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Displaying: 1-17 of 17 documents

1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Heide Göttner Theorienstruktur in der Literaturwissenschaft
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In diesem Artikel wird skizziert, wie sich mithilfe der Kuhn-Sneedschen Wissenschaftstheorie literaturwissenschaftliche Theorien ihrer logischen Struktur nach analysieren und systematisch darstellen lassen. Die systematische Darstellung läßt sich von den zentralen theoretischen Prämissen bis zu den einzelnen Verwendungen einer Literaturtheorie durchführen, wobei an das mengentheoretische Verfahren Sneeds das satzanalytische Poppers angeschlossen wird. Dabei werden zwei Fragen andeutungsweise geklärt: Erstens wird das Verhältnis von Literaturtheorie und Hypothesenbildung der literaturwissenschaftlichen Einzeluntersuchungen näher bestimmt, zweitens das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis der Hypothesen, des Gegenstandsbereichs und der Methodiken von der Literaturtheorie genauer untersucht.
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Ota Weinberger Interpretation und Zielsetzung: Betrachtungen zum Problem der Eigenart der juristischen interpretation
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Der Autor unterscheidet nicht nur Schichten der Semiotik, sondern auch syntaktische, semantische und pragmatische Sprachen. Bei diesen kann durch Interpretation eine Modifikation der Bedeutung von Ausdrücken eintreten. Interpretation ist die Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Ausdrücken einer pragmatischen Sprache. Die hermeneutische Methodik wird der hermeneutischen Philosophie gegenübergestellt. Als bedeutungsbestimmende Momente werden diskutiert: sprachliche Operationen, Wissen und Vorwissen, die gnoseologische Analyse der Problemsituation, die Funktion von Deutungsschemen, die Ich-Perspektive der Deutung, volitive Momente und Zielsetzung der Deutung. Die juristische Interpretation wird als Interpretation unter Zwecken dargestellt.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Joseph Margolis Knowledge and Belief; Facts and Propositions
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The principal claims supported include: (i) that 'believe' and 'know' take the same grammatical object 'that p'; (ii) that each may take grammatical objects that the other cannot take; (iii) that merely grammatical considerations cannot determine whether 'that p' designates a proposition or a fact; (iv) that, on an epistemically relevant interpretation, 'that p' may be construed either as designating a proposition or a fact or both; (v) that propositions and facts are correlative and heuristic entities. The issues are developed in the context of exploring chiefly the views of Zeno Vendler, Alan White, and Peter Geach. Complications bearing on the distinction between thought and speech are considered.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Wolfgang Lenzen Knowledge, Belief, Existence, and Quantifiers: A Note on Hintikka
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Die Diskussion des in Hintikkas Knowledge and Belief entwickelten Systems epistemischer Logik hat gezeigt, daß einige fundamentale, intuitiv außer Frage stehende Prinzipien zu unerwarteten Schwierigkeiten führen. Hier wird nun nachzuweisen versucht, daß diese Schwierigkeiten nicht den informellen Prinzipien anzulasten sind, sondern Hintikkas Behandlung der Existenz. Speziell wird gezeigt, daß die fraglichen Probleme sich dadurch lösen lassen, daß man allgemein über "mögliche Objekte", und nicht nur über tatsächlich existierende Gegenstände quantifiziert.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Petra von Morstein Über Wahrnehmung von Aspekten
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Unter the general heading of 'as-experiences' (to see X as Y) a distinction is drawn between epistemologically neutral (N-experiences) and epistemologically bound (B-experiences). N- and B-experiences move across the scale of O- and S-experiences; the distinction between 0- and S-experiences is a distinction in degree with regard to the subject's involvement in as-experiences. Constitutive and non-constitutive aspects are distinguished, and a conceptual connection is shown between constitutive aspects of an object and Rylean categories.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Reinhardt Grossmann The Factuality of Facts
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It is argued that, while there is no such property as truth, there is a feature of factuality which certain states of affairs have and others lack. Since states of affairs can appear before the mind as having this feature when, in reality, they do not have it, a most difficult epistemological problem arises, namely, how to distinguish between a state of affairs which merely appears to have factuality and a state of affairs which really is factual. The test for factuality, it is maintained, is twofold. It consists, on the one hand, of perception and introspection, and on the other, of coherence. What we perceive and introspect is not only presented to us as factual, but justifiedly taken to be factual. In case of doubt, though, we cannot but fall back on coherence, comparing some of our beliefs, perceptions, assumptions etc. with others.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
John M. Vickers On the Phenomenology of Partial Judgment
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The main sources here are Hume, Husserl, and De Finetti. The problem is how phenomenological investigation has to do with partial or probabilistic judgment. Behavioristic, frequentist and subjectivistic views are briefly surveyed. A variant of Hume's account of the probability of chances is developed with the help of De Finetti's concept of exchangeability. The question of transcendental elements in or behind partial judgment is considered in the light of understanding disagreement and error in partial judgment.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
John Woods Ad Baculum
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In an attempt to overcome the traditional casual neglect of the study of the informal fallacies, we here treat one fallacy, the ad baculum, at an adequate theoretical level in order to determine how it may best be understood as a fallacy. We conclude, after following through a number of plausible routes of tracking down the essential fallaciousness of the ad baculum, that the type of phenomenon apparently so typically thought to constitute ad baculum by the texts is not, so far as we can tell, an instance of a logical fallacy.
