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editorial
1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Alexander Yu. Antonovski Александр Юрьевич Антоновский
The Crisis of Collegiality in Scientific Organization, and the Scientific Policy
Кризис коллегиальности в научной организации и научная политика

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The article substantiates that science, thanks to the latest media in the dissemination of scientific communication (especially computer word processing, big data accumulation, mega-science installations, the latest international networking platforms and collaborations), has gone beyond all institutional, organizational, regional, national and partly disciplinary borders. Science as a supranational communication system has reached a complexity that is incompatible with the standards for evaluating scientific work and scientific achievements, which are traditionally carried out in the form of scientific committees, individual examinations and other collegial forms of scientific communication. The collegiality of making the most important decisions regarding the examination of the scientific product itself, the thematic agenda, professional competencies and the resulting distribution of remuneration, reputation, ranks, degrees, grants has exhausted its capabilities to a certain extent. As a result, science turns out to be opaque both for the regulator, who is trying to exercise control over scientific institutions, and for science itself, which in the form of scientific self-government and philosophical reflection of science carries out the function of self-observation and self-description. A working hypothesis is proposed, which states that in response to this crisis of collegiality, reflection and control, new media of communicative success and new organizational forms of scientific communication crystallize in science, which can restore the ability of a scientific system to process its internal and external complexity. These media are represented by a new, social-networked form of scientific expertise and partly scientific work, which will be able to compensate for the lack of self-reflection, both at the organizational level of research institutes and at the level of global control over science as a whole.
panel discussion
2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Kirill A. Rodin Кирилл Александрович Родин
The Rule-Following Problem and Wittgenstein’s Place in Sociology Studies: A Return to Peter Winch
Проблема следования правилу и место Л. Витгенштейна в социологических исследованиях

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The article presents an attempt to evaluate the influence of the late Wittgenstein philosophy (by the example of the rule-following problem) on sociology and some empirical programs of sociological research. At first we give a brief overview of the rule-following problem and consider, on the one hand, a skeptical reading and a skeptical solution to the problem by S. Kripke and, on the other hand, criticism towards Kripke by some Wittgensteinians). Then we reveal the role of skeptic reading in the sociological works of D. Bloor and the role of anti-sceptic reading in ethnomethodological projects. At the end we show the paramount importance of Peter Winch – we prove the following thesis: the ideas of Peter Winch anticipated many of the points and arguments in the dispute between D. Bloor and ethnomethodology.
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Vitaly V. Ogleznev Виталий Васильевич Оглезнев
Wittgenstein’s Problem of Rule-Following and Legal Philosophy Studies
Проблема следования правилу Витгенштейна и философско-правовые исследования

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The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin’s argument that after publishing of Peter Winch’s book “The Idea of Social Science” (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein’s problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Alexander A. Sanzhenakov Александр Афанасьевич Санженаков
Wittgenstein and Husserl as the Reformers of Social Science
Витгенштейн и Гуссерль как реформаторы социальной науки

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The article is devoted to the rule-following problem and its impact on the sociology of science as K.A. Rodin presents them in his article. It is known that L. Wittgenstein in “Philosophical Studies”, using the rule of arithmetic addition as an example, formulated the rule-following problem, which has acquired the ultimate form of skepticism thanks to S. Kripke. This problem was transferred to the sociology of science by D. Bloor, where it received the following sociological explanation: rule-amenably activity can be understood only by incorporating rules into social institutions. P. Winch rejected a skeptical interpretation of this problem, and as K.A. Rodin shows in the article, most adequately showed the consequences of Wittgenstein’s ideas for sociology. In his answer, A.A. Sanzhenakov draws attention to two circumstances. Firstly, sociology was influenced not only by late but also early ideas of Wittgenstein. Secondly, the rule-following problem as an important factor in the sociological turn can also be found in the phenomenology of E. Husserl. The author concludes about the need for additional research, which will draw a line between the influence of Wittgenstein and Husserl on sociology.
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Anna Yu. Moiseeva, Alina S. Zaykova Анна Юрьевна Моисеева
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Performative Turn
Витгенштейн и перформативный поворот

