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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Mark Schroeder Sins of Thought
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According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Andrew Law The Dependence Response and Explanatory Loops
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There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves the way for a new reply to a compelling objection to the dependence response, the challenge from prepunishment. But perhaps not so serendipitously, the argument also renders the dependence response incompatible with certain views of providence.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Katherin A. Rogers An Anselmian Approach to Divine Simplicity
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The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is an important aspect of the classical theism of philosophers like Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas. Recently the doctrine has been defended in a Thomist mode using the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. I argue that this approach entails problems which can be avoided by taking Anselm’s more Neoplatonic line. This does involve accepting some controversial claims: for example, that time is isotemporal and that God inevitably does the best. The most difficult problem involves trying to reconcile created libertarian free will with the Anselmian DDS. But for those attracted to DDS the Anselmian approach is worth considering.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Todd DeRose Empirically Skeptical Theism
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Inspired by Peter van Inwagen’s “simulacra model” of the resurrection, I investigate whether it could be reasonable to adopt an analogous approach to the problem of evil. Empirically Skeptical Theism, as I call it, is the hypothesis that God shields our lives from irredeemable evils surreptitiously (just as van Inwagen proposes that God shields our bodies from destruction surreptitiously). I argue that EST compares favorably with traditional skeptical theism and with eschatological theodicies, and that EST does not have the negative moral consequences we might suppose.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Ben Page Arguing to Theism from Consciousness
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I provide an argument from consciousness for God’s existence. I first consider a version of the argument which is ultimately difficult to evaluate. I then consider a stronger argument, on which consciousness, given our worldly laws of nature, is rather substantial evidence for God’s existence. It is this latter argument the paper largely focuses on, both in setting it out and defending it from various objections.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Elijah Hess, Alan Rhoda Is an Open Infinite Future Impossible? A Reply to Pruss
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Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle certain statements about infinite futures in a mathematically or religiously adequate manner. We argue that, once the distinction between being true and becoming true is applied to such statements, it is evident that they pose no problem for Open Futurists.
reviews
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
W. Matthews Grant Peter Furlong, The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Simon Kittle W. Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb Anne Jeffrey, God and Morality
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Kirk Lougheed John Pittard, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment
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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Peter Furlong Leigh Vicens and Simon Kittle, God and Human Freedom
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