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Dialogue and Universalism

Volume 31, Issue Supplement, 2021
Varia: Clashes of Cultures, Religions and Models of Democracy; Max Scheler’s Selected Conceptions

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Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents

1. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Małgorzata Czarnocka, Stanisław Czerniak Editorial — Varia: Clashes of Cultures, Religions and Models of Democracy; Max Scheler’s Selected Conceptions
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2. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Michael Mitias Possibility of Friendship between Religions
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The majority of theologians, philosophers, and religious leaders have, during the past five decades, either argued or taken it for granted that the primary aim of interreligious dialogue is mutual understanding and that the purpose of realizing this aim is mitigation of alienation, hatred, and violence between the religions and cooperation on worthwhile projects. On the contrary, the author of this paper argues that the primary aim of interreligious dialogue should be to create a bond of friendship between the various religions of the world. In his attempt to establish the validity of this proposition, the author, first, advances a concept of "collective subject" as a condition for the possibility of friendship primarily because friendship is viewed as a relation between two human subjects; second, he introduces a general concept of friendship whose main elements are good will, mutual affection, and social service; and, third, he argues that religions can, qua collective subjects, establish a bond of friendship between them.
3. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Kevin M. Brien The Confucian and Marxian Ways: Ironic Affinities
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This essay explores significant affinities with respect to the humanism of the Marxian and Confucian Ways. Although orthodox Marxism suppresses the humanistic dimensions of Marx’s thought, they are foremost in his earlier writing, and were never abandoned in his later thought. All varieties of Confucianism recognize its humanism. The essay argues that both perspectives involve process modes of understanding; that both have a convergent understanding of abstract general terms; that both view the human being as a community being; that both advocate similar ideal modes of becoming; and that both are concerned with the problems of human alienation.
4. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Temisanren Ebijuwa The Public Sphere, Deweyan Democracy and Rational Discourse in Africa
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The quest for a decent political order in many societies is imperative today because of the heterogeneous nature of our social existence and the complexity of our ever increasing socio-economic and political experiences. Since the public sphere is a domain of freedom exemplified by dialogical engagements, the outcome of such encounter must involve the intelligible thoughts of all discussants with the sole aim of dealing with the concerns and commanding the commitment of all to the decisions reached. In this study, it is argued that Deweyan democracy as an alternative theory of rational inquiry is relevant for engaging the present sordid condition of many Africans democratic practice and policy outcomes. As a rational procedure, it is averred that John Dewey’s emphasis on epistemic properties of democratic discourse makes the proceduralist account of democracy superfluous and exposes the weakness of the content of democratic discourse in political actions and decisions. The study also contend that given the consensual state of Dewey’s epistemic thought, Jürgen Habermas theory rather than expanding the space of epistemic democracy stifled it because of his insistence on the force of a better argument in the resolution of conflicting concerns of dialoguers. The study therefore, argues for Dewey’s democracy as an alternative mode of political order since it does not undermine the views of the citizens but gives room for the activation a certain set of attitude that can challenge prevailing opinions and accepts the views that do not embrace conventional wisdom—a procedure that is necessary for the growth and development of our democratic space.
5. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Stanisław Czerniak Max Scheler’s Pluralistic Conception of Knowledge
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This article aims to reconstruct Max Scheler’s conception of three types of knowledge, outlined in his late work Philosophical Perspectives (1928). Scheler distinguished three kinds of knowledge: empirical, used to exercise control over nature, eidetic (essential) and metaphysical. The author reviews the epistemological criteria that underlie this distinction, and its functionalistic assumptions. In the article’s polemic part he accuses Scheler of a) crypto-dualism in his theory of knowledge, which draws insufficient distinctions between metaphysical and eidetic knowledge; b) totally omitting the status of the humanities in his classification of knowledge types; c) consistently developing a philosophy of knowledge without resort to the research tools offered by the philosophy of science, which takes such analyses out of their social and historical context (i.e. how knowledge is created in today’s scientific communities).
6. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Stanisław Czerniak The Consistence of the Assumptions of the Sociology of Knowledge with those of Philosophical Anthropology (On the Example of Max Scheler)
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In this article I ask about the theoretical-methodological consistence between research sub-disciplines, which their creators see as discourses or paradigms that correspond on a general philosophical level. I will base this analysis on the historical-philosophical examples of certain sociology of knowledge and philosophical anthropology conceptions developed by Max Scheler as part of a broader philosophical theory. Scheler’s intention, which he often articulated in his writings, was to show philosophical anthropology in its role as the categorial foundation of the sociology of knowledge, a reservoir of the philosophical assumptions that underlie sociocognitive theories. The interpretative hypothesis in this article is that a) some parts of Scheler’s sociology of knowledge (the so-called class idol conception) would be very difficult to see as "grounded" in the conceptual model of philosophical anthropology he proposed, and b) that there exists an anthropological standpoint that differs from Scheler’s—Helmuth Plessner’s—and is more logically coherent with the "class idol" idea.
7. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Małgorzata Czarnocka The Duality of the Cognitive Subject in the Conception of Max Scheler
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The object of my inquiry is Max Scheler’s cognitive subjectivity conception, which in particular addresses the problem of subjectivity in science. Scheler introduces two kinds of subject: the first is the standard cognitive subject encountered in epistemological theories—an individual subject which really carries out cognitive acts. The second, collective subject, controls the first, imposing upon it the cognitive forms it has developed; I call this subject the creating subject. In Scheler’s theory, the creating subject is represented by the ethos of groups that initiate cognition, which determines the validity criteria of cognition. Therefore, Scheler’s cognitive subject is dual; both its forms have different attributes and functions in cognition: the individual cognitive subject is nonautonomous and determined by a superior collective one. The Schelerian creating subject can be seen as a detranscendentalised equivalent of Kant’s transcendental subject, insofar as both shape cognitive forms and thereby determine the cognitive acts of the individual subject.
8. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 31 > Issue: Supplement
Aivaras Stepukonis The Functionalization of Essential (A Priori) Knowledge: A Close Look at Max Scheler's Epistemology
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The article explores a special mode of the human mind outlined in the writings of Max Scheler under the notion of the functionalization of essential (a priori) knowledge. While the concept of a priori was given its profound elaboration in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Scheler applies it with a number of significant modifications. Along with the a priori of objective reality, which is the mind’s first step in grasping the autonomous world, Scheler comes to posit a species of a priori that is subjective. A person’s exposure to an objective essence exercises a special kind of influence on that person’s mind: what was once an objective a priori is appropriated as a subjective a priori, the thing thought becomes a “form” or pattern of thinking, the thing liked becomes a “form” or manner of liking. “Functionalization” characterizes precisely the mind’s ability to transmute the essential knowledge of autonomous reality into subjective a priori forms of knowing and anticipating that reality. This transmutation unfolds on three intuitive planes: that of meaning which is known, that of value which is perceived or apprehended, and that of existence which is encountered in the resistance of objects to the will of the percipient.