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This article is a response to the thesis of K.A. Rodin about the exclusively conceptual influence of Wittgenstein and the problem of following the rule on social research. The authors argue that along with the methodological line traced by K.A. Rodin, one should single out a purely scientific line of influence of Wittgenstein's ideas, the result of which was the so-called performative turn in social sciences.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Valery A. Surovtsev Валерий Александрович Суровцев
Rule-Following and Social Theory
Следование правилу и социальная теория

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The article contains some considerations on influence of Wittgenstein’s Problem of Rule-Following to Social Theories, especially as it is analyzed in the text of K.A. Rodin. I consider “skeptical decision” of S. Kripke, and demonstrate that in some new situation’s theory of G. Baker and P. Hacker are preferable.
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Kirill A. Rodin Кирилл Александрович Родин
On the Specifics of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Influence on Social Sciences and the Humanities. Reply to Critics
О характере влияния Л. Витгенштейна на социальные и гуманитарные исследования. Ответ оппонентам

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epistemology & cognition
8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Tatiana D. Sokolova Татьяна Дмитриевна Соколова
A Priori in the Philosophy of Science: Methodological Aspects of Research
A priori в философии науки

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The article is devoted to the analysis of research approaches and attitudes to the study of the a priori in the philosophy of science. In the first part, I outline the basic premises of this study: (a) scientific knowledge as the highest manifestation of rationality; (b) the normative nature of scientific knowledge. In the second part, I turn to the difference in the subject of philosophical research on the history of science – the history of science as a “history of facts” vs the history of science as a history of scientific thought. The third part discusses the main theoretical and technical difficulty associated with changing the subject of research – the possibility of a transition from historical fact to “scientific thought at the time of its birth” (in Helene Metzger terminology). The forth part is devoted to the analysis of the “model approach” (Arianna Betti, Hein van den Berg) in philosophy as a possible way to overcome this difficulty and includes both theoretical and technical aspects of the future direction of research. In conclusion, consequences are drawn about the possibility of using the “model approach” for reconstruction a priori in the history of science as “constitutive elements of scientific knowledge” (David Stump).
language and mind
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Miguel Lopez-Astorga Мигель Лопез-Асторга
The Modal Square of Opposition and the Mental Models Theory
Логический квадрат и теория ментальных моделей

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The mental models theory is a current approach trying to account for human thought and hence communication by highlighting the action of semantics and ignoring, to a large extent, syntax. However, it has been argued that the theory actually contains an underlying syntax related to any kind of modal logic. This paper delves into this last idea and is intended to show that the concepts of possibility and necessity as understood in it fulfill the basic requirement that, according to Fitting and Mendelsohn, every modal logic has to meet: to satisfy the relationships provided by the Aristotelian modal square of opposition.
vista
10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Natalia I. Kuznetsova Наталия Ивановна Кузнецова
History of Science: Projects and Realities
История науки: проекты и реалии

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The article analyzes the key methodological problems of the contemporary research in the field of the history of science. It is shown that in the 18th and 19th centuries works on the history of science demonstrated the difficult paths of scientists to the heights of scientific discoveries. The positivism of the 19th century has opened the field of the philosophy of science, emphasizing the crucial role of scientific knowledge for the development of civilization. The history of science is fundamental for the justification of this thesis. However, in the 20th century, the history of science has solved mainly applied problems. It was necessary as a cursory review of the main achievements of various scientific disciplines arranged in chronological order. In fact, the history of science was based on the cumulative concept of the development of science. The criticism of cumulatism and the fight against anti-historical stereotypes emerged thanks to T. Kuhn. Later, the criticism of presentism in the community of science historians has become the main methodology for reconstructing the development of cognition. It is shown in the paper that the history of science was closely connected with the philosophy of science. However, genuine cooperation between philosophers and historians of science had not yet occurred. The situation has changed with the advent of a new philosophical discipline – historical epistemology.
11. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Andrei G. Kuznetsov Андрей Геннадиевич Кузнецов
Sociology or Psychology?: On Conceptual Architecture of David Bloor’s Strong Programme in Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
Социология или психология?

