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Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Volume 4, Issue 3, 2004
The Philosophy of Robert Nozick

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articles
1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Carla Bagnoli Introduction
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2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Catherine Z. Elgin Optional Stops, Foregone Conclusions, and the Value of Argument
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If the point of argument is to produce conviction, an argument tor a foregone conclusion is pointless. I maintain, however, that an argument makes a variety of cognitive contributions, even when its conclusion is already believed. It exhibits warrant. It affords reasons that we can impart to others. It identifies bases tor agreement among parties who otherwise disagree. It underwrites confidence, by showing how vulnerable warrant is under changes in background assumptions. Multiple arguments for the same conclusion show how our beliefs hang together.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Elijah Millgram The Ontological Meta-Argument: (and the Ontological Argument for the Actuality of the World)
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Would the Ontological Argument Greater Than Which None Can Be Conceived proue the existence of God? Might an ontological argument prove the actuality of the world (as Robert Nozick once suggested)? Should you believe that you’re actual, even if you’re not? And what happens if we attempt to answer these questions, having adopted Nozick’s mature view of the function of argument?
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Adam Leite Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure: or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism
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Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take the Closure Principle as central in discussions of skepticism. The paper concludes by examining the prospects for a plausible skeptical argument.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Kvanvig Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure
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Nozick’s contribution to the epistemology of the last half of the twentieth century includes addressing the question of whether knowledge is closed under known implication. I argue that the question of closure provides a serious obstacle to Nozickian approaches to epistemology.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Ronald de Sousa Rational Animals
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I begin with a rather unpromising dispute that Nozick once had with Ian Hacking in the pages of the London Review of Books, in which both vied with one another in their enthusiasm to repudiate the thesis that some human people or peoples are closer than others to animality. I shall attempt to show that one can build, on the basis of Nozick’s discussion of rationality, a defense of the view that the capacity tor language places human rationality out of reach of a comparison with animals. The difference rests, paradoxically, on the human capacity tor irratianality. Irrationality depends on the capacity tor language, which allows the detachment of explicit thoughts from their underlying dynamic implementation; these, in turn, condition the essential disputability of principles of rationality. That is what places every human potentially -- if not actually -- on the other side of an unbridgeable gulf that separates us from other animals.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Marc Slors The Closest Continuer View Revisited
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Many theories of personal identity allow for the metaphysical possibility of fission. In 1981 Nozick proposed a theory of personal identity called ‘the closest continuer view’ (CCV) that denies fission in the case of persons but allows fisson in the case of human beings. CCV may thus appear to reduce ‘person’ to a nonmetaphysical, practical notion. Against this I argue that CCV is an externalist metaphysical theory that purports to solve a problem that is insurmountable within the confines of an internalist metaphysics of personal identity.
book reviews
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Filip Grgić Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism
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9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Magdalena Črnac Liberalizam sa skeptičkim licem: (Liberalism with a Skeptical Face)
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