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1. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Józef Bremer, Mariusz Flasiński The Turing Test, or a Misuse of Language when Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines
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In this paper we discuss the views on the Turing test of four influential thinkers who belong to the tradition of analytic philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Noam Chomsky, Hilary Putnam and John Searle. Based on various beliefs about philosophical and/or linguistic matters, they arrive at different assessments of both the significance and suitability of the imitation game for the development of cognitive science and AI models. Nevertheless, they share a rejection of the idea that one can treat Turing test as a test for “machine thinking.” This seems to stem from a concern for the proper use of language—one that is a fundamental methodological commitment of analytic philosophy.
2. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Babalola Joseph Balogun Resolving the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds through the Identity-Based Model: A Critique of Christopher Peacocke’s “Interlocking Account”
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Christopher Peacocke’s Interlocking Account offers an example of the identity-based strategy for resolving the conceptual problem of other minds. According to the Identity Model, the sameness of meaning of a mental concept across inter-subjective domains is guaranteed by the sameness of the mental states to which the concept refers. Hence, for example, the meaning of the concept “pain” is fixed by the sameness of the sensation of pain to which the concept refers across inter-subjective fields. As an instance of this model, the Interlocking Account draws its most fundamental strength from the claim that human beings are similar in so far as they are carriers of conscious mental states, and that similar mental concepts have similar mental contents across individuals. The implication of this is that when similar mental concepts are used to describe contents of experience by different persons, the meanings of the concepts used are fixed by the similarity of the contents of experience to which the concepts refer. This paper argues that this identity-based strategy fails for three main reasons: (1) the identity relation it purports to establish between one’s own case and those of others is difficult to achieve; (2) the sense in which the relation of one's mind and those of others exhibits that identity is not clear; and (3) it is an argument by analogy in disguise.
3. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Kingsley Mbamara Sabastine Methods of Practising Christian Philosophy: Stanisław Kamiński’s Approach
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The concept of Christian Philosophy is not new in the history of philosophy. However, since the mid-twentieth century the idea of Christian Philosophy gained momentum and has become an object of explicit discussion among philosophers. The historical circumstances leading to its emergence as a distinct type of philosophy are not here discussed, and the existence of Christian Philosophy with a distinct content and purpose that sets it apart from other philosophies is here presupposed. Instead, the paper focuses on the concept and methods of practising Christian Philosophy with specific reference to the methodology developed by Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986). The paper argues for the suitability of his method of philosophising within the context of Christian Philosophy. Kamiński proposes a unique style that is strictly philosophical but also Christian. This methodology was based on the classical theory of being which fulfils the demand for the autonomy of philosophy but in relationship to faith. Kamiński’s doctrinal standpoints in philosophy are rational, objective, and universal. But is also most friendly and compatible with the Christian faith. In this sense, one can speak of his Christian philosophy and the suitability of his methodology for the practice of Christian philosophy.
4. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Wojciech Szczerba There and Back Again as a Free Person: Philosophical Shades of Freedom on the Walls of Plato’s Cave in the Thought of Heidegger and Arendt
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The article refers to the issue of freedom from a philosophical perspective. First of all, it discusses Plato’s metaphor of the cave in Politeia, in which the philosopher writes of freedom in its individual and collective forms. Then the article indicates how the metaphor was read by such contemporary philosophers as Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, who interpret Plato’s metaphor from existential-phenomenological and political perspectives. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. A person, who experienced the truth as un-concealment, is not enslaved anymore to the impersonality of the crowd. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of freedom is shown in his care for others, even if it means risking one’s life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right forcefully to pull them out of the cavern? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob? In this way Arendt refers to the concept of freedom, as it is sketched in Plato’s cave. At the same time, she argues with Heidegger’s interpretation of the Platonic metaphor.
5. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Piotr Duchliński, Piotr Stanisław Mazur Transcendentalising Reduction: The Heuristic Role of the Phenomenological Epoché in the Metaphysics of Existential Thomism
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The aim of this article is to outline the concept of transcendentalising reduction and demonstrate its role in Thomistic metaphysics. The proposed analysis puts forward an adaptive interpretation involving the application of phenomenological thinking, based on a reduction to Thomistic metaphysics via the notion of epoché. This is used to present the structure of the transcendentalising reduction, in which the epoché takes several different forms. Consistently applied, such a reduction can be expected to lead to a neutralised concept of being as the subject of metaphysics, expressed in the formula “being as being.” In conclusion, we note that the proposed interpretation opens the door to further research, in which phenomenology could be applied in the context of metaphysical studies to a greater extent than has been the case to date.
book reviews
6. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Kamila Drapało Małgorzata Hołda. On Beauty and Being: Hans-Georg Gadamer’s and Virginia Woolf’s Hermeneutics of the Beautiful
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7. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Note about Forum Philosophicum
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