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The article is an attempt at the reverse engineering of conceptual architecture and logic of David Bloor's Strong Programme (SP) in the sociology of scientific knowledge via explicating key resources and interpretative techniques for constructing it. To do this I show how problematic is a conventional interpretation of the SP as a radicalization of Kuhn's theory of science and as a sociologization of epistemology. This problematization allows me to put anew three questions concerning the SP. In what sense it is post-positivist? In what sense it is sociological? Does it belong to social epistemology? To answer these questions I set myself four tasks. First, Bloor’s theoretical position concerning the Kuhn-Popper debate is located. Second, I point to and present Mary Hesse’s network model of science (NM) as a crucial theoretical source for the early SP. Third, I analyze in detail how Bloor interpreted and appropriated NM. Finally, I show what theoretical and methodological effects this interpretation had for the SP as presented in 1976. The general layout of the conceptual architecture of SP is modeled on the Hesse’s NM. It combines the principle of correspondence and that of coherence and sees the language of science as a network of predicates and laws segmented by contingent and empirical boundaries and not a priori logical divisions between theory and observation. But Bloor creatively interprets and appropriates NM by the double move of generalization and specification. Whereas Hesse’s NM refers to the functioning of scientific language, in Bloor’s hands, it comes to describe human learning in general inscribed in psychological processes (perception and thinking). As a result, SP is based on a form of psychological empiricism that sees science as a two-storied building. The first floor (perception) ensures correspondence and the second one (thinking) provide conditions of coherence. SP of 1976 is a specific model for the sociological segmentation of the second floor.
case-studies – science studies
12. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Irina A. Gerasimova Ирина Алексеевна Герасимова
Petroleum Genesis as a Problem of Transdisciplinary Research
Генезис нефти и газа как проблема трансдисциплинарных исследований

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The problem of petroleum genesis is fundamental for natural science. Scientific discussion on the problem of petroleum genesis originated with the science of theModern time and continues to this day. Physicists, chemists, biologists, geologists, geophysicists and cosmologists take part in the discussion. The problem attracts the attention of philosophers on science in many aspects. The author believes that it is necessary to conduct research of a transdisciplinary type that combines natural science and philosophical knowledge. Transdisciplinary research allows conceptually combine different scales of vision, different languages and standards of justification for specific sciences. The prerequisite for a transdisciplinary approach on the part of natural scientists can be the synergetic setting of theoretical constructions. V.I. Vernadsky’s concept of biosphere and noosphere, which is included in the scientific picture of the world, can serve as philosophical and conceptual basis. Transdisciplinary discussion on the petroleum genesis involve the analysis of philosophical, socio-psychological and concrete scientific aspects. The author carries out the logical and methodological analysis of the hypothesis of D.I. Mendeleev. The author comes to the conclusion that the philosophical type of argumentation prevails. The basis for a new dialogue should be the subject- subject-object relationship. The principles of the philosophy of complexity can be used when discussing the problems of geoecology and specific environmental research areas.
13. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Ivan A. Karpenko Иван Александрович Карпенко
The Second Law of Thermodynamics in the Context of Contemporary Physical Research
Второй закон термодинамики в контексте современной физики

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The second law results in the growth of the entropy – in superficial interpretation this principle presumes that the sufficient energy inevitably turns into the substandard energy. Order turns into chaos over time; however, chaos also turns into order under certain circumstances. The first research objective is to establish the possible prescientific ideas about the phenomenon – some philosophical intuitions that have preceded the scientific discovery of the second law and have conformed to it in a certain sense. It is essential because there are always certain bonds and continuity in the history of philosophy and science – the correct interpretation of the phenomenon becomes difficult, if not impossible, without the establishment of such bonds.Moreover, the main task is to understand what the second law is and which significance its principal corollaries have. We need to give the second law a correct interpretation that will allow making assumptions about its connection with time in the context of the initial state problem and about the possible new ways of modern physics development – in particular, the creation of the quantum theory of gravity. Two solutions to the entropy and initial state connection problem are proposed in the context of the time arrow discussion (G. Calender’s approach to solving the problem is disputed).
interdisciplinary studies
14. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Vladimir P. Vizgin Владимир Павлович Визгин
Socio-Cultural Aspects of the Standard Model in Elementary Particles Physics and the History of Its Creation
Социокультурные аспекты стандартной модели в физике элементарных частиц и истории ее создания

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The article соnsiders the socio-cultural aspects of the standard model (SM) in elementary particle physics and history of its creation. SM is a quantum field gauge theory of electromagnetic, weak and strong interactions, which is the basis of the modern theory of elementary particles. The process of its elaboration covers a twenty-year period: from 1954 (the concept of gauge fields by C. Yang and R. Mills) to the early 1970s., when the construction of renormalized quantum chromodynamics and electroweak theory wеre completed. The socio-cultural aspects of SM are explored on the basis of a quasi-empirical approach, by studying the texts of its creators and participants in the relevant events. We note also the important role of such an “external” factor as large-scale state projects on the creation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, which provided personnel and financial support for fundamental research in the field of nuclear physics and elementary particle physics (the implementation of thermonuclear projects took place just in the 1950s, and most of the theorists associated with the creation of SM were simultaneously the main developers of thermonuclear weapons, especially in the USSR). The formation of SM is considered as a competition between two research programs (paradigms) – gauge-field and phenomenological, associated with the rejection of the field concept. The split of the scientific community of physicists associated with this competition is going on during this period. It’s accompanied by a kind of “negotiations”, which in the early 1970s lead to the triumph of the gauge field program and the restoration of the unity of the scientific community. The norms and rules of the scientific ethos played the regulatory role in this process. The scientific-realistic position of the metaphysical attitudes of the majority of theorists and their negative attitude to the concepts of philosophical relativism and social construction of scientific knowledge are emphasized. Some features of the history of SM creation are also noted, such as the positive role of aesthetic judgments; “scientific-school” form of research (in the USSR), its pros and cons; a connection to historical-scientific “drama of ideas” with “dramas of people” who made a wrong choice and (or) “missed their opportunities”.
archive
15. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Angelina S. Bobrova Ангелина Сергеевна Боброва
“Logic of the Future” as C.S. Peirce Understood It (First Volumes of Peirceana)
«Логика будущего», какой ее видел Ч.С. Пирс (первые тома Пирсианы)

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Finally, the first book started Peirceana. Peirceana is expected as a new series that provides access to both Peirce’s mostly unpublished late works and secondary papers, in which ideas of this American philosopher are developed. This edition is opened with three volumes on Peirce’s manuscripts on “Logic of the Future.” The thinker gave this definition to his theory of existential graphs, i.e., a diagrammatical logical project that includes three sections. The sections can roughly correspond to propositional logic, first-order logic and modal logic. The theory of existential graphs is a particular conception. It predicts ideas of proof theory, mathematics of continuity, and cognitive sciences. Besides, it has an impressive philosophical foundation and perfectly emphasizes the importance of diagrammatic notations. Since many writings are published here for the first time, the edition per se is a significant event for the history of logic. However, Peirceana can do more than this. It urges to think of how the logic of 20‒21st centuries would have looked like if Peirce’s intentions were discovered earlier. At the same time, it clarifies the ground for contemporary investigations. Today we have a bunch of papers about various non-classical modifications, extensions, restrictions, and applications of the original theory. Peirceana is projected as the publication that can gather specialists (logicians, philosophers, as well as IT and cognitive science scholars) who are interested in the development of Peirce’s approach. It lets the readers reconsider our ordinary logical conceptions (e.g., reasoning, logical and language analysis, and others) as well as the conventional understanding of the evolution of modern logic. The current paper has two objectives: firstly, it estimates this diplomatic partly critical edition with its several thoroughly elaborated introductions, and secondly, it briefly introduces the existential graphs theory. A set of examples demonstrates the basic principles of this system.
16. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Alexey A. Golovin Алексей Алексеевич Головин
Science as a Vocation. Hermeneutics and Reflection
Наука как призвание и профессия. Герменевтика и рефлексия

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In this article, the author tries to understand the significance of “Science as a Vocation” for Max Weber’s listeners: what goals and objectives did the speaker set, and what is the relevance of the lecture to understand science and scientists today? As a historical source, the autobiography of K. Levit is used, which recorded the listener’s personal experiences from the speech. Referring to Schleiermacher’s ideas, the author seeks to interpret Weber's speech as Lebenswerk. The author connects the ideas of the speech with the historical context of that time, as well as the philosophy of life and neo-Kantianism. The author believes that Weber’s call for reflection is of key importance for understanding science as vocation. The author comprehends the significance of reflection not only for science, but also for the personality as a whole – for its self-identification and self-knowledge, orientation in the social space.
new trends
17. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Ekaterina V. Vostrikova Екатерина Васильевна Вострикова
Philosophy and Linguistics: New Trends in the Interdisciplinary Studies of Meaning
Философия и лингвистика

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This paper is an overview of the contemporary discussions in interdisciplinary studies of meaning of natural language expressions. The paper discusses the latest work published in two interdisciplinary journals «Linguistics and Philosophy» and «Natural Language Semantics» most relevant for philosophy of language. The paper focuses on two general topics: the semantics of singular terms (proper names, pronouns, demonstratives) and the semantics of belief-reports. The paper discusses the recent proposal about the interpretation of pronouns by [Stojnic et al., 2019] according to which such interpretation is strictly determined by the linguistic rules and does not depend on the context. According to this proposal, the referent of a pronoun is determined by a specific coherence relationship the sentence it occurs in has to the previous sentence in a discourse unless it is preceded by a pointing gesture. The paper discuses some issues with this proposal. Specifically, it discusses its difficulties with explaining the cases where the referent of a pronoun stands out in a context and, thus, no pointing gesture or previous discourse is required for the referent identification. It also discusses cases where a coherence relationship (such as Narration) between two sentences allows flexibility with respect to the referent identification and points at pragmatic factors that can be relevant in this respect. The paper also presents some other recent research on proper names, demonstratives and pronouns both linguistically and philosophically oriented.The paper also presents informally some work on belief-reports in linguistics and discussed its relevance for philosophy of language. It discusses the recent work on restrictions on the types of embeddings of propositional attitude verbs and the general approach that derives those restrictions from the predicted meanings of the relevant sentences, such as [Theiler et al., 2019]. The paper discussed the relevance of this issue to a more general question about the nature of a natural language and the relationship between language and logic.
18. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Petr S. Kusliy Петр Сергеевич Куслий
Searching for the Justification of Realism
В поисках обоснования реализма

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This critical analytical review examines the ways in which realism can be justified in epistemology and philosophy of science and which are presented in the collection of papers “Perspectives of Realism in Modern Philosophy” (M., 2017). The exposition of areas in which the authors of this book study the problems of realism, as well as those arguments in its defense that they offer, is given. A criticism of these arguments is presented, according to which all of them are not able to convince an antirealist to abandon their views in favor of realism. The question of whether realists and anti-realists have the same object of discussion and what could become a common ground for them is explored. The author suggests that an appeal to language can become such a common ground and reproduces Frege’s argument against skeptics and idealists as a possible methodological justification for realism.
editorial
19. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Ilya T. Kasavin Илья Теодорович Касавин
Knowledge and Reality in the Historical Epistemology
Знание и реальность в исторической эпистемологии

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The article gives a generalized view of the historical epistemology and highlights its main problems: the nature of historical reality, historical knowledge and historical agent. The historical epistemology represents a special philosophical discourse, the purpose of which is constructing historical knowledge for cultural assimilation of the new historical reality at the intersection of science and society. A distinction is proposed between the position of a historian of science and a historical epistemologist in terms of the essence of historical event and historical fact. The historical epistemology reveals its boundaries and a position within modern epistemological approaches. On the one hand, it is the substantialist interpretation of the historical event, which loses its a priori status only by socio-epistemological explanation. On the other hand, a figure of the historical agent (hero and author) keeping the status of a theoretical fiction in historical epistemology, acquires the adequate meaning in the existential philosophy of science.
panel discussion
20. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Sergei Yu. Shevchenko Сергей Юрьевич Шевченко
Incline and Admonish: Epistemic Injustice and Counter-Expertise
Презирать и подсказывать

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The article deals with the forms of epistemic injustice associated with the scentization of expertise, its locking in a separate scientific discipline. Counter-expertise is directed against deprivation of the right to speak out about one's own interests which is the most common form of epistemic injustice. But the most radical form is related to the comprehension of other’s phenomenal experience as a derivative of the parameters measured by expert. In this regard, the concept of embodiment can play a crucial role both in preventing epistemic injustice and in overcoming the crisis of expertise.