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Displaying: 1-10 of 1681 documents


articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Justin Morton Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?
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Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet it, successfully replying to the objections without relying on the problematic kinds of substantive moral claims. Theists have a distinctive and plausible reply to epistemological objections to moral (and, in fact, normative) realism.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Jon W. Thompson Divine Idealism as Physicalism? Reflections on the Structural Definition of Physicalism
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Hempel’s Dilemma remains at the center of the problem of defining physicalism. In brief, the dilemma asks whether physicalism should be defined by appeal to current or future physics. If defined by current physics, physicalism is almost certainly false. If defined by an ideal future physics, then physicalism has little determinable content. Montero and Papineau have innovatively suggested that the dilemma may be avoided by defining physicalism structurally. While their definition is one among many definitions, it is significant in that—if successful—it would break the impasse for defining physicalism. I argue, however, that the structural definition fails because it counts metaphysical frameworks (crucially, versions of divine idealism) as “physicalist”—an unwelcome result for physicalists. This paper thus furthers the debate on the definition of physicalism and sheds light on the relationship between physicalism and idealism.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Robert C. Roberts Is Kierkegaard a “Virtue Ethicist”?
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Several readers of Kierkegaard have proposed that his works are a good source for contemporary investigations of virtues, especially theistic and Christian ones. Sylvia Walsh has recently offered several arguments to cast doubt on the thesis that Kierkegaard can be profitably read as a “virtue ethicist.” Examination of her arguments helps to clarify what virtues, as excellent traits of human character, can be in a moral outlook that ascribes deep sin and moral helplessness to human beings and their existence and salvation entirely to God’s grace. The examination also clarifies the relationship between virtues and character and between the practices of virtue ethics and character ethics. Such clarification also may provide a bridge of communication between Kierkegaard scholarship and scholars of virtue ethics beyond the theistic communities. In particular, I’ll argue that a character ethics that is not a virtue ethics would be suboptimal as an aid to the formation of Christian wisdom and sanctification. Kierkegaard’s character ethics is a virtue ethics.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Hugh Burling The Reference of “God” Revisited
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I argue that the reference for “God” is determined by the definite description “the being that is worthy of our worship.” I describe two desiderata for rival theories of the reference of “God” to meet: accessibility and scope. I explain the deficiencies of a view where God is dubbed “God” and the name passed down by causal chains and a view where “God” picks out the unique satisfier of a traditional definite description. After articulating the “Worship-Worthiness” view, I show how it best satisfies the desiderata. I then respond to some putative counterexamples to the view.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Frederick Choo The Prior Obligations Objection to Theological Stateism
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Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection.
book reviews
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Gregory E. Ganssle Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism, edited by Benjamin H. Arbour
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7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Kate Finley Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation, by Scott Davison
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Dustin Crummett Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism, edited by Klaas Kraay
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Chris Tweedt Faith and Humility, by Jonathan Kvanvig
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Michael Thune God, Science, and Religious Diversity: A Defense of Theism, by Robert T. Lehe
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