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Eike von Savigny Das normative Fundament der Sprache: Ja und Aber
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There are at least two vital restrictions on setting out to construct a common language independently of any natural language: 1. Laying down rules for a common language makes use of rules for stipulating uses of words and/or for pointing at things, rules that should, in their turn, count as rules of language. 2. The classification schemes to be proposed must be learnable for men. "Ostensive definition" of predicates is no kind of definition at all, but a way of teaching, and useful as such precisely because most classification systems are not learnable. So if language has a normative foundation, this is not so because its rules have been or might ideally have been reasonably laid down, but because it is governed by rules that could not possibly be all laid down in complete liberty.
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Hans Lenk Handlungsgraphen: Graphentheoretische Modelle i n der analytischen Handlungsphilosophie
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Goldman (1971) analyzed interrelations between act-statements by inducing a structure by means of the relationship by, e.g.: "He turned on the light by flipping the switch." Generally, the structure is represented by act-diagrams, e.g. act-trees. In the present article the mathematical theory of directed graphs (digraphs), specifically the concepts of partially or strictly ordered sets, graph-theoretical trees, semi-lattices etc. are shown to be applicable and conducive to the formal and a more general description of networks of act statements generated by a (relative) basic actionstatement and by the relation by. The well-known problem of identity of acts described by corresponding statements connected by by is differentiated by introducing the graph-theoretical equivalence relation of belonging to the same-graph {graph-sameness or graph-identity) admitting of a more refined classification and logical description of the interdependence of actions, acttypes, act-properties etc.
11. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Reinhold Bichler 'Intentionale Erklärungen': Kritische Gedanken zu Henrik von Wrights Sicht der Erklärung
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G. H. V. Wright möchte die 'typische' Erklärung des Historikers als andersartig gegenüber der subsumptionstheoretischen Auffassung betrachten. Neu dabei ist sein Bemühen, das Schema des praktischen Schlusses als Basis der 'intentionalen Erklärung', die seiner Ansicht nach für die Geschichtswissenschaft charakteristisch ist, in den Vordergrund zu stellen. Doch scheitert sein Versuch, von der Handlungstheorie her ein Erklärungsschema aufzubauen, das logisch als Syllogismus erscheinen, aber ohne generelle Prämissen (über Korrelationen von 'Motivationshintergrund' und Handlung) auskommen soll. Die in der weiteren Diskussion (W. Stegmüller u.a.) herausgestellte Möglichkeit, 'Erklären' in der Historie als eine Art Motiv-Analyse aufzufassen und von der Kausalanalyse zu trennen, kann m.E. zu einer Beschränkung der Forschungs- und Argumentationsmöglichkeiten in der Geschichtswissenschaft führen.
review articles
12. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Reinhard Kamitz Logischer Empirismus - der Wiener Kreis
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13. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Stephan Körner Die Voraussetzungen der Transzendentalphilosophie: Kant in weltanschauungsanalytischer Beleuchtung
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14. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Lothar Eley Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding
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15. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
Herbert Schnädelbach Analytische Geschichtsphilosophie: Eine kritische Einfiihrung
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16. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
John B. Bacon The Nature of Necessity
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17. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 